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Chapter 1
General Introduction
Many important questions in macroeconomics, in particular policy-related ones,
call for quantitative answers. Quantitative macroeconomists address such questions
by applying their models to real world economies. They use calibrated models as
laboratories and employ computational experiments to study the issue of interest.
Kydland and Prescott (1996, p. 69) describe this approach as follows:
“In a computational experiment, the researcher starts by posing a well-
defined quantitative question. Then the researcher uses both theory
and measurement to construct a model economy that is a computer
representation of a national economy. A model economy consists of
households, firms and often a government. The people in the model economy
make economic decisions that correspond to those of their counterparts in
the real world. ... The researcher then calibrates the model economy so that
it mimics the world along a carefully specified set of dimensions. Finally,
the computer is used to run experiments that answer the question.”
This dissertation consists of three essays that deal with macroeconomic topics
and are linked by a common method, the computational experiment. The essays
give answers to quantitative questions on the post-war U.S. macroeconomy. Two
essays evaluate episodes of contemporary economic policy: namely, the role of the
Ford/Carter deregulation for the productivity growth resurgence in the early 1990s
and the contribution of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 to the housing boom of the
2000s. Another essay deals with the connection between business cycle fluctuations and
1
2economic growth during the post-war period. The essay also contributes to a discussion
about policy proposals of countercyclical R&D subsidies. In the remainder, I provide
a brief summary of each essay.
In Chapter 2, which is co-authored with Georg Du¨rnecker, we study macroeconomic
effects of the Ford/Carter deregulation of U.S. product markets. This essay is
motivated by the fact that the U.S. economy experienced a significant and persistent
rise in the rate of investment-specific technical change (ISTC) in the early 1980s.
This acceleration which was mainly due to the intensified adoption and usage of
new information and communication technologies has boosted economic growth in
recent decades. The macroeconomic consequences of faster ISTC are well understood.
However, little is known about its origins. In this essay, we argue that the U.S.
product market deregulation, as initiated by the Ford/Carter Administrations in
the late 1970s, contributed to the acceleration of ISTC. We document that this
acceleration is especially pronounced for deregulated industries which also show faster
labor productivity growth. We develop a multi-sector general equilibrium model of
endogenous ISTC that features imperfect competition and a technology choice by firms.
The framework is used to study industry and macroeconomic effects of competition
policy and to quantitatively assess to what extent the Ford/Carter regulatory reforms
can account for the observed acceleration of ISTC and the subsequent divergence of
labor productivity across U.S. industries. The quantitative experiment generates more
than two thirds of the acceleration in ISTC for the deregulated industries and about a
quarter of the divergence of labor productivities across industries.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the effects of business cycle fluctuations on R&D
activities and long-run growth. The question is whether recessions really foster
economic growth. On the one hand, an opportunity cost argument suggests that
recessions are ideal times to undergo R&D aimed at enhancing productivity. On the
other hand, empirical measures of U.S. R&D activity are procyclical. To resolve this
discrepancy, I propose a calibrated real business cycle model featuring R&D-based
growth through horizontal innovations. The model is used to quantitatively analyze
growth implications of business cycle shocks under various specifications of the R&D
process. I find that the specification of R&D inputs is essential for the cyclicality of
R&D activities. First, the popular knowledge-driven specification of R&D has a hard
3time to generate both procyclical R&D investment and procyclical R&D labor at the
same time. Second, the calibrated multi-input specification generates procyclical R&D
investment as well as procyclical employment of scientists and engineers. In addition,
the endogenous growth mechanism gives rise to amplification of business cycle shocks.
Thus, booms promote productivity growth.
In Chapter 4, which is joint work with Tom Krebs and Mark Wright, we ask to
what extent government policy, namely the U.S. tax reform of 1997, has contributed
to the recent boom in the U.S. residential housing market. In the period 1997-2007,
the following developments took place in the U.S.: first, house prices and mortgage
volume increased strongly, but mortgage volume increased faster than house prices so
that the loan-to-value ratio increased. Second, delinquency rates fell. In this essay, we
develop a macro model with a housing sector to conduct a quantitative analysis of
the 1997 tax reform. First, using a calibrated version of the model economy, we argue
that the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which eliminated taxes on capital gains from the
sale of residential housing for most households, can account for a substantial part of
these developments in the U.S. housing market. With higher after-tax gains from the
purchase of housing, agents are less likely to default on their mortgages which increases
both the demand and supply of credit for housing and hence helps us understand the
simultaneous increase in the loan-to-value ratio and decline in mortgage default rates
observed over the period 1997-2007. Second, we consider a hypothetical tax reform
that taxes capital gains on home sales at the same rate that all other capital gains are
taxed without any exemptions. We find that this tax reform would have reduced house
prices, mortgage debt, and the loan-to-value ratio. Altogether, implementing this repeal
of housing tax-breaks instead of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 would have dampened
the observed rise in house prices by about 20 percent.
Lastly, let me remark that all chapters of this Ph.D. thesis are written as
independent essays. Each chapter contains its own introduction and appendices that
provide supplementary materials such as additional graphs and tables as well as data
sources. Hence, the essays can be read in any order. References from all three chapters
can be found in one bibliography at the end of this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Macroeconomic Effects of the U.S.
Product Market Deregulation1
2.1 Introduction
In the early 1980s the U.S. economy experienced a substantial and persistent rise
in the rate of investment-specific technical change (ISTC). Evidence provided by
Cummins and Violante (2002); Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000); Pakko
(2002b,c); and others suggests that until the 1970s investment-specific technical change
was fairly stable between 3% and 4% but it started to accelerate in the early 1980s
leading to annual rates of more than 6% in the subsequent decades.2 This acceleration
in ISTC was the main driver of the U.S. growth resurgence in the 1990s.3 However,
little is known about its origins.
At about the same time, labor productivity across U.S. industries started to
diverge: industries of the communications, energy, finance, and transportation sectors
experienced a considerable hike in productivity growth. On average, their growth rate
rose by more than 3% percentage points in the 1980s and 1990s while other private
industries continued to grow at an annual rate of 1%. Consequently, those industries
contributed substantially to the U.S. growth resurgence. Remarkably, communications,
energy, finance, and transportation were prime target of the regulatory reforms of the
1This chapter is joint work with Georg Du¨rnecker.
2Structural-break tests by Pakko (2005) provide overwhelming evidence for a breakpoint in 1983.
3E.g., Cummins and Violante (2002); Mart´ınez, Rodr´ıguez, and Torres (2010); Pakko (2002c, 2005).
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6Ford and Carter Administrations.
This observation suggests the question whether a change in competition policy is
able to explain a such rise in productivity growth. To this end, we propose a general
equilibrium multi-sector model of endogenous investment-specific technical change and
study industry and macroeconomic effects of competition policy. We use a version of
the model economy calibrated to U.S. data to assess quantitatively to which extent the
Ford/Carter regulatory reforms can account for the observed acceleration of ISTC and
the subsequent divergence of labor productivity in the U.S.
The present study contributes in three respects: first, we empirically document
that those industries that were deregulated in the late 1970s performed fundamentally
differently in the subsequent decades than those not directly affected by the
Ford/Carter reforms. In particular, deregulated industries experienced faster
investment-specific technical change and substantially higher labor productivity growth
than the rest of the U.S. economy. One reason is that they reduced their technological
backwardness by replacing old capital with state-of-the-art equipment.
Second, we provide a general equilibrium multi-sector model framework to
investigate industry and macroeconomic effects of competition policy. In the model,
deregulation of entry restrictions encourages new competitors to enter the products
market. Intensified competition leads to lower prices and expanding production. Firms
install additional capital which fosters R&D activities to improve investment goods.
Investment-specific technical change accelerates and, hence, labor productivity grows
at a higher rate.
Third, our quantitative experiment finds that about 70% of the observed
acceleration in ISTC for the deregulated industries and almost a fifth of the
overall acceleration for the U.S. economy can be explained by the Ford/Carter
reforms. Furthermore, deregulation leads to a divergence of labor productivities across
industries, as in the data.
In a seminal paper, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) find that the
introduction of new, more efficient capital goods is the major source of U.S. post-
war growth. Besides, the observed acceleration in ISTC called forth vivid interest. A
large literature discusses its consequences for various macroeconomic outcomes. Among
the more recent contributions are Krusell, Ohanian, Rı´os-Rull, and Violante (2000)
7studying the rise in the skill premium; Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2007) focusing
on policy outcomes; Duernecker (2013) studying the divergence of unemployment rates;
and Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) addressing the rise in labor market frictions. This
essay proposes a cause.4
In addition, the current study contributes to the literature investigating the
macroeconomic effects of deregulation such as Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)
examining the interaction of product market and labor market regulations, Bertinelli,
Cardi, and Sen (2013); Ebell and Haefke (2009); Fang and Rogerson (2011) studying
effects of deregulation on labor market outcomes, and Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti, and
Schiantarelli (2005); Barone and Cingano (2011); Dawson and Seater (2013); Nicoletti
and Scarpetta (2003) estimating growth effects. One of the main differences is that
our essay considers a multi-industry framework similar to Ngai and Samaniego (2009)
which allows us to model industry-specific deregulation and investigate inter-industry
input-output linkages.
It is also related to the large literature on the relationship between competition
and innovation (e.g. Klette and Griliches (2000); Vives (2008) in partial equilibrium,
and Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005); Aghion, Harris, Howitt,
and Vickers (2001) in general equilibrium). However, these papers focus on in-house
R&D and process innovation by product market firms while this essay considers R&D
activities that are outsourced and lead to investment-specific technical change.
The rest of this essay is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a summary of the
regulatory reforms under presidents Ford and Carter. Section 3 presents a set of
macroeconomic developments of the U.S. economy during the 1980s and 1990s. Section
4 sets up the model. Section 5 calibrates the model, describes our policy experiment,
and reports the findings. Section 6 summarizes the essay and offers some concluding
comments.
4So far, little is known about the origins of this acceleration in ISTC. Boucekkine, del R´ıo, and
Licandro (2003), who a study two-sector learning-by-doing model, find that an exogenous change
in learning efficiency favoring investment goods over consumption goods could explain faster ISTC.
However, they do not provide an explanation for such an ”technological reassignment” in the late
1970s.
82.2 U.S. Product Market Deregulation
In the late 1970s and early 1980s a wave of regulatory reforms affected the U.S.
economy. Within less than a decade presidents Ford, Carter, and – to a lesser extent –
Reagan liberalized virtually every previously regulated sector of the American economy.
Originating from a novel attitude towards economic regulation, this regulatory reform
movement marked an extraordinary turning point in U.S. economic policy.5
The reforms addressed both the nature and extent of regulation. Output restrictions
were given up, rate-of-return regulation came to an end, price controls were abolished,
licensing was replaced by free entry, and regulatory agencies like the Civil Aeronautics
Board or the Federal Power Commission were closed down (Joskow and Noll, 1994;
Weiss and Klass, 1986). Most affected by this liberalization of regulatory restrictions
are the following industries: communications, energy, finance, and transportation. Table
2.1 provides an overview of those regulatory reforms by industry. Joskow and Noll
(1994); Weiss and Klass (1986); Winston (1993, 1998) portray the regulatory changes
in detail. Distilling their accounts of deregulation, we conclude that in the 1970s entry
restrictions were an omnipresent measure of regulation. Subsequently, groundbreaking
regulatory changes have altered industry structures, operation practices, and pricing
conditions.
Basically, the market conditions under which about one sixth of U.S. GDP were
produced changed completely. But these industries did not only produce 16% of GDP
and employ 12% of the labor force before the reforms took place. Rather, about 55% of
their output was input to other U.S. industries, making up 22% of total intermediate
inputs. This suggests that deregulated industries were well connected to the whole
U.S. economy. Hence, input-output relationships might be an important channel for
spillover effects.
The fact that liberalizing operations, pricing, entry and exit has permeated broad
fields of the American economy is also reflected in the OECD regulatory indicators.
Consisting of five sub-indicators, the OECD constructs a measure for the intensity of
5Winston (1993, p. 1263) assesses the economic deregulation of American industry as ”one of the
most important experiments in economic policy of our time”.
9Table 2.1: Regulatory reform
Industry Regulatory Agenciesa Regulatory Changes Major Initiatives
Airlines Civil Aeronautics Board
(1985)
phased out route regu-
lation, eliminated regula-
tions on fares
CAB initiatives (mid 1970s),
Airline Deregulation Act
(1978)
Passenger
Transit
Interstate Commerce
Commission (1996)
relaxed entry controls,
freed up rates, abolished
some types of collective
rate making
Federal Bus Regulatory Re-
form Act (1982)
Shipping Federal Maritime Com-
mission
permitted independent
rate making
Ocean Shipping Act (1984)
Road
trans-
port
Interstate Commerce
Commission (1996), state
agencies
rates could be set in-
dependently but had to
be filed, entry restrictions
were eliminated
ICC initiatives (late 1970s),
Motor Carrier Reform Act
(1980)
Railroads Interstate Commerce
Commission (1996)
liberalization of rates and
contracting, permission to
abandon routes and of
mergers
ICC initiatives (late 1970s),
Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act
(1976), Staggers Rail Act
(1980)
Telecom-
munica-
tions
Federal Communications
Commission, state agen-
cies
industry restructuring,
deregulation of equipment
prices and long distance
rates, open entry
Agency initiatives, Court De-
cisions (by mid 1970s), Exe-
cunet Decision (1977), AT&T
Settlement (1982)
Cable
Tele-
vision
Federal Communications
Commission, municipali-
ties
price deregulation FCC initiatives (late 1970s),
Cable Television Deregula-
tion Act (1984)
Brokerage Securities and Exchange
Commission
outlawed fixed brokerage
rates
Securities Acts Amendments
(1975)
Banking Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation
(1989), Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation,
Federal Reserve Board,
Comptroller of the
Currency
eliminated interest rate
ceilings, deregulated
deposit services,
liberalized investment
portfolios, permitted
interstate bank branching
and commercial bank
ownership of subsidiaries
in investment banking
Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act (1980), Garn-
St. Germain Act (1982),
Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act (1989)
Petroleum Federal Energy Adminis-
tration
phased out controls on
domestic crude oil prices
executive orders (beginning
in 1979)
Natural
Gas
Federal Power Commis-
sion (1977), Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commis-
sion, state agencies
deregulation of field
prices, created open
access to interconnected
grid, unbundling of gas
supplies, contractual
revisions
Agency initiatives, Natural
Gas Policy Act (1978), Fuel
Use Act (1978)
Electric
power
Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission, state
agencies
deregulation of field
prices, created open
access to interconnected
grid, unbundling of gas
supplies, contractual
revisions
Public Utility Regulatory Act
(1982)
a Year of dissolution in parentheses.
Sources: Joskow and Noll (1994); OECD (1999); Weiss and Klass (1986); Winston (1993, 1998)
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Figure 2.1: OECD Regulation Indicators
Notes: The Regulation Impact Indicator is computed at the industry level. We illustrate the median
value of the Regulation Impact Indicator for every year.
Data Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation Database.
product market regulation in the energy, communications, and transportation sector
(Conway and Nicoletti, 2006).6 Furthermore, the OECD provides a Regulation Impact
Indicator measuring how other industries are affected by regulation in the energy,
communications, and transportation sector through input-output relations.
Figure 2.1 illustrates these indicators. Both the aggregate Product Market
Regulation Indicator and the Regulation Impact Indicator show a declining trend with
two pronounced drops: the Ford/Carter/Reagan and the Clinton deregulation. The
three sub-indicators for public ownership, market structure, and entry barriers show a
similar evolution. In particular, entry barriers were substantially reduced, most notably
around 1979 and 1984.
Ebell and Haefke (2009), for example, estimate hat entry costs in the late 1970s
were about the ninefold of their late-1990s level.7 Finally, an international comparison
of the OECD indicators reveals that the U.S. were in the vanguard of the deregulation
6The scale from 0 to 6 reflects increasing restrictiveness of regulatory provisions. The sub-indicators
are: entry barriers, public ownership, market structure, vertical integration, and price controls.
7Following a similar approach, Bertinelli, Cardi, and Sen (2013) estimate a relationship between
the aggregate PMR indicator and price-cost margins. Their results suggest that the average price-cost
margin in U.S. declined by 5.3 percentage points since the late 1970s to about 1.5.
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movement.
2.3 Macroeconomic Developments
This section documents the long-run development of several macroeconomic outcomes
in the U.S. The main message is that those industries that were deregulated in the
late 1970s experienced a fundamentally different evolution subsequently than those
not directly affected by the Ford/Carter reforms.
One development which has attracted a lot of attention in the literature is the
acceleration of investment-specific technical change in the U.S.8 It is a well-documented
fact that there was a substantial and persistent rise in the rate of ISTC by about 2.5
percentage points in the early 1980s (Cummins and Violante, 2002; Pakko, 2002c,
2005).9 Reporting the Cummins and Violante (2002) data, the first row of Table 2.2.A
illustrates this acceleration.
In addition, we establish that the acceleration of ISTC was more powerful in
deregulated industries than in the rest of the U.S. economy. To this end, we construct
measures of ISTC at the industry level which aggregate asset-specific ISTC rates into
industry-level rates (Table 2.2).10 Between 1960 and 1975 the ISTC rate for deregulated
industries (3.8% p.a.) was lower than for all other private industries (4.4% p.a.).
However, during the 1980s and 1990s deregulated industries experienced an acceleration
by 3.5 percentage points to 7.3% per year, while all other industries increased their
ISTC rate by 2.1 percentage points.11
Interestingly, the sources of this acceleration differ as well, as the decomposition
in Table 2.2.B reveals. Deregulated industries attained high rates of ISTC mainly by
replacing their old equipment capital with state-of-the-art vintages while keeping their
8Cummins and Violante (2002); Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997), for example, find that
investment-specific technical change is one of the major determinants of U.S. productivity growth.
They quantify the contribution of ISTC to post-war growth to approximately 60%.
9Table 2.9 in the Appendix gives a broad overview of the literature documenting this rise in ISTC.
10The aggregation method, a Tornqvist procedure, is described in Appendix 2.C.1.
11We run panel-data regressions to estimate the causal effect of the Ford/Carter deregulation on
the industry rate of ISTC (see Appendix 2.A). The difference-in-difference estimate attributes an
acceleration of 1.3 percentage points to the regulatory reforms. However, we regard this estimate to
be a lower bound since the regression analysis does not allow for spillover effects. Nevertheless, the
regression analysis confirms that deregulated industries experienced a faster acceleration of ISTC than
the rest of the U.S. economy.
12
Table 2.2: Average annual rate of ISTC
A: current investment sharesa B: 1975 investment sharesb
1960-75 1980-89 1990-2000 ∆ 1980-89 1990-2000 ∆
aggregate 4.1 5.0 6.9 +2.8 3.7 4.9 +0.8
de/regulated 3.8 5.2 7.3 +3.5 4.9 6.8 +3.0
others 4.4 4.7 6.5 +2.1 3.1 4.0 -0.4
Aggregate refers to Private industries; de/regulated does not only include de/regulated industries
(Energy and utilities, Communications, Transportation, and Brokers) but also industries ”severely
affected by deregulative reform” according to the OECD Regulatory Impact indicator; other industries
are all remaining private industries.
a We follow the Tornqvist procedure employed by Cummins and Violante (2002) to aggregate asset-
level ISTC rates into industry-level ISTC rates. To compute the asset’s share in industry investment
we use the detailed estimates from BEA’s Fixed Asset Accounts.
b Panel B is computed using a Tornqvist procedure but holding the investment composition fixed at its
1975 shares. That way, we decompose the acceleration of ISTC into two origins: first, an acceleration
due to a shift in investment from low-ISTC to high-ISTC assets. Second, an acceleration purely due
to an acceleration of ISTC in underlying assets. The latter is reported here.
Sources: Cummins and Violante (2002); Bureau of Economic Analysis, Fixed Asset Accounts.
composition of investment stable.12 This way, deregulated industries took advantage
of the acceleration in ISTC of capital assets they use intensively, especially new
information and communication technologies. In contrast, the remaining industries
shifted their investment to high-ISTC assets. This composition effect contributes about
2 percentage points to their ISTC rate (Table 2.2).
At the same time, labor productivity across U.S. industries started to diverge as
Figure 2.2 shows. Average U.S. labor productivity growth was about 1% per year during
the period 1965-1980 and increased to 1.4% p.a. in 1980-1995. This increase was mainly
driven by deregulated industries: their labor productivity growth amounted to 4% p.a.
during the post-deregulation period while other private industries continued to grow at
an annual rate of 1%. Those private industries that obtained more than 20% of their
intermediate inputs from de/regulated industries, in contrast, have grown faster. This
finding suggests that these industries may have benefited from the faster productivity
growth of deregulated industries through input-output linkages.
The simultaneity of this growth acceleration and the Ford/Carter reforms might
point to a causal link such as competitive pressures inducing a battle for technological
12Documenting a reduction their technological gap, Figure 2.3 supports this view.
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Figure 2.2: Labor productivity diverges
Notes: Labor productivity is computed as real value-added per full-time equivalent employee.
Aggregate refers to Private industries; de/regulated industries are Energy and utilities,
Communications, Transportation, and Brokers; affected industries are those private industries that
obtained more than 20 % of their intermediate inputs from de/regulated industries; other industries
are all remaining Private industries.
Data Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA.
leadership. The following pieces of evidence tend to be in line with such a view.
Figure 2.3 compares the technological gaps of U.S. industries for two periods. The
technological gap measures how much more productive new capital goods are compared
to the average vintage.13 The figure reveals that during the pre-deregulation period
the technological gap of deregulated industries was higher than for other industries.
This means, deregulated industries initially operated with technologies more distant
from the technology frontier, leaving scope for technological catch-up. While for all
other industries the technological gap remained stable, the gap closed for deregulated
industries subsequent deregulation, matching the rest of the U.S. economy.
Figure 2.4 suggests that competitive pressures have increased in the U.S. ensuing
the Ford/Carter deregulation. The figure displays estimates of the gross markup
for two periods: 1961-77 and 1983-1994 (see Appendix 2.B). Each bullet depicts a
13Cummins and Violante (2002) define the technology gap Γ between a new machine and the average
machine as the efficiency gap between the leading-edge technology q and average practice Q relative
to the average efficiency level of the corresponding capital stock: Γ = (q −Q)/Q.
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Figure 2.3: Technology gap closes
Notes: Following Cummins and Violante (2002) the technology gap for an industry Γ is computed
as the efficiency gap between the leading-edge technology q and average practice Q relative to the
average efficiency level of the industry’s capital stock: Γ = (q −Q)/Q.
Data Source: Cummins and Violante (2002).
Figure 2.4: Markups
Notes: The figure displays estimates of industry gross markups for two periods: 1961-77 and
1983-1994 (for details see Appendix 2.B). Bullets below the 45◦-line indicate industries that
experienced a decline in markup, while bullets above suggest an increase in markups.
Data Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP-by-Industry Accounts & Fixed Asset Accounts.
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single industry. Most bullets are below the 45◦-line which means that these industries
experienced a decline in the markup after the regulatory reforms. This is particularly
true for the majority of deregulated industries. For them, the gross markup decreased,
on average, by 22 percentage points from 1.92 to 1.71 (Table 2.7 in the Appendix).
Similarly, markups in severely affected industries decline on average by 35 percentage
points, while for the remaining private industries there is essentially no change.
However, these estimates should be treated with caution as the number of observations
is small and standard errors are high.
2.4 The Model
This section develops a multi-sector general equilibrium model of endogenous technical
change. The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived representative household. The
production side of the economy consists of a final good sector, a products sector, and a
R&D sector. The final goods sector competitively assembles an all-purpose numeraire
good from intermediate products.
The products sector consists of a large number of industries. Each industry produces
its own output good using capital, labor, and intermediate inputs. In the model,
governmental regulation raises barriers to entry and leads to imperfect competition
in product markets. We focus on legal and administrative restrictions to entry. The
reason is that only those deregulative measures that decrease the rents required to
enter and stay in the market will permanently be effective in spurring competition, as
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) find.
R&D activities improve the quality of capital goods in the spirit of Aghion and
Howitt (1992); Grossman and Helpman (1991). However, the precise formulation of the
R&D sector is close to Krusell (1998)’s model of endogenous ISTC in which innovations
are embodied in investment goods. This is a simple way to model productivity growth
which is driven by the ongoing development of better equipment.
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2.4.1 Economic Environment
Final good composite. In the economy there is a final good Y which can be used
for consumption purposes C, investment X as well as R&D activities S. Furthermore,
entry costs that might be paid arise in terms of the final good. This final good is a
composite of products which are assembled under perfect competition according to a
Cobb-Douglas aggregator
Y =
I∏
i=1
(yfi )
θYi , θYi ≥ 0 ∀i,
I∑
i=1
θYi = 1 (2.1)
where yfi is final demand of the product produced by industry i. The price index
corresponding to the final good is P Y =
∏I
i=1
(
pi/θ
Y
i
)θYi where pi is the price of
industry i’s output. We choose the final good as the numeraire and normalize P Y = 1.
Hence, the aggregate resource constraint reads as Y = C+X+S+E where E denotes
aggregate entry costs paid.
Products. The economy consists of a large but finite number of industries I. Each
industry i is populated by a finite number of product market firms Ni which produce
a perishable differentiated product yi. This product can be used for final demand y
f
i
or as intermediate input yzi by other industries: yi = y
f
i + y
z
i .
It is produced from capital k, labor h, and intermediate inputs z. The main
difference between intermediate inputs and capital is that the latter is accumulable
and can be used for production for more than one period, whereas the former is non-
storable and gets used up in production. All incumbent firms of an industry operate
according to the same Cobb-Douglas technology
yij = Aik
αki
ij z
αzi
ij h
1−αki−αzi
ij 0 < α
k
i , α
z
i , α
k
i + α
z
i ≤ 1, ∀i (2.2)
where the subscript ij denotes firm j in industry i. Ai > 0 is an industry-specific
productivity parameter. The firm uses intermediate inputs from other industries, each
representing a different input variety. The firm’s total input of intermediate goods is
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denoted by zij. It is given by a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of the different input varieties:
zij =
I∏
l 6=i
(zl,ij)
θzl,i , θzl,i ≥ 0 ∀l 6= i,
I∑
l 6=i
θzl,i = 1 (2.3)
where zl is the quantity of the intermediate input obtained from sector l.
The firm’s capital stock is not homogeneous but it consists of different varieties
of capital goods such as computers, machines, structures, etc. A particular variety is
denoted by ν ∈ {1, ..., ν¯} where ν¯ denotes the total number of varieties available. Total
capital input k is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of the different varieties employed by the
firm:
kij =
ν¯∏
ν=1
(kν,ij)
θkν,i θkν,i ≥ 0 ∀ν,
ν¯∑
ν=1
θkν,i = 1 (2.4)
where kν is the quantity of variety ν and θ
k
ν,i is the associated weight. As there is
investment-specific technical change, capital stocks are measured in efficiency units.
This means, that xν,t units of investment contribute φν,t · xν,t effective units to the
capital stock, where φν,t is the quality of period t investment goods. The capital stock
depreciates at rate δν . Hence, the law of motion of the firm’s capital stock of variety ν
reads:
kν,ij,t+1 = (1− δν)kν,ij,t + φν,ij,t · xν,ij,t ∀ν (2.5)
Product market incumbents. Consider any product market incumbent in an
industry. The incumbent’s state consists of the capital stocks he owns: {kν,t}ν¯ν=1.
However, his state is sufficiently characterized by the composite of capital services
kt.
It is convenient to break the decision problem of a product market incumbent into
two pieces: static and dynamic. The static part involves hiring labor and purchasing
intermediate inputs in order to produce as well as competing in Cournot quantity
competition for sales, taking the firm’s state and input prices as given. The dynamic
part deals with the decision whether to exit or to stay in the market and, conditional
on staying, to choose investment for each capital variety.
The objective of the static problem is to maximize current period profits, given the
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firm and industry state which is denoted by ωit ≡ (Nit, {kijt}Nitj=1):
p¯i(k, ω) = max
h,{zl}Il 6=i
{
p(yi)yij − whij −
I∑
l 6=i
plzlij
}
s.t. (2.2),
where w is the economy-wide wage rate per unit of labor and p(yi) is the demand
curve for the corresponding industry’s total output produced by all incumbents: yi =∑Ni
j=1 yij. The first-order conditions imply that the marginal revenue products equal
factor costs
w = pi
[
1− 1
i(yi)
yij
yi
]
· (1− αki − αzi )Aikijα
k
i zij
αzi h
−αki−αzi
ij (2.6)
P zi = pi
[
1− 1
i(yi)
yij
yi
]
· αzAikijαki zijαzi−1h1−α
k
i−αzi
ij (2.7)
and demand relations for each intermediate variety zl (by firm j in sector i) are given
by:
zijl = θ
z
l,i · P zi zij/pl for all l 6= i (2.8)
where i(yi) ≡ −∂yi∂pi
p(yi)
yi
is the price-elasticity of the industry demand curve and P zi =∏I
l 6=i
(
pl/θ
z
l,i
)θzl,i the price index for intermediate goods.
Since any industry’s output is used as input by final good producers or as
intermediate input by other industries, industry i’s demand consists of final demand
yfi = θ
Y
i · Y/pi and intermediate input demand yzi =
∑I
l 6=i
∑Nj
j=1 θ
z
l,i · P zl zlj/pi. Hence,
the industry demand curves p(yi) are unit-elastic, i.e. i(yi) = 1 ∀i = 1, ..., I. As a
result, maximized current period profits can be written as
p¯i =
(
1− (1− αki )
[
1− yij
yi
])
pi(yi)yij (2.9)
The dynamic optimization problem is to maximize the value of a firm which enters
period t with capital k. This value consists of current period profits and the discounted
future value net of investment if the incumbent decides to continue operating or an
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outside option value of zero if the incumbent exits the market:
v(k, ω) = p¯i(k, ω) + max
(
0, max
{xν}ν¯ν=1
{
−
ν¯∑
ν=1
qν · xν + 1
1 + r′
v(k′, ω′)
})
(2.10)
subject to the capital accumulation equations (2.5) and law of motion for the industry
state: ω′ = hω(ω). Here r denotes the real interest rate. The first-order conditions is
k′ν = θ
k
ν,i · P ki k′i/
qν
φν
for all ν = 1, 2, ..., ν¯ (2.11)
and the envelope condition implies
1
1 + r
∂p¯i(k′, ω′)
∂k′
= P ki (2.12)
where P ki =
∏ν¯
ν=1
(
qν
φνθkν,i
)θkν,i
is the price index for the capital bundle. The incumbents’
corresponding investment demand is derived from the capital accumulation equation
(2.5):
xν,ij,t = θ
k
ν,i · P ki kij,t+1/qν,t − (1− δν) · kν,ij,t/φν,t (2.13)
Investment demand is decreasing in the price qν and increasing in the quality level φν,t.
The latter effect reflects obsolescence of the existing capital stock.
Product market regulation and entry. Product industries are subject to
governmental regulation raising barriers to entry. We focus on barriers to entry not
only because they were common in the U.S. (e.g. licenses being a brute measure of
entry regulation, red tape related to new business start-ups a more subtle one) but also
because Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) find them to be the regulatory measure crucial
for the mode of industry competition. The reason is that entry regulation determines
the number of firms operating in an industry and, thereby, their market power and profit
margins. Entry costs are a convenient way of modeling entry regulation: a decrease
in barriers to entry is a de-facto reduction of entry costs and it therefore mimics a
deregulative measure. For example, cutbacks in regulations that require filing of reports
and studies or stamps of approval will reduce the real resource cost of entry. A decline
20
in license fees will have a similar effect from the entrant’s perspective.14
We assume that there is free entry into the products market. Attempted entry is
successful upon payment of entry costs which flow into the ocean. There is a pool of
potential entrants which can choose to enter into any of the I industries upon paying a
fixed setup cost. The cost of entry into industry i is denoted by κit ≥ 0.15 The process
of entry takes a full period as investments need to be installed. The timing is as follows:
an entering firm pays κit and purchases capital goods in period t; it starts operating
in period t+ 1. Entry into a given industry takes place if:
− κit + max
xν,ie
{
−
∑
ν¯
qν · xν,ie + 1
1 + r′
v(k′ie, ω
′)
}
≥ 0 (2.14)
where
k′ie =
ν¯∏
ν=1
(φν · xν,ie)θkν,i
In case of entry, the optimal capital stock is given by (2.12) and investments are
determined by:
xν,ie,t = θ
k
ν,i · P ki kie,t+1/qν for all ν = 1, ..., ν¯ (2.15)
For future reference, we denote the number of entrants entering into industry i by NEi .
R&D firms. Each variety of capital ν is produced by a single R&D firm which
is the sole producer of this variety. This firm can pursue R&D activities to increase
the quality of its capital variety. These quality improvements result in endogenous
investment-specific technical change: installing the current vintage of the capital good
augments the corresponding capital stock by φν,t efficiency units.
More specifically, we assume a lab-equipment innovation possibilities frontier:
quality φν,t is increasing in the firm’s R&D spending sν,t (which is in terms of the
final good).
φν,t = φν,t−1 · [1 +mν
(
sν,t
Ωt
)γν
] mν , γν > 0 ∀ ν (2.16)
where γν governs the returns to scale in R&D, mν scales the productivity of R&D, and
14If licence fees were refunded, a distinction might be sensible as Fang and Rogerson (2011) discuss.
15We assume that entry costs grow with the same rate as the economy does.
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Ωt is a growth trend that eliminates scale effects.
Capital goods are sold to product market firms. Let qν(Xν) denote the aggregate
inverse demand function for capital goods of variety ν where
Xν,t ≡
I∑
i=1
Nit·xν,ij,t+NEit ·xν,ie,t =
I∑
i=1
(Ni+N
E
i )·θkν,i·P ki kij,t+1/qν−(1−δν)/φν,t·
I∑
i=1
Ni·kν,ij,t
is total investment demand for variety ν. As every variety is produced by a single R&D
firm, these firms possess monopoly power in their corresponding sales markets.
The decision problem of any R&D firm involves choosing R&D activities and capital
goods production in order to maximize profits. As the R&D firm is short-lived and will
be replaced next period by some other R&D firm, its decision problem is static but
consists of two stages: the first stage is to choose the optimal R&D investment strategy
in order to improve the quality of its capital good. In stage two, the firm chooses a
production quantity to maximize profits taking the quality level φν,t as given. The
production of one unit of capital requires one unit of the final good. Hence, the stage-2
optimization problem of the firm is the following:
p¯iRν (φν,t) ≡ max
qν,t
{[qν,t(Xν,t)− 1] ·Xν,t(φν,t)} (2.17)
The first-order condition can be written as the usual markup-pricing rule over marginal
costs (which are equal to 1)
qν,t =
1
1− 1
ν(Xν,t)
(2.18)
where the price elasticity of investment demand ν(Xν) ≡ − ∂Xν∂qν(Xν)
qν
Xν
=∑I
i=1(Ni+N
E
i )·θkν,i·Pki kij,t+1
qνXν
is determined by the corresponding nominal capital-investment
ratio.
In the first stage, the firm chooses R&D to maximize profits net of R&D investment
max
sν,t
{
p¯iRν (φν,t)− sν,t
}
(2.19)
subject to the innovation possibility frontier (2.16) which governs the extent of quality
improvement that is achieved by any chosen R&D level. The first-order condition can
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be written as
sνt = [qν,t − 1]Xν,t(φν,t) · ηXν ,φν · ηφν ,sν (2.20)
where ηXν ,φν ≡ ∂Xν,t(φν,t)∂φν,t
φν,t
Xν,t(φν,t)
=
(1−δν)·
∑I
i=1 Ni·kν,ij,t
φν,tXν,t
and ηφν ,sν ≡ ∂φν,t∂sν,t
sν,t
φν,t
=
γν
mν(st/Ωt)γν
1+mν(st/Ωt)
γν
t
Hence, net profits are
p¯iRν − sν,t = [1− ηXν ,φν · ηφν ,sν ]
[
ν(Xν,t)
ν(Xν,t)− 1 − 1
]
Xν,t (2.21)
which are payed out to the household every period.
Household. The economy is populated by a infinitely-lived representative
household that values consumption of the final good C and inelastically supplies L
units of labor to the market sector. Labor is employed in the products sector and it
is perfectly mobile across firms and industries. The objective of an individual is to
maximize lifetime utility. Preferences are described by the following time-separable
CIES utility function:
U =
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct) u(Ct) =
C1−σt − 1
1− σ (2.22)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the personal discount factor and σ determines the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. The household earns wage and interest income. In addition,
he receives a stream of distributed profits from R&D firms. The household chooses
consumption to maximize his life-time utility (2.22) subject to his budget constraint:
Ct + At+1 = wtL+ (1 + rt)At + Π
R
t (2.23)
where A denotes the household’s asset holdings and ΠRt ≡
∑ν¯
ν=1 p¯i
R
ν,t − sν,t are the
profits net of R&D spending of all R&D firms. The asset is a balanced portfolio of
equity of all product market firms in all industries: At =
∑I
i=1Nitvijt.
The household’s optimality condition delivers the usual consumption-Euler
equation: (
Ct+1
Ct
)σ
= β (1 + rt+1) (2.24)
Having described the economic environment, we next turn to the equilibrium concept.
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Beforehand we briefly characterize the model’s balanced growth path.
2.4.2 Balanced Growth Path and Stationary Transformation
Along a balanced growth path all variables grow at constant rates. Obviously, hours
worked will remain constant while capital and output will grow in the presence of
investment-specific technological change. The aggregate resource constraint implies
that final output, consumption, investment, and R&D expenditures all have to grow at
the same (gross) rate, say g. Similarly, the resource constraints for each product mean
that output, final demand, and intermediate input demand grow at a common rate gyi .
As the final good is assembled from intermediate products according to a Cobb-
Douglas production function, the economy’s growth rate is a weighted geometric mean
of the industry growth rates: g =
∏I
i=1 (gyi)
θYi . Industry growth, in turn, is related
to growth in capital services and intermediate inputs, as described by each industry’s
production function: gyi = g
αki
ki
g
αzi
zi . Again, due to the Cobb-Douglas functional form,
growth in intermediate inputs and capital services, respectively, is a geometric mean of
the growth rates of the corresponding components: gzi =
∏I
l 6=i (gzl)
θ
zi
l =
∏I
l 6=i (gyl)
θ
zi
l
and gki =
∏ν¯
ν=1 (gkν,i)
θkν,i . Recall that kν,i is the capital stock of variety ν, measured
in efficiency units. Hence, its growth rate does not only reflect growth in physical
investment but also investment-specific technical change: gkν = gφνg, as implied by the
accumulation equation (2.5). Here, gφν denotes the rate of investment-specific technical
change in the corresponding capital good. Note that the BGP growth rate of capital of
variety ν is the same for all firms in all industries because each firm’s investment grows
at the same rate, g. Nevertheless, capital growth may differ across industries due to a
varying composition of the capital stock: gki = gY ·
∏ν¯
ν=1 (gφν )
θkν,i .
Given these BGP growth rates, detrending variables by their balanced growth path
will render them stationary. In the following we use a tilde to denote the stationary
transformation of any variable: the stationary transformation of capital, for example,
is denoted by k˜t ≡ kt/gtk.
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2.4.3 Equilibrium
Next, we consider a stationary symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium of the
decentralized economy. In a symmetric equilibrium all firms within an industry choose
the same level of capital. Stationarity requires all variables to grow at constant rates.
In other words, the economy follows a balanced growth path.
Stationary symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium. A stationary symmetric
Markov-perfect equilibrium of the decentralized economy is represented by an allocation
(C˜, A˜, {y˜i, z˜i, hi, {k˜ν,i}ν¯ν=1}Ii=1), the number of product market firms in each industry
{Ni}Ii=1, and prices (w˜, r, {pi}Ii=1, {qν}ν¯ν=1) such that
1. the household solves his utility maximization problem given prices;
2. the final good firm solves its profit maximization problem given prices;
3. product market firms solve their profit maximization problems given input prices,
industry demand curve, and competitors’ quantities;
4. R&D firms solve their profit maximization problem given input prices and
investment demand curve;
5. the number of product market firms in each industry is determined by free entry;
6. the laws of motion for the industry state {hω(ω)}Ii=1 are consistent with number
of product market firms operating in each industry {Ni}Ii=1.
7. all markets clear:
(a) labor
L =
I∑
i=1
Nithijt (2.25)
(b) final good
Yt = Ct +Xt + St + Et (2.26)
where aggregate investment is Xt =
∑ν¯
ν=1Xν,t, aggregate R&D spending is
St =
∑ν¯
ν=1 sν,t, and total entry costs are Et =
∑I
i=1 N
E
it κit.
(c) products
Nityijt = yit = y
f
it + y
z
it ∀ i = 1, ..., I (2.27)
25
(d) capital goods
Xν,t =
I∑
i=1
Nit · xν,ij,t +NEit · xν,ie,t ∀ ν = 1, ..., ν¯ (2.28)
(e) asset
At =
I∑
i=1
Nitvijt (2.29)
The model is solved numerically for its stationary equilibrium.
2.5 Quantitative Analysis
This section explores the model’s ability to generate an acceleration of investment-
specific technical change and a divergence in labor productivities as a result of product
market deregulation. We begin with a discussion of our calibration strategy. Then,
we introduce our quantitative experiment symbolizing the Ford/Carter deregulatory
reforms and, finally, we present the findings.
2.5.1 Calibration
The model economy’s balanced growth path is calibrated to match various stylized
facts of the U.S. economy in the period 1960-75, that is, the pre-deregulation period.
All parameters are listed in Table 4.1. Some parameters are set based upon a priori
information from the literature. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/σ is
routinely set to 1/2 and the real interest rate to 4.5%. Both values are inserted into
the Euler equation (2.24) to pin down the discount factor β.
Turning to the technology parameters, the elasticities of the Cobb-Douglas
aggregators for the final good, the capital bundles, and the intermediate product
bundles are pinned down by the corresponding cost shares in the data. The share of
final demand in nominal output determines the elasticity of the final good aggregator:
θYi =
piy
f
i
PY Y
for all 57 industries. We compute these shares of final demand in nominal
output from the 1972 Input-Output tables published by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (Table 2.15). Furthermore, the Input-Output tables allow us to compute
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Table 2.3: Calibration
Parameter name Symbol Dim Target
Preferences
discount factor β 1 r
intertemp. elasticity of substitution 1/σ 1 1/2
Production Technology
elasticity of final good aggregator Y θYi I
piy
f
i
PY Y
elasticity of capital aggregator k θkν,i I · ν¯ qνt·kνt+1/φνtµk,t·kt+1
elasticity of intermediate input aggregator z θzl,i I · I ply
zi
l
P zizi
output elasticity w.r.t. capital αki I
whi
piyi
output elasticity w.r.t. intermediates αzi I
P zizi
piyi
industry TFP Ai I
piyi−P zizi∑
i yi
depreciation rate δν ν¯
qν ·xν
qν ·kν,t/φν,t−1
R&D Technology
R&D duplication parameter γν ν¯ gφν
R&D productivity parameter mν ν¯ 1
Policy
entry cost κi I
intermediate input shares θzl,i =
ply
zi
l
P zizi
. In the same way we compute the shares of all
27 capital goods we distinguish in the Current-Cost Net Stock of Private Fixed Assets
by Industry from BEA’s Fixed Asset Accounts θkν,i =
qνt·kν,i,t+1/φνt
Pki,t·ki,t+1
. Besides, we choose
the depreciation rates δν to target the investment-to-capital ratios
qν ·xν
qν ·kν,t/φν,t−1 for all
27 capital goods since both are related to each other through the capital accumulation
equation (2.5).
The output elasticities of the production function have to be calibrated jointly
with the number of firms by industry. In any industry all incumbent firms operate
according the same production function. Hence, the incumbents’ first-order conditions
with respect to labor (2.6) and intermediate inputs (2.7) can be rearranged in order
to target the industry’s wage bill share and intermediate inputs share in industry’s
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nominal gross output, respectively:
(
1− 1
Ni
)
(1− αki − αzi ) =
wNihij
Nipiyij
=
whi
piyi
and (
1− 1
Ni
)
αzi =
∑I
l 6=iNiplzli
Nipiyij
=
P zizi
piyi
We compute these targets from the BEA’s GDP by Industry Accounts. Finally, the
industry total factor productivity parameters Ai are calibrated to match the statistic
piyi−P zizi∑
i yi
.
The R&D technology parameter γν is chosen to match the pre-deregulation ISTC
rate of the corresponding capital good reported by Cummins and Violante (2002) (Table
2.14 in the Appendix).16
Finally, the policy parameter entry costs are calibrated in the following way. In
equilibrium, the free entry condition (2.14) imposes a positive relationship between
entry costs and the value of a product market incumbent firm and, hence, an
incumbent’s current period profit contribution (2.9) which is negatively related to the
number of incumbent firms operating in that industry. Hence, we calibrate the pre-
deregulation level of entry costs by targeting the number of firms in each industry.
However, we do not observe these data directly. But the County Business Patterns
published by U.S. Census provide an annual series of the number of establishments
by industry. We use this establishment data for 1975 to construct a target of the
number of firms by industry as follows: firstly, we assume that the number of firms in
each industry is proportional to the number of establishments reported in the County
Business Patterns. Secondly, we calibrate this factor of proportionality in order to
match a markup of 12% for the aggregate economy.
16Cummins and Violante (2002) provide ISTC rates for 26 capital goods covering equipment and
software capital. For structures we follow the literature (e.g. Pakko, 2002c, 2005) and use the estimate
of Gort, Greenwood, and Rupert (1999) who find an ISTC rate of 1% per year.
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2.5.2 The Experiment
The purpose of the quantitative model is to answer the question ”How much of the
observed acceleration in investment-specific technical change is accounted for by U.S.
product market deregulation?”. We address this question by simulating two model
economies. The first one matches important empirical facts of the U.S. economy in the
pre-deregulation period (1960 - 1975), that is, before the Ford/Carter/Reagan reforms
were implemented. The second model economy is a hypothetical one: how would the
U.S. economy have looked like if product market regulations in the 1970s were at their
post-deregulation levels. Comparing the change in ISTC rates of these model economies
to the observed acceleration in actual U.S. data allows us to compute the fraction which
is accounted for by deregulation in our model.
To this end, we decrease the entry costs for all 16 industries that have been
deregulated under the Ford, Carter, and Reagan Administrations17 by factor 5.18 For
all other industries which have not been subject to regulatory changes we assume that
entry costs did not change.
2.5.3 Findings
The results of the deregulation experiment are reported in Table 2.4. In the model,
deregulation leads to an increase in the aggregate rate of ISTC from 4.2% to 4.7%
per year. Comparing this acceleration of 0.5 percentage points to the observed
acceleration of 2.7 percentage points means that the considered regulatory relief is
able to explain about 18.6% of the acceleration of ISTC in the aggregate economy.
However, focusing on the 16 deregulated industries only, deregulation is an important
explanation for the acceleration of ISTC in deregulated industries. For these industries
the policy experiment generates an acceleration of 2.5 percentage points, compared to
17The deregulated industries are: Oil and gas extraction, Petroleum and coal products,
Railroad transportation, Local and interurban passenger transit, Trucking and warehousing, Water
transportation, Transportation by air, Pipelines, except natural gas, Transportation services,
Telephone and telegraph, Radio and television, Electric services, Gas services, Depository institutions,
Nondepository institutions, and Security and commodity brokers.
18On the one hand, Ebell and Haefke (2009) find that in the U.S. entry costs decreased by factor 9
between the late 1970s and late 1990s. On the other hand, our calibration of pre-deregulation entry
costs suggests a factor of 2.5 between non-deregulated and deregulated industries. In the light of this
evidence, factor 5 is an intermediate value for the extent of deregulation.
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Table 2.4: Comparison of ISTC and labor productivity in the model and in the data
U.S. economy Model economy Fraction
pre- post-
∆
pre- post-
∆
accounted
deregulation deregulation for
investment-specific technical changea
aggregate 4.12 6.87 2.74 4.16 4.67 0.51 18.6%
de/regulated 3.78 7.32 3.54 4.20 6.70 2.50 70.6%
others 4.43 6.46 2.03 4.14 4.49 0.35 17.2%
labor productivityb
aggregate 1.19 1.79 0.60 2.91 3.60 0.69 115.0%
de/regulated 1.55 5.07 3.52 2.92 4.04 1.12 31.8%
others 1.09 1.17 0.08 2.91 3.21 0.30 375.0%
∆ 0.46 3.90 3.44 0.01 0.83 0.82 23.8%
Pre-deregulation refers to the period 1960-75, post-deregulation to 1990-2000.
The model panel shows BGP growth rates, the data panel average growth rates
for the corresponding periods. Both are reported in percentage points per year.
The last column computes the fraction of the observed acceleration in ISTC and
labor productivity growth, respectively, that is accounted for by the deregulation
experiment in the quantitative model (column 7 divided by column 4).
a The pre-deregulation period excludes ISTC rates for 1975 which are known to be
an outlier (cf. Cummins and Violante, 2002, p. 257).
b Due to lacking data availability, the pre-deregulation period for labor productivity
is 1978-1984 and the post-deregulation period is 1990-1997.
Data sources: Cummins and Violante (2002); Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Historical Industry Accounts and Fixed Assets Accounts.
3.5 percentage points in the data. This means, 70.6% of the acceleration are accounted
for by the quantitative model. For other industries, however, the model explains about
one sixth of the observed acceleration in ISTC. One explanation for this might be
that the model does not allow for a changing composition of the capital stock (in
nominal terms) while the data suggests that a shift in investment towards high-ISTC
capital goods contributes substantially to the acceleration of ISTC in non-deregulated
industries. For example, the experiment explains five eighths of the increase in aggregate
ISTC that is due to a pure asset-specific acceleration (0.8 percentage points, Table
2.2.B).
The quantitative model performs well in predicting a moderate rise in aggregate
labor productivity growth as well as an almost constant growth rate for the non-
deregulated industries. The 16 deregulated industries grew about 3.5 percentage points
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faster in the 1990s than before the reforms. Thus, the gap in labor productivity growth
between deregulated and non-deregulated industries increased to the same extent.
The quantitative model, however, captures only about one third of the rise in labor
productivity growth of the deregulated industries. This suggests that gains in total
factor productivity, maybe due to a reorganization of the production process, might be
another important outcome of product market deregulation. Despite neglecting other
sources of productivity growth than ISTC, the model is able to generate diverging
labor productivities ensuing deregulation: the quantitative experiment still accounts
for about a quarter of the observed divergence.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
Documenting that deregulated industries have outperformed the remaining U.S.
economy in terms of labor productivity growth and investment-specific technical
change, this essay studies industry and macroeconomic effects of competition policy.
In particular, we address a quantitative question: to what extent can the Ford/Carter
regulatory reforms account for the observed acceleration of ISTC and the subsequent
divergence of labor productivity in the U.S.?
To this end, we develop a multi-sector general equilibrium model of endogenous
ISTC that features imperfect competition and a technology choice by firms. In the
model, industries are subject to governmental regulations which constitute barriers to
entry. Deregulation is modelled as a reduction in entry barriers which results in new
competitors entering deregulated industries. Intensified competition, in turn, leads to
lower markups, declining prices, and expanding production. In order to increase output
firms install additional capital goods. This rise in investment demand fosters R&D
activities to improve the efficiency of capital goods and, hence, accelerates investment-
specific technical change. Consequently, labor productivity grows at a higher rate.
We employ our model framework for a quantitative experiment. The experiment
investigates the effects of the Ford/Carter reforms by simulating model economies
calibrated to the U.S. economy with and without deregulation. We find that
the quantitative model explains 70% of the observed acceleration in ISTC for
the deregulated industries and almost a fifth of the overall acceleration for the
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U.S. economy. Furthermore, the deregulation experiment leads to a divergence of
labor productivities across industries, as in the data. Deregulated industries grow
substantially faster than the remaining U.S. economy. However, the simulations also
suggest that a broad rise of asset-specific ISTC rates is not the only source. Rather, the
figures leave some scope for investments being shifted towards high-ISTC assets, as the
data for non-deregulated industries indicates. Beyond its role for ISTC, deregulation
might have had important stimulating effects on total factor productivity, in addition.
Both qualifications point to interesting directions of future research.
2.A Industry-level evidence on the acceleration of
investment-specific technical change
2.A.1 Dataset
Our empirical analysis inspects whether deregulation has indeed accelerated the pace
of investment-specific technical change. To identify the causal impact of deregulation,
we compare a panel of U.S. industries; some of them being directly affected by the
Ford/Carter/Reagan reforms. We use industry-level data on the rate of ISTC computed
by Cummins and Violante (2002). Constructed from a Tornqvist aggregation of asset-
specific technology indexes, the industry-level indexes measure ”the rate of technological
improvement in the typical mix of investment goods used in production by each industry”
(Cummins and Violante, 2002, p. 260).19
We classify the 62 industries covered by the Cummins and Violante (2002) dataset
into two groups: deregultated versus non-deregulated industries.20 Figure 2.5 shows the
investment-share weighted mean for both groups as well as for the whole economy and
reveals faster ISTC for deregulated industries. Note that the cross-industry variation in
the rate of ISTC stems from the different composition of investment goods installed by
each industry. The figure reveals that ISTC rates increased in the late 1950s and in the
1980s again. As we focus our analysis on the consequences of the Ford/Carter/Reagan
19The Tornqvist aggregation method is described in Appendix 2.C.1.
20Our classification is based upon the information on legislative and regulatory changes provided
by Joskow and Noll (1994); Winston (1993). See Table 2.8 for details.
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Figure 2.5: Rate of investment-specific technical change by regulation status
deregulation, we restrict our estimation period to 1961-94 in order not to cover the
Clinton deregulation period of the late 1990s.21 As the vast majority of regulatory
reforms was enacted in the years 1978 to 1982, we view this time span as the treatment
epoch. Correspondingly, in our baseline specification the pre- and post-treatment period
amount to 1961-77 and 1983-1994, respectively.
2.A.2 Empirical Strategy
The industry-level data allow us to compare the pace of technical change in deregulated
industries with others not directly affected by the Ford/Carter/Reagan reforms.
However, computing the causal effect of deregulation on the rate of ISTC would require
data on an unobservable counterfactual situation: what would have been the pace of
ISTC if deregulated industries had not been deregulated?
The econometric literature offers several estimators that make use of cross-sectional
and/or longitudinal variation and employ different sets of assumptions to identify the
21The choice of 1961 as the first year under study is motivated by data issues: First, the underlying
asset-specific ISTC rates are not available for computers and peripheral equipment and all three
categories of software before 1960 in the Cummins and Violante (2002) dataset. Second, we regard the
observations for 1959 and 1960 in the transportation by air industry with ISTC rates of more than
50% p.a. as outliers.
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average treatment effect of the treated.
1. The cross-sectional estimator:
The cross-sectional estimator compares the rates of ISTC for deregulated
industries to those of non-deregulated industries assuming that in absence
of deregulation ISTC were the same across all industries. But if ISTC were
faster (slower) for deregulated industries, the estimator would be biased upward
(downwards).
2. The before-after estimator:
The before-after estimator compares the rates of ISTC for deregulated industries
before and after the policy change. This comparison is a valid estimate of the
true causal effect only if the pace of ISTC would not have changed over time,
had there not been the deregulative reforms. In the presence of a positive time
trend, however, the causal effect is overestimated by the before-after estimator.
3. The difference-in-difference estimator:
The difference-in-difference estimator allows for a time trend that is common for
both industry-groups by computing the difference of the before-after estimator
between the deregulated and non-deregulated industries. The identifying
assumption implicitly made here is that without any policy change, for both
groups the change in ISTC rates would have been the same.
Of course, one can expect spillover effects from deregulated industries: even
industries that were not directly affected by the regulatory reforms can benefit from
higher quality equipment being available, although the R&D process has probably
been more directed to the needs of the deregulated industries that increased their
investment. In this case, both the cross-sectional and the difference-in-difference
estimator underestimate the causal effect. Therefore, we regard them as a lower
bound; and, hence, together with the before-after estimator the true causal effect of
deregulation on investment-specific technical change is bracketed.
To implement these estimators on our (balanced) panel dataset, we estimate the
average rate of ISTC in the period prior to and after the reforms for both groups.
Thereto we regress the rate of ISTC, qi,t, on dummy variables indicating the time
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period, Postt, and regulatory status, Deregi, of industry i:
qi,t = α + β · Postt + γ ·Deregi + δ · (Postt ∗Deregi) + i,t
where the coefficients β, γ and δ capture the before-after estimator, the cross-sectional
estimator and the difference-in-difference estimator, respectively.
Given the panel structure of our dataset, independence of observations is unlikely:
rather, the estimation strategy has to address the possibility of regression disturbances
being correlated both over time and between industries. To the extent these correlations
are due to unobservable common factors that are uncorrelated with the regressor,
standard panel methods like pooled OLS or fixed effects still provide consistent
coefficient estimates while standard error estimates are no longer valid. A popular
remedy is to rely on ”robust” standard errors, which are adjusted to be valid if certain
assumptions regarding the model disturbances are violated: clustered standard errors,
for instance, are valid if error terms can be assumed to be correlated only within
the observational unit. The assumption of residuals being correlated within a cluster
but independent across clusters is often inappropriate for panel models. Beck and Katz
(1995) suggest panel corrected standard errors, which are robust to both contemporary
cross-panel and serial correlation. Alternatively, one can apply a FGLS estimator with
appropriate restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix.
2.A.3 Results
Table 2.5 reports the results for different specifications of pooled OLS and fixed
effects regressions.22 Among the pooled least squares estimates, we consider – besides
a standard pooled OLS regression with clustered standard errors – a Prais-Winsten
specification with panel-corrected standard errors as recommended by Beck and Katz
(1995) as well as a feasible GLS model where the error process is allowed to be
heteroskedastic across panels and assumed to follow a common AR(1) process. Finally,
we employ a one-way error component regression model to allow for industry-specific
fixed effects. While the first specification with clustered standard errors is equivalent
22Random effects specifications have most often been rejected by a Hausman test.
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Table 2.5: Regression DiD: deregulated industries
Pooled Least Squares Industry Fixed Effects
OLSa Prais-Winstenb FGLSc Withina, e Withind, e
Explanatory
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
dereg 1.342** 1.385*** 0.842**
(0.592) (0.415) (0.420)
d83 2.526*** 2.697** 2.534*** 2.526*** 2.588***
(0.536) (1.059) (0.511) (0.536) (0.413)
d83Xdereg 1.312** 1.345** 0.957* 1.312** 1.411***
(0.580) (0.551) (0.557) (0.579) (0.465)
d7783 0.098 0.146 0.274 0.098 0.025
(0.190) (1.447) (0.264) (0.190) (0.260)
d7783Xdereg 0.363 0.288 0.035 0.363 0.411
(0.814) (0.662) (0.669) (0.814) (0.568)
cons 6.694*** 6.799*** 6.224*** 5.634*** 5.663***
(0.549) (0.799) (0.386) (0.124) (0.122)
R2 0.038 0.027 0.046 0.037
χ2 18.430 81.665
F 11.858 14.710 19.186
p 0.0000 0.0025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AC(1) 0.234 0.127
corr fe -0.109 -0.112
sigma u 2.009 2.063
sigma e 3.380 3.383
rho fov 0.261 0.271
N industries 62 62 62 62 62
Tbar 34 34 34 33
N 2108 2108 2108 2108 2046
a clustered standard errors reported
b Beck and Katz (1995) panel-corrected standard errors reported
c pooled FGLS with heteroskedastic errors following a common AR(1) process
d fixed effects model with common AR(1) error process
e within-R2reported
estimation period: 1961-1994
significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
to the pooled OLS estimator, the second within estimator explicitly models a common
AR(1) error process.
The first column of Table 2.5, for instance, reports the results of the pooled OLS
specification. In this case, the difference-in-difference estimator takes the value 1.312
percentage points p.a., the coefficient on the deregulation dummy estimates the cross-
sectional estimator to be 1.342, and the before-after comparison yields an annual
acceleration of 2.526 percentage points.23
To sum up, all specifications show a statistically significant and economically
momentous increase of the ISTC rate. Except for the FGLS model, the difference-
23Note that the data is coded such that the coefficient on the interaction term of the post-treatment
period with the deregulation dummy is identical to the difference-in-difference estimator, while the
coefficients on the post-treatment period and the deregulation dummy are the before-after estimator
and the cross-sectional estimator, respectively.
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in-difference estimator, which yields a lower bound of the true causal effect, indicates
an acceleration due to deregulation slightly above 1.3 percentage points p.a. The cross-
sectional estimates are in line with the difference-in-difference results. On the other
hand, the before-after estimator offers an upper bound in the range of 2.5 to 2.7
percentage points.
Overall, the Cummins and Violante (2002) industry-level data provide empirical
evidence of a 1.3 to 2.5 percentage point acceleration of investment-specific technical
change caused by the Ford/Carter/Reagan deregulative reforms. Finally, our robustness
checks confirm this finding. Extending the estimation period to the full sample slightly
increases the causal effect (Table 2.10), while additionally classifying industries that
were severely but only indirectly affected by the reforms as ”deregulated” reduces it by
about 0.4 percentage points (Table 2.11). Moreover, the results are robust to different
time frames of the interim, i.e. reform, period (Table 2.12).
Regulation Impact Regressions
The OECD indicator of regulation impact provides another way of robustness check:
Instead of coding industries either as deregulated or not, the OECD indicator of
regulation impact provides a measure of the extent of regulation impact. We regress the
rate of ISTC on the OECD sectoral indicator of regulation impact. The dataset contains
27 industry groups for which the regulation impact (RI) indicator and the rate of ISTC
can be matched.24 Spanning from 1975 to 1999 it covers the Ford/Carter/Reagan and
the Clinton deregulation.
Our hypothesis that deregulation has accelerated investment-specific technical
change can be tested with a industry-fixed effects regression model. As the fixed-effects
estimator relies solely on within variation, it captures only the impact of deviations of
the regulation impact indicator from its time-mean on the rate of ISTC and discards
the effect of cross-industry variation due to differing initial conditions. A negative
relationship between the regulation impact indicator and the rate of ISTC will support
our hypothesis, implying that more severe regulation is linked with lower technical
24As the OECD defines sectors according to the International Standard Industrial Classification
(ISIC), concordance tables are used to match the industries. In this case, however, one has to
considerably aggregate SIC industries to achieve correspondence.
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Table 2.6: Regulation Impact Indicator Regression
Industry Fixed Effects
Withina Withina
Explanatory
Estimate Estimate
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
regimp -37.823***
(4.320)
lnregimp -8.812***
(1.041)
cons 9.182*** -16.806***
(0.459) (2.596)
within-R2 0.066 0.096
F 76.646 71.613
corr -0.919 -0.962
sigma u 4.533 6.774
sigma e 2.346 2.308
rho 0.789 0.896
N industries 27 27
Tbar 24 24
N 648 648
a clustered standard errors reported
estimation period: 1975-1999
significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
change. As Table 2.6 shows for both the linear and the lin-log specification, the
significantly negative coefficients confirm our hypothesis.
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2.B Markup Estimation
2.B.1 Dataset
We use time-series data on value added and compensation of employees from the GDP-
by-industry accounts published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The dataset
is based on SIC industries and covers the period 1947 to 1997. Besides, we use the
stock of private fixed assets and depreciation of private fixed assets from the BEA’s
Fixed Asset Accounts.25 The literature computes the remuneration of capital as the
product of a rental rate of capital and the capital stock. The rental rate of capital
consists of an economic depreciation rate which is computed from FAA-data and the
firms’ real costs of funds rate. The latter is approximated by the nominal interest rate
implied by Moody’s AAA Corporate Bond index less inflation expectations. We follow
Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996) and construct our measure of inflation
expectations as the HP-trend of the annual inflation rate, measured by a chain-type
price-index for GDP.
2.B.2 Empirical Strategy
Roeger (1995) proposes to estimate the markup ratio of prices over marginal costs,
µ ≡ P
MC
, indirectly via the Lerner index, L ≡ P−MC
P
∈ [0, 1]. Employing primal and
dual growth accounting, Roeger (1995) derives his estimation equation
∆yt = L ·∆xt + ut (2.30)
from a constant-returns-to-scale production function, At · F (Nt, Kt), for value added,
Qt, under imperfect competition. Here Nt and Kt denote labor and capital input,
respectively, and At measures total factor productivity. Roeger (1995)’s dependent and
explanatory variables are functions of these quantities and corresponding factor prices.
Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996) show that one can rearrange terms so
25Tables 3.1ES and 3.4ES as of September 25, 2002.
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that ∆yt and ∆xt are defined only by nominal variables:
∆yt ≡ ∆(qt + pt)− αt ·∆(nt + wt)− (1− αt) ·∆(kt + rt)
∆xt ≡ ∆(qt + pt)−∆(kt + rt)
where Pt is the price of value added, Wt the wage rate, Rt the rental rate of capital,
and αt ≡ WtNtPtQt the wage bill share in value added. Lower-case letters denote logs
of the corresponding (upper-case) variables. However, this regression may suffer from
endogeneity issues as nominal value added appears on both sides of the estimation
equation. Boulhol (2008); Hindriks, Nieuwenhuijsen, and de Wit (2000) argue that
rearranging terms in the following way mitigates this bias:
∆xt = µ ·∆zt + et (2.31)
where
∆zt ≡ αt · [∆(nt + wt)−∆(kt + rt)]
As this regression estimates the markup directly, it is called the µ-based version, while
Roeger (1995)’s original regression equation is called L-based version. Note that the
relationship between both measures is non-linear: µ = 1
1−L . Boulhol (2008) shows
theoretically that L-based markups are higher than µ-based ones.
Eventually, Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996) show that in the presence
of decreasing (increasing) returns to scale the estimated markup is upward-biased
(downward-biased). This finding is especially relevant in the case of fixed factors. As
Boulhol (2008) points out, returns to scale on the variable factors matter. Hence, if
capital, for example, were fixed in the short-run and returns to scale on the variable
factors were decreasing, markups would be overestimated.
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2.B.3 Results
We estimate markups by running µ-based regressions for 69 U.S. industries.26 In order
to bring out the impact of the Ford/Carter/Regan deregulation on market conduct,
we split the sample into two estimation periods: a pre-deregulation period and a post-
deregulation one. The regression results are illustrated in Figure 2.4 and condensed in
Table 2.7.
Figure 2.4 compares the estimated gross markups for our benchmark period. Each
bullet depicts a single industry. Bullets below the 45◦-line indicate industries that
experienced a decline in markup, while bullets above suggest an increase in markups.
First of all, many estimates lie in the [1,2]-square. This means these markups are in
a range of 0 to 100%, a very plausible order of magnitude. More importantly, most
bullets are below the 45◦-line which means that most U.S. industries experienced a
decline in the markup after the Ford/Carter/Reagan deregulation. This is particularly
true for the majority of deregulated industries (red bullets).
Table 2.7 reports these markup estimates for a few industry groups. For the
aggregate of deregulated industries, the gross markup decreased, on average, by 22
percentage points from 1.92 to 1.71. This decrease comes mainly from the Energy and
Utilities industry as well as Radio and Television, as the industry-group estimates show.
Similarly, markups in severely affected industries decline on average by 35 percentage
points, while for the remaining private industries there is essentially no change. Overall,
these findings indicate that deregulation lead to more intense competition in the 1980s
and 1990s that becomes visible in lower markups.
26Table 2.C.2 compares our µ-based and L-based estimates to Roeger (1995) as well as
Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996). By and large, our µ-based markups are close to Roeger
(1995)’s estimates. Furthermore, for most of the industries that were not covered by Roeger (1995) or
Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996) our estimates seem to be plausible with respect to their
order of magnitude.
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Table 2.7: Estimation of Markup Ratios
Estimation Period
1961 1983
∆
1961 1983
∆
1977 1994 1974 1997
Private Industries 1.95 1.87 -0.08 2.06 1.87 -0.19
(0.09) (0.04) (0.06) 80.04)
Deregulated Industries 1.92 1.71 -0.22 1.95 1.76 -0.20
(0.15) (0.22) (0.18) (0.23)
Energy and Utilities 3.00 1.07 -1.93 3.09 1.02 -2.06
(0.35) (0.90) (0.38) (0.88)
Telecommunication 2.34 2.68 0.34 2.42 2.38 -0.04
(0.19) (0.57) (0.19) (0.56)
Transportation 1.57 1.50 -0.06 1.52 1.51 -0.01
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10)
Radio and Television 1.95 1.06 -0.89 1.80 1.26 -0.55
(0.21) (0.77) (0.21) (0.66)
Banking 1.57 1.70 0.14 1.58 1.75 0.17
(0.10) (0.18) (0.11) (0.18)
Severely Affected Industries 2.35 2.00 -0.35 2.69 1.98 -0.70
(0.22) (0.33) (0.20) (0.32)
Remaining Private Industries 1.92 1.90 -0.03 2.02 1.88 -0.13
(0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Estimates for µ-based version of the regression equation.
White standard errors are reported in parentheses.
2.C Supplementary Materials
2.C.1 Data
Measuring Investment-specific Technical Change
The industry-level data on the rate of ISTC were constructed by Cummins and Violante
(2002) from a Tornqvist aggregation of asset-specific technology indexes that are
price-based measures of investment-specific technical change. To be precise, Cummins
and Violante (2002) estimate for each of the 26 different categories of producers’
durable equipment and software the quality bias implicit in the official NIPA price
indexes. Correcting for this quality bias, they compute the (constant-quality) price of
a investment good in terms of consumption, which the literature identifies with the
inverse of the index of investment-specific technology. Then they aggregate for each of
the 62 industries considered the asset-specific ISTC rates by weighting them according
to their share in the industry’s nominal investment expenditures. This yields a measure
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of ”the rate of technological improvement in the typical mix of investment goods used
in production by each industry” (Cummins and Violante, 2002, p. 260).
The investment data we use to aggregate the industry-specific ISTC rates into
an index for deregulated and one for non-deregulated industries come from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Fixed Asset Tables: Investment in Private Equipment
and Software by Industry.
The OECD product market regulation index
Based on its International Regulation Database, the OECD compiles, among others,
indicators of product market regulation at sectoral levels. According to Conway and
Nicoletti (2006, p. 6) all indicators intend to ”quantify the degree to which regulatory
settings in a given sector are anti-competitive.”
For sectors of the energy, transport and communication (ETCR) group, these
indicators of sectoral regulation have been constructed for the years 1975 to 2007,
while for retail distribution and business services (RBSR) sectors the indicators are
only available for the years 1996, 1998, and 2003. Due to this data availability problem,
we focus on the seven non-manufacturing sectors that have been under study since the
mid-1970s, i.e. airlines, telecoms, electricity, gas, post, rail, and road freight.
Depending on the sector, some of the following low-level indicators have been
computed: barriers to entry, public ownership, vertical integration, market structure,
and price controls. Conway and Nicoletti (2006) claim that the coverage of the various
regulatory areas is tailored to the structural characteristics of each industry.
These low-level indicators are constructed as weighted average of several items, each
coded on a scale of 0 to 6, reflecting increasing restrictiveness of regulatory provisions to
competition. Scores are awarded relative to theoretical best or worst practice situations.
In order to obtain indicators by area of regulation, low-level indicators are aggregated
across sectors using some weighting scheme.
The Barriers to Entry Indicator covers regulations that curb entry and/or distort
market structure relative to a competitive outcome (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006, p. 7).
It is therefore closest to our question at hand. The indicator consists of 2 to 4 equally
weighted items and collects information on the extent to which the number of firms
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that are allowed to operate in a market is restricted and on the legal conditions of entry
into the market; for the energy sector information on the terms and conditions of third
party market access and on the extent of choice of supplier for consumers instead.
Classifying Deregulated Industries
For the classification of industries into deregulated or non-deregulated we collect
information on legislative and regulatory changes during the Ford, Carter, and Reagan
presidencies. Our classification is based upon Joskow and Noll (1994, tab. 6.2) and
Winston (1993, tab. 1) and shown in the third column of Table 2.8.
Moreover, the OECD Indicators of Regulation Impact (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006)
allow us to identify industries that were not directly hit by the deregulative reforms
but were affected indirectly via economic linkages to deregulated ones.27 We define
an industry to be severely affected by deregulation if its Regulatory Impact indicator
declined by more than 10% between 1978 and 1982. These industries are marked in
the last column of Table 2.8.
27OECD Indicators of Regulation Impact are available from the OECD International Regulation
Database at http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3343,en_2649_34323_2367297_1_1_1_1,00.
html.
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Table 2.8: Coding of deregulation dummy
US SIC Industry
year of earliest severely affected
deregulative reform industries
1 Farms x
7 Agricultural services, forestry, and fishing x
10 Metal mining
12 Coal mining
13 Oil and gas extraction 1978
14 Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels
15 Construction
20 Food and kindred products
21 Tobacco products
22 Textile mill products
23 Apparel and other textile products
24 Lumber and wood products x
25 Furniture and fixtures
26 Paper and allied products
27 Printing and publishing
28 Chemicals and allied products
29 Petroleum and coal products 1981
30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products x
31 Leather and leather products
32 Stone, clay, and glass products x
33 Primary metal industries x
34 Fabricated metal products
35 Industrial machinery and equipment
36 Electronic and other electric equipment
371 Motor vehicles and equipment
372 Other transportation equipment
38 Instruments and related products
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
40 Railroad transportation 1976 x
41 Local and interurban passenger transit 1982 x
42 Trucking and warehousing 1980 x
44 Water transportation 1984 x
45 Transportation by air 1978 x
46 Pipelines, except natural gas 1981 x
47 Transportation services 1980 x
481 Telephone and telegraph 1977
483 Radio and television 1981
491 Electric services 1978
492 Gas services 1981
495 Sanitary services
50 Wholesale trade
Continued on next page
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Table 2.8: Coding of deregulation dummy
US SIC Industry
year of earliest severely affected
deregulative reform industries
52 Retail trade
60 Other depository institutions 1980
6011 Federal reserve banks
61 Nondepository institutions 1980
62 Security and commodity brokers 1975
63 Insurance carriers
64 Insurance agents, brokers, and service
65 Real estate
671 Nonfinancial holding and investment offices
672 Financial holding and investment offices
70 Hotels and other lodging places
72 Personal services
73 Business services
75 Auto repair, services, and parking
76 Miscellaneous repair services
78 Motion pictures
79 Amusement and recreation services
80 Health services
81 Legal services
82 Educational services
83 Other services, n.e.c.
Industries classified as ”severely affected by deregulative reform” are defined by a decline of the OECD
Regulatory Impact indicator by more than 10% between 1978 and 1982.
Industries classified as ”deregulated” or ”highly affected by deregulative reform” are coded as 0,
others as -1.
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Table 2.9: Rise in Investment-Specific Technical Change
article aggregation of data source growth in ISTC p.a.
investments period 1 period 2
GY (1997) producers’ durable equipment Gordon, NIPA 1954-74: 3.3% 1975-1990: 4.0%
KORV (2000) capital equipment Gordon 1963-79: 3.6% 1980-1992: 6.0%
KORV (2000) capital equipment NIPA 1963-79: 0.3% 1980-1992: 2.6%
CV (2002) equipment & software CV 1960-79: 3.6% 1980-2000: 5.5%
Fisher (2006) equipment & software CV 1955-82: 3.2% 1983-2000: 5.8%
RT (2012) equipment & software CV, RT 1977-80: 2.6% 1980-1990: 5.5%
Pakko (2002c) total private NFIa Pakko 1950-82: 2.0% 1983-2000: 4.0%
Pakko (2005) total private NFIa Pakko 1951-87: 2.2% 1988-2001: 3.8%
JPT (2009) consumer durables & PDIb CV 1954-81: 1.2% 1982-2000: 3.1%
JPT (2009) consumer durables & PDIb NIPA 1954-81: 0.6% 1982-2000: 2.4%
a NFI: nonresidential fixed investment
b PDI : private domestic investment
GY (1997): Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997)
KORV (2000): Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000)
CV (2002): Cummins and Violante (2002)
RT (2012): Rodr´ıguez-Lo´pez and Torres (2012)
JPT (2009): Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2009)
2.C.2 Tables and Figures Appendix
Acceleration of Investment-specific technical change
It is a well-documented fact that ISTC accelerated in the early 1980s. Table 2.9
provides an overview of the empirical evidence. Note that there exist, essentially, two
different measures of the state of investment-specific technology: first, both Cummins
and Violante (2002) and Pakko (2002b) provide time-series data on the development of
investment-specific technology indices, which are derived from a constant-quality price
index for investment goods based on Gordon (1990)’s ”The Measurement of Durable
Goods Prices”. Second, the Bureau of Economic Analysis started to introduce hedonic
methods only in the late 1980s and 1990s.28
As expected, both the growth rates of investment-specific technology and their
increase show some variation, depending not only on the data source and periods
considered but also the definition of investments employed. A closer look at the
varieties of investments establishes the following pattern: ISTC is especially prominent
in computers, communication equipment, and software – sometimes at two-digit rates
28see e.g. Pakko (2002a) or Pakko (2005, Appendix).
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Figure 2.6: Labor productivity diverges
Notes: Labor productivity is computed as real value-added per full-time equivalent employee.
De/regulated industries are Energy and utilities, Communications, Transportation, and Brokers;
affected industries are those private industries that obtained more than 20 % of their intermediate
inputs from de/regulated industries; other industries are all remaining private industries.
Data Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA.
–, while other types of producers’ durable equipment and structures show lower
rates.29 Nevertheless, all report an economically significant acceleration, mostly in
the range between 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points p.a. . Regarding the timing of the
acceleration, Pakko (2005, Tab. 1) conducts statistical structural-break tests and
provides overwhelming evidence for a breakpoint in 1983 – just about the end of the
deregulation phase.
Robustness of DiD results
29ISTC rates for different asset categories are reported by Cummins and Violante (2002) and Pakko
(2002a, Web appendix). In order to evaluate their contribution to productivity growth, Mart´ınez,
Rodr´ıguez, and Torres (2010); Rodr´ıguez-Lo´pez and Torres (2012) conduct decomposed growth
accounting.
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Table 2.10: Regression DiD: deregulated industries, all years
Pooled Least Squares Industry Fixed Effects
OLSa Prais-Winstenb FGLSc Withina, e Withind, e
Explanatory
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
dereg 1.416** 1.454*** 0.976***
(0.655) (0.474) (0.373)
d83 3.935*** 4.083*** 3.667*** 3.925*** 3.897***
(0.460) (0.919) (0.437) (0.457) (0.373)
d83Xdereg 1.352*** 1.407** 1.003** 1.342*** 1.258***
(0.494) (0.599) (0.471) (0.491) (0.420)
d7783 1.104*** 1.062 0.953*** 1.104*** 1.047***
(0.246) (1.330) (0.246) (0.246) (0.270)
d7783Xdereg 0.329 0.282 0.235 0.319 0.157
(0.767) (0.837) (0.659) (0.772) (0.589)
cons 7.130*** 7.239*** 6.634*** 6.010*** 6.075***
(0.607) (0.728) (0.346) (0.106) (0.105)
R2 0.110 0.078 0.125 0.088
χ2 25.154 302.724
F 60.298 75.388 74.417
p 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AC(1) 0.240 0.215
corr fe -0.090 -0.084
sigma u 1.624 1.641
sigma e 3.547 3.479
rho fov 0.173 0.182
N industries 62 62 62 62 62
Tbar 51.97 51.97 51.97 50.97
N 3222 3222 3222 3222 3160
a clustered standard errors reported
b Beck and Katz (1995) panel-corrected standard errors reported
c pooled FGLS with heteroskedastic errors following a common AR(1) process
d fixed effects model with common AR(1) error process
e within-R2reported
estimation period: 1948-1999
significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.11: Regression DiD: deregulated and severely affected industries
Pooled Least Squares Industry Fixed Effects
OLSa Prais-Winstenb FGLSc Withina, e Withind, e
Explanatory
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
dereg 0.018 0.036 -0.457
(0.517) (0.359) (0.329)
d83 2.124*** 2.269** 2.117*** 2.124*** 2.191***
(0.365) (1.121) (0.365) (0.365) (0.325)
d83Xdereg 0.960** 0.971** 0.560 0.960** 1.085***
(0.447) (0.476) (0.436) (0.447) (0.400)
d7783 0.157 0.187 0.298 0.157 0.055
(0.210) (1.428) (0.288) (0.210) (0.285)
d7783Xdereg 0.052 0.052 -0.087 0.052 0.169
(0.562) (0.574) (0.525) (0.562) (0.489)
cons 5.646*** 5.725*** 5.198*** 5.634*** 5.663***
(0.461) (0.846) (0.275) (0.125) (0.123)
R2 0.039 0.028 0.045 0.037
χ2 15.594 98.946
F 13.268 15.215 18.767
p 0.0000 0.0081 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AC(1) 0.227 0.127
corr fe -0.002 -0.003
sigma u 1.925 1.975
sigma e 3.382 3.385
rho fov 0.245 0.254
N industries 62 62 62 62 62
Tbar 34 34 34 33
N 2108 2108 2108 2108 2046
a clustered standard errors reported
b Beck and Katz (1995) panel-corrected standard errors reported
c pooled FGLS with heteroskedastic errors following a common AR(1) process
d fixed effects model with common AR(1) error process
e within-R2reported
estimation period: 1961-1994
significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.12: Regression DiD: deregulated industries, interim period
pre reform 1961 - 1979 1961 - 1976 1961 - 1974
post reform 1980 - 1994 1983 - 1994 1985 - 1994
Prais-Winstenb Withina, c Prais-Winstenb Withina, c Prais-Winstenb Withina, c
Explanatory
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
dereg 1.068*** 1.385*** 1.363***
(0.398) (0.415) (0.466)
d80 1.208 1.402***
(1.044) (0.510)
d80Xdereg 0.895* 1.037*
(0.527) (0.548)
d83 2.697** 2.526***
(1.059) (0.536)
d83Xdereg 1.345** 1.312**
(0.551) (0.579)
d7783 0.146 0.098
(1.447) (0.190)
d7783Xdereg 0.288 0.363
(0.662) (0.814)
d85 1.291 1.730***
(1.180) (0.593)
d85Xdereg 1.365** 1.310**
(0.613) (0.629)
d7585 -2.196* -1.426***
(1.259) (0.188)
d7585Xdereg 0.567 0.367
(0.601) (0.780)
const 5.809*** 5.027*** 6.799*** 5.634*** 6.512*** 5.588***
(0.789) (0.107) (0.799) (0.124) (0.898) (0.131)
R2 0.002 0.011 0.027 0.046 0.047 0.059
χ2 8.415 18.430 14.989
F 5.449 14.710 27.369
p 0.0382 0.0229 0.0025 0.0000 0.0104 0.0000
corr fe -0.129 -0.109 -0.104
sigma u 1.988 2.009 2.013
sigma e 3.440 3.380 3.356
rho fov 0.250 0.261 0.265
N industries 62 62 62 62 62 62
Tbar 34 34 34 34 34 34
N 2108 2108 2108 2108 2108 2108
a clustered standard errors reported
b Beck and Katz (1995) panel-corrected standard errors reported
c within-R2reported
significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Markup Estimation
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Table 2.13: Comparison of Markups for the U.S.
Roeger (1995) Oliveira Martins et al. (1996) L-based µ-based
Period 1953 - 1984 1970 - 1992 1953 - 1984 1953 - 1984
Industry Markup Markup Markup 95% CI (White) Markup 95% CI (White)
Private industries 2.01 1.89 2.14 1.95 1.83 2.08
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 15.85 9.78 41.82 4.59 1.03 8.15
Farms 23.80 12.55 231.27 4.81 0.74 8.89
Agricultural services, forestry, and fishing 2.66 2.38 3.03 2.36 2.15 2.57
Mining 6.42 3.47 42.47 1.78 0.43 3.13
Metal mining 4.74 3.46 7.52 2.30 1.25 3.34
Coal mining 3.14 1.77 13.77 1.33 1.03 1.62
Oil and gas extraction 12.41 6.64 94.63 3.81 1.75 5.87
Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels 3.09 2.54 3.95 2.42 1.96 2.87
Construction 1.44 1.55 1.40 1.73 1.50 1.35 1.64
Manufacturing 1.62 1.51 1.75 1.55 1.39 1.70
Durable goods 1.45 1.60 1.47 1.75 1.51 1.37 1.66
Lumber and wood products 1.75 1.22 2.06 1.89 2.26 1.94 1.77 2.11
Furniture and fixtures 1.28 1.06 1.34 1.18 1.56 1.23 1.03 1.43
Stone, clay, and glass products 1.59 1.09 - 1.18 1.90 1.68 2.18 1.76 1.53 1.99
Primary metal industries 1.58 1.10 - 1.14 1.99 1.74 2.33 1.70 1.47 1.93
Fabricated metal products 1.33 1.09 1.39 1.29 1.49 1.33 1.21 1.45
Machinery, except electrical 1.41 1.06 - 1.54 1.50 1.36 1.66 1.39 1.24 1.55
Electric and electronic equipment 1.34 1.49 1.31 1.73 1.33 1.10 1.56
Motor vehicles and equipment 2.06 1.09 2.48 2.09 3.04 2.00 1.63 2.37
Other transportation equipment 1.22 1.05 - 1.13 1.78 1.12 4.32 1.13 0.92 1.33
Instruments and related products 1.47 1.09 1.60 1.35 1.95 1.38 1.13 1.64
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 1.62 1.08 1.75 1.42 2.30 1.19 0.81 1.56
Nondurable goods 1.48 1.72 1.57 1.89 1.61 1.41 1.82
Food and kindred products 1.50 1.05 2.25 1.71 3.27 1.51 1.13 1.90
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Roeger (1995) Oliveira Martins et al. (1996) L-based µ-based
Markup Markup Markup 95% CI (White) Markup 95% CI (White)
Tobacco products 2.75 1.56 7.35 6.01 9.46 6.13 5.39 6.87
Textile mill products 1.34 1.08 1.43 1.31 1.56 1.36 1.26 1.46
Apparel and other textile products 1.15 1.10 1.25 1.13 1.38 1.15 1.02 1.27
Paper and allied products 1.57 1.13 1.77 1.59 2.00 1.65 1.48 1.82
Printing and publishing 1.40 1.19 1.66 1.48 1.89 1.52 1.32 1.72
Chemicals and allied products 2.11 1.18 - 1.44 2.67 2.27 3.25 2.06 1.71 2.41
Petroleum and coal products 1.11 9.63 5.28 54.31 2.27 0.84 3.70
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 1.36 1.61 1.42 1.85 1.46 1.22 1.70
Leather and leather products 1.19 1.08 1.30 1.14 1.50 1.12 0.96 1.28
Transportation and public utilities 2.16 1.89 2.51 1.99 1.77 2.22
Transportation 1.68 1.50 1.92 1.60 1.43 1.77
Railroad transportation 1.61 1.37 1.97 1.41 1.20 1.62
Local and interurban passenger transit 1.96 1.65 2.42 1.62 1.47 1.78
Trucking and warehousing 1.56 1.45 1.69 1.49 1.38 1.59
Water transportation 1.51 1.26 1.87 1.26 1.02 1.51
Transportation by air 2.14 1.85 2.55 1.82 1.58 2.07
Pipelines, except natural gas 10.90 8.05 16.88 4.97 3.09 6.85
Transportation services 4.46 2.96 9.03 1.89 1.08 2.71
Communications 2.55 2.14 3.16 2.11 1.83 2.39
Telephone and telegraph 2.69 2.21 3.44 2.14 1.82 2.46
Radio and television 1.40 2.10 1.83 2.47 1.78 1.55 2.01
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 3.14 3.84 3.36 4.48 3.22 2.68 3.76
Wholesale trade 2.19 1.98 2.44 2.01 1.85 2.17
Retail trade 1.91 1.77 2.08 1.82 1.66 1.98
Finance, insurance, and real estate 5.01 4.62 5.47 4.83 4.47 5.19
Banking 2.47 2.19 2.82 2.14 1.84 2.44
Credit agencies other than banks 9.18 3.76 ∞ 1.04 0.20 1.88
Security and commodity brokers 2.10 1.69 2.77 1.62 1.37 1.87
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Roeger (1995) Oliveira Martins et al. (1996) L-based µ-based
Markup Markup Markup 95% CI (White) Markup 95% CI (White)
Insurance carriers 1.76 1.51 2.11 1.48 1.27 1.68
Insurance agents, brokers, and service 2.72 2.37 3.21 2.26 1.85 2.67
Real estate 23.02 18.81 29.64 17.12 14.95 19.30
Services 1.73 1.63 1.84 1.68 1.58 1.78
Hotels and other lodging places 2.01 1.84 2.22 1.88 1.68 2.08
Personal services 1.93 1.77 2.13 1.82 1.66 1.98
Business services 1.67 1.54 1.81 1.53 1.41 1.65
Auto repair, services, and parking 2.89 2.40 3.65 2.21 1.69 2.73
Miscellaneous repair services 2.77 2.22 3.67 1.98 1.54 2.43
Motion pictures 2.55 2.09 3.27 1.83 1.40 2.26
Amusement and recreation services 2.30 1.96 2.77 2.00 1.79 2.21
Health services 2.09 1.69 2.74 1.37 1.03 1.70
Legal services 3.47 2.89 4.35 2.37 1.74 3.00
Educational services 1.07 1.02 1.13 1.05 0.99 1.11
Other 1.19 1.13 1.25 1.17 1.11 1.23
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2.C.3 Calibration
Table 2.14: Average annual rate of ISTC by capital good
Capital Type ISTC rate
1960-75 1965-75
1 Computers and peripheral equipment 26.083 23.475
2 Pre-Packaged software 17.146 15.767
3 Customized software 0.512 0.971
4 Own-account software 4.386 4.440
5 Communication equipment 3.234 3.766
6 Instruments, photocopy, and related equipment 6.957 9.332
7 Office and accounting equipment 2.667 3.349
8 Fabricated metal products 2.769 2.262
9 Engines and turbines 3.117 2.126
10 Metalworking machinery 1.260 1.644
11 Special industry machinery 3.874 4.040
12 General industrial equipment 2.430 2.150
13 Electrical transmission, distribution, and industrial apparatus 4.316 2.877
14 Trucks, buses, and truck trailers 4.057 4.252
15 Autos 4.031 5.472
16 Aircraft 10.752 10.893
17 Ships and boats 2.199 1.933
18 Railroad equipment 1.538 2.216
19 Furniture and fixtures 1.871 1.644
20 Tractors 1.808 2.420
21 Agricultural machinery 0.092 0.122
22 Construction machinery 2.196 1.900
23 Mining and oilfield machinery 2.196 1.900
24 Service industry machinery 5.451 5.221
25 Electrical equipment 1.746 1.839
26 Other equipment 2.424 2.355
27 Structures 1.000 1.000
Sources: For equipment and software capital the underlying data is taken from the web appendix to Cummins and Violante
(2002). For structures we use the estimate of Gort, Greenwood, and Rupert (1999) which we assume to be valid for the
whole post-war period.
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Table 2.15: Calibrated share in final demand
Industry θYi [%]
1 FARMS 1.10419
2 AGRICULTURAL SERVICES, FORESTRY, FISHING 0.09339
3 METAL MINING 0.02490
4 COAL MINING 0.02205
5 OIL & GAS EXTRACTION 0.06561
6 NONMETALLIC MINERALS, EXCEPT FUELS 0.00291
7 CONSTRUCTION 10.59149
8 LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS 0.11373
9 FURNITURE AND FIXTURES 0.99012
10 STONE, CLAY, AND GLASS PRODUCTS 0.17679
11 PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES 0.13412
12 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 0.61937
13 INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY 3.24991
14 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 2.33676
15 MOTOR VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT 4.82430
16 OTHER TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 1.38573
17 INSTRUMENTS AND RELATED PRODUCTS 0.78747
18 MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING 0.87027
19 FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS 7.79307
20 TOBACCO PRODUCTS 0.67382
21 TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS 0.78039
22 APPAREL & OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS 2.36554
23 PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 0.30183
24 PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 0.65215
25 CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 1.38040
26 PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS 1.40795
27 RUBBER AND PLASTIC PRODUCTS 0.54685
28 LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS 0.55120
29 RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION 0.33863
30 LOCAL AND INTERURBAN TRANSIT 0.44804
31 TRUCKING AND WAREHOUSING 0.80221
32 WATER TRANSPORTATION 0.13292
33 AIR TRANSPORTATION 0.60672
34 PIPELINES, EXCEPT NATURAL GAS 0.03127
35 TRANSPORTATION SERVICES 0.03540
36 TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH SERVICES 1.60874
37 RADIO & TV BROADCASTING 0.00778
38 ELECTRIC SERVICES 1.30755
39 GAS SERVICES 0.67403
40 SANITARY SERVICES 0.13031
41 WHOLESALE TRADE 4.89388
42 RETAIL TRADE 15.11415
43 DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 1.33678
44 NONDEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 0.38531
45 SECURITY AND COMMODITY BROKERS 0.40867
46 INSURANCE CARRIERS 2.04622
47 INSURANCE AGENTS AND BROKERS 0.00000
48 REAL ESTATE 12.07569
49 HOTELS AND LODGING PLACES 0.51125
50 PERSONAL SERVICES 1.69478
51 BUSINESS SERVICES 0.40354
52 AUTO REPAIR, SERVICES, AND PARKING 1.46024
53 MOTION PICTURES 0.16037
54 AMUSEMENT AND RECREATION SERVICES 0.73559
55 HEALTH SERVICES 4.95109
56 LEGAL SERVICES 0.57186
57 EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 1.07725
58 OTHER SERVICES 2.20339
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Chapter 3
On the Cyclicality of R&D
Activities: Do Recessions Foster
Economic Growth?
3.1 Introduction
Background. — Economists have recently revived the long-standing notion that
cyclical fluctuations and productivity growth are closely interrelated.1 Some economists
argue that economic downturns may well be ideal times to enhance productivity.
Their reasoning is based on an opportunity cost argument: during recessions R&D
activities are relatively more profitable than goods production because forgone output,
the opportunity cost of R&D, is comparatively low (Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1998;
Saint-Paul, 1993). This is why in an endogenous growth framework short-run economic
fluctuations have a persistent impact on the economy’s output level, namely through
their impact on the intertemporal allocation of R&D resources over the business cycle
(Barlevy, 2007; Fata´s, 2000a,b).
The facts. — Empirical evidence for the post-war U.S. economy shows that R&D
activities are procyclical: both real R&D expenditures and employment of scientists
and engineers tend to rise during booms and fall during recessions. This procyclicality
1See, among others, Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998); Barlevy (2004, 2007); Comin and Gertler (2006);
Fata´s (2000a,b); Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2009); Nun˜o (2011); Posch and Wa¨lde (2011); Wa¨lde (2002,
2005).
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is documented at the aggregate and the industry level, and for total as well as industry-
funded R&D.2
The question. — Do recessions foster economic growth, as an opportunity cost
argument predicts? Or is it booms, as empirical evidence on R&D activity suggests?
First, the essay asks whether an endogenous growth framework is able to capture the
cyclical properties of R&D activities – both procyclical R&D investment and procyclical
employment of scientists and engineers. Then, the long-run consequences of business
cycle shocks on productivity are explored.
The approach. — I propose a calibrated real business cycle model featuring
R&D-based growth through horizontal innovations. The R&D process allows for
multiple inputs into R&D: labor and goods. This novel, more realistic description
of R&D is based on detailed evidence from the National Science Foundation. Then,
I quantitatively study the relevance of goods inputs into R&D as well as endogenous
labor supply for rendering R&D procyclical. To the best of my knowledge, this is
the first quantitative investigation into the determinants of the procyclicality of R&D.
Finally, I employ the calibrated model to investigate whether shocks enhance or weaken
endogenous total factor productivity (TFP).
The contribution. — The contribution of this essay is twofold: first, the essay
widens the perspective of the empirical literature on the cyclicality of R&D by
employing the classical RBC approach. It documents a set of new business cycle facts
related to R&D activities for the U.S. post-war economy. To compute these statistics,
aggregate macroeconomic data that treat R&D as investment are constructed, based
on the BEAs R&D Satellite Account (see Lee and Schmidt, 2010). As a consequence,
R&D investment constitutes a component of GDP. This incorporation yields national
accounts that are conceptually in line with the model.
Second, the essay contributes a new explanation for the observed procylicality of
R&D activities. Since a bare opportunity cost argument predicts countercyclical R&D,
the literature aims at resolving this discrepancy. While recent theoretical studies find
that market frictions such as dynamic R&D externalities may cause this discrepancy
between empirical evidence and the opportunity cost hypothesis, the current results
2See Barlevy (2007); Comin and Gertler (2006); Fata´s (2000a); Nun˜o (2011); Ouyang (2011).
59
suggest that complementarity among R&D inputs may play a vital role. Besides,
welfare-improving policy interventions are studied in the literature. Some authors (e.g.
Barlevy, 2007; Nun˜o, 2011) argue that an optimal intervention should reverse the
timing of R&D, e.g. by subsidizing R&D activities in recessions. I critically discuss such
proposals. Finally, the quantitative analysis contributes to settle the dispute about role
of labor supply (Barlevy, 2007; Fata´s, 2000a; Nun˜o, 2011).
Findings. — The specification of the R&D process with respect to factor inputs is
essential for both the cyclicality of R&D activities and the importance of endogenous
labor supply for these cyclical properties. First, I show that the popular knowledge-
driven specification of the R&D process has a hard time to generate both procyclical
R&D investment and procyclical R&D labor at the same time. Rather, R&D labor
tends to be countercyclical due to the opportunity cost effect unless labor supply is
very elastic or innovations earn a very small markup.3 Thus, R&D output and, hence,
endogenous TFP is typically countercyclical so that economic downturns foster TFP.
Moreover, due to its simplicity, the knowledge-driven model cannot match the empirical
values of the share of R&D investment in GDP and the number of scientists and
engineers simultaneously.
Second, I show that the calibrated multi-input specification generates procyclical
R&D investment as well as procyclical employment of scientists and engineers.
Intersectoral reallocation of workers seems to be much less relevant when the R&D
process involves multiple inputs. This might be due to complementarities between
R&D inputs. Besides, the endogenous growth mechanism amplifies business cycle
shocks. Therefore, the calibrated multi-input specification implies that booms promote
productivity growth. Finally, I conclude that a sound assessment of welfare-improving
policy interventions requires a careful modeling of the R&D process and results may
crucially depend on the underlying assumptions.
Sectioning. — The rest of this essay is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
empirical evidence on the cyclicality of R&D activities. Section 3 sets up the model.
3Note that in a knowledge-driven model with exogenous labor supply R&D labor is countercyclical
while R&D investment is ambiguous. In contrast, R&D investment is clearly procyclical under a lab-
equipment specification of R&D. These results follow immediately from Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998).
However, the lab-equipment model does not allow for R&D labor and, hence, is not well suited to
study the implications of business cycle shocks for R&D activities.
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Section 4 calibrates the model, reports the findings on the business cycle properties
of R&D activities, and quantifies the importance of the endogenous growth channel.
Section 5 summarizes the essay and offers some concluding comments.
3.2 Empirical Evidence
Most recent empirical studies for the U.S. find that real R&D expenditures are
procyclical.4 This procyclicality is documented at both the aggregate (Barlevy, 2007;
Comin and Gertler, 2006; Fata´s, 2000a; Nun˜o, 2011) and the industry (Barlevy, 2007;
Ouyang, 2011) level, for total as well as industry-funded R&D, and for both National
Science Foundation (NSF) and S&P Compustat data. However, these results are based
on NIPA national accounting standards which treat R&D as expense while from an
economic point of view R&D is seen as investment.
The present study considers a new data source: the BEAs R&D Satellite Account
(henceforth R&DSA) which extends the NSF-scope of R&D and incorporates it into
national accounting by treating R&D as investment (Lee and Schmidt, 2010).5 As a
consequence, the R&DSA do not only include R&D investment into GDP but also
provide a measure of the stock of R&D capital. During the post-war period, R&D
investment contributed on average 2.7% to GDP. R&D capital made up about 4.5% of
produced assets (cf. Figure 3.9 in Appendix 3.B).
Figure 3.1 compares the growth rates of private R&D investment and total funds for
industrial R&D from NSF. Both measures of R&D activity covary positively with GDP
growth and tend to move through troughs during NBER-recessions.6 This confirms the
procyclicality-result of previous literature for R&DSA data.
Employment of scientists and engineers (henceforth S&E) is weakly procyclical.
As is evident from Figure 3.2, the growth rate of scientists and engineers shows a
pattern similar to the growth rate in R&D investment. Barlevy (2007) reports that
4Wa¨lde and Woitek (2004) document procyclical contemporaneous correlations of R&D
expenditures with GDP for six out of seven G7 countries.
5Both R&D investment from R&DSA and total funds for industrial R&D from NSF grew in parallel
during the last 50 years, as Figure 3.10 in Appendix 3.C shows.
6As in Barlevy (2007), for the NSF time series the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s are an
exception. The R&DSA data, however, show a trough for the recession of 1981/82.
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Figure 3.1: Procyclicality of R&D
Notes: All variables are defined as real per-capita measures. The shaded regions correspond to
NBER-recessions.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, R&D Satellite Account; National Science Foundation
Figure 3.2: Cyclicality of employment
Notes: All variables are defined as real per-capita measures. The shaded regions correspond to
NBER-recessions.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA; National Science Foundation
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Figure 3.3: Composition of industrial R&D
Notes: The shaded regions correspond to NBER-recessions.
Source: National Science Foundation, Survey of Industrial Research and Development
the correlation between these two time series is about 0.6 which suggests that S&E
employment captures R&D activity only partially.
Indeed, the NSF data in Figure 3.3, left panel, reveal that only 46% of industrial
R&D funds are wages. Interestingly, expenditures for materials and supplies (17%)
and other costs (37%) comprise the majority of industrial R&D funds. Besides, the
R&D wage bill is split 3:2 between scientists and engineers, on the one hand, and
supporting personnel on the other hand. Both wage bill shares in industrial R&D
funds remained quite stable during the period under observation. Note that the share
of R&D supporting personnel in R&D funds is less than 20%.
Lastly, industrial performers spend on average 76% of R&D funds on development
activities, 20% on applied research, and 4% on basic research (Figure 3.3, right
panel). This means, industrial R&D activities are mainly directed towards ”translating
research findings or other scientific knowledge into products or processes” (Wolfe,
1997, p. 113) as development is defined.
Next, turn to standard business cycle measures of R&D activities. Following the
RBC literature, I consider logs of actual time series and extract trends using the
HP-filter. This yields cyclical components – percentage deviations from the trend –
for which first-order autocorrelations, standard deviations, and cross-correlations with
cyclical output are computed. Table 3.1 reports these summary statistics for R&D
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related series.7 Several features of the data are worth noting:
• Comovement: The cyclicality of R&D has attracted most attention. Recently,
there has emerged a consensus that total and private R&D expenditures
are procyclical: Barlevy (2007) reports a correlation of 0.39 between R&D
expenditure growth and GDP growth, while Nun˜o (2011) computes 0.27.
Comin and Gertler (2006) decompose R&D expenditures into trend, medium-
frequency oscillation, and high-frequency fluctuation and find a contemporaneous
correlation of 0.3 at both frequencies. Following the RBC approach, Cahn (2012)
finds a contemporaneous correlation coefficient of 0.48. Wa¨lde and Woitek (2004)
provide similar evidence for most G7 countries.
The findings for both industrial R&D expenditures (from NSF) and R&D
investment (from the R&DSA) confirm this procyclicality result and extend it to
several components of R&D. The facts are as follows.
1. Both industrial R&D expenditures and total R&D investment are
procyclical.
2. Private R&D investment is procyclical too, while federal government’s R&D
investments are only weakly correlated with contemporaneous GDP.
3. Development expenditures are procyclical, while basic and applied
research are essentially acyclical in the sense that their correlation with
contemporaneous output is close to zero.
4. The three R&D cost types – wages, materials & supplies, other costs –
show almost the same degree of comovement with output as private R&D
investment.
5. Their shares in industrial R&D expenditures are essentially acyclical.
6. R&D capital is essentially acyclical, as is the R&D investment share in GDP.
7. Scientist & Engineer’s labor is weakly procyclical and lags output.
• Volatility
7Business cycle summary statistics for standard series based on annual data are provided in Table
3.8 in Appendix 3.C.
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Table 3.1: Business Cycle Statistics of the U.S. Economy, 1959-2007
National Science Foundation
SDa AR(1) GDP−2 GDP−1 GDP GDP+1 GDP+2
GDP (NIPA) 1.98 0.57 0.04 0.57 1.00 0.57 0.04
Industrial R&D exp. 5.01 0.79 0.08 0.42 0.52 0.43 0.30
basic 10.28 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.25 0.33
applied 7.98 0.30 0.01 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.20
development 5.19 0.73 0.08 0.44 0.55 0.45 0.27
wage cost1 4.94 0.51 0.01 0.26 0.43 0.39 0.25
materials & supplies1 7.41 0.38 -0.18 0.20 0.42 0.27 0.14
other cost1 6.61 0.50 0.34 0.50 0.48 0.27 -0.03
R&D exp/GDP 4.33 0.75 0.08 0.22 0.15 0.24 0.33
R&D wage cost share1 2.34 0.34 -0.25 -0.34 -0.22 0.04 0.26
R&D materials share1 5.06 0.42 -0.39 -0.11 0.09 0.03 0.08
R&D other cost share1 4.03 0.40 0.40 0.32 0.14 -0.01 -0.21
wage cost ratio S to LR2 2.76 -0.01 0.69 0.13 -0.37 -0.15 -0.14
S&E labor 4.14 0.74 0.35 0.40 0.33 0.27 0.22
BEA R&D Satellite Account
SDa AR(1) GDP−2 GDP−1 GDP GDP+1 GDP+2
GDP 1.99 0.58 0.06 0.58 1.00 0.58 0.06
R&D investment, total 4.27 0.85 0.13 0.48 0.61 0.52 0.33
private 4.57 0.75 0.26 0.53 0.52 0.26 0.06
wage cost1 4.37 0.53 0.16 0.37 0.43 0.25 0.09
materials & supplies1 6.73 0.39 -0.11 0.26 0.43 0.18 0.03
other cost1 6.60 0.53 0.44 0.56 0.45 0.14 -0.17
fed. gov. extramural 5.98 0.82 -0.05 0.23 0.45 0.51 0.41
fed. gov. intramural 4.81 0.80 0.06 0.21 0.31 0.32 0.22
private + extramural 4.59 0.83 0.12 0.47 0.59 0.50 0.31
R&D capital, total 2.65 0.86 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.25 0.36
private 2.19 0.79 0.21 -0.04 -0.09 0.07 0.20
fed. gov. extramural 4.11 0.87 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.29 0.38
fed. gov. intramural 2.74 0.84 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.13 0.20
private + extramural 2.11 0.79 0.21 -0.01 -0.05 0.11 0.22
R&D inv/GDP 3.93 0.70 0.28 0.32 0.09 0.01 0.04
S&E labor (NSF) 4.14 0.74 0.36 0.42 0.35 0.28 0.23
All variables are defined as logarithms of real per-capita measures which are computed by normalizing with
the price index for GDP and the civilian noninstitutional population, aged 16 years and over. The business cycle
component is calculated as deviation from trend, using the HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 100. According
to these transformations, one can interpret the cyclical components as percentage deviations from the trend.
a Standard deviations are reported in percentage terms.
1 Period 1962-2007; between 1977 and 1997 data were collected only at biannual frequency. HP-filtering is conducted
with Schlicht (2008)’s MEND-code.
2 Period 1962-1975.
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1. While physical investment is almost four times as volatile as GDP, R&D
investment is only more than twice as volatile as GDP. This is in line with
Nun˜o (2011) and Comin and Gertler (2006)’s finding for the medium-term,
whereas Cahn (2012) finds a volatility that is only 15% higher than of GDP.
2. The share of R&D investment in GDP is about twice as volatile as GDP
while the share of physical investment is about three times as volatile.
3. Expenditures for industrial basic research are about 5 times, applied research
is 4 times, and development expenditures are about 2.5 times as volatile as
GDP.
4. Federal government’s extramural R&D investment is more volatile than are
federal intramural or private R&D investment.
5. R&D wage costs are about as volatile as industrial R&D expenditures while
materials & supplies costs and other costs are more volatile.
6. Their shares in industrial R&D expenditures are less volatile than the costs
itself.
7. Just as physical capital, R&D capital has about the same volatility as
output.
8. Scientist & Engineer’s labor is more than twice as volatile as GDP while
production labor has about the same volatility as output.
• Persistence
1. Both R&D investment and R&D capital are extremely persistent. Their
serial correlation is in the order of 0.8 to 0.9 at annual frequency which is
substantially higher than for output, consumption, or physical capital.
2. Basic and applied research are less persistent than development expendi-
tures.
3. Scientist & Engineer’s labor is more persistent than production labor.
The rest of this essay focuses mainly on the business cycle facts regarding the
cyclicality – i.e., the cross-correlation with GDP – and volatility of private R&D
investment.
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3.3 Model
The aim of the analysis is to investigate how relevant the opportunity cost hypothesis
is quantitatively for the business cycle patterns of R&D activities in the light of
endogenous labor supply. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time assessing
quantitatively the contribution of different determinants to the procyclicality of R&D.
For this, I incorporate endogenous growth into an otherwise standard RBC model which
allows comparing the business cycle properties of the model to the RBC literature.
This will facilitate the calibration of the model’s parameters. The building blocks of
the model are:
• a competitive final goods sector that benefits from an increasing division of labor,
• a monopolistically competitive machine production sector,
• a R&D sector employing both goods and labor inputs,
• a representative household that takes a consumption-savings decision, labor-
leisure decision, and a portfolio choice decision.
The model focuses on the R&D sector which generates economic growth
endogenously through horizontal innovations a` la Romer (1990). Guided by detailed
evidence from the National Science Foundation, the model considers a more realistic
framework of the R&D process that allows for multiple inputs. This is a novelty to the
literature which has so far either studied the knowledge-driven specification or the lab-
equipment specification of R&D. The substitution possibilities and complementarities
between R&D inputs, which are introduced by the multi-input specification, will also
be crucial for the cyclical properties of R&D investment.
The model enables an examination of how the cyclicality of R&D investment
depends on the relative importance of labor inputs in R&D activities. By successively
switching on features like endogenous labor supply or R&D labor, their importance
for the cyclical properties of equilibrium R&D are assessed. Then the main question
of the essay is addressed: how does the cyclicality of R&D activities influence long-run
productivity growth?
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3.3.1 Economy
Final goods production
Final goods Y are produced by competitive firms that hire production workers lY and
rent a set of machines, X(m),m ∈ [0,Mt]. The final goods sector as an aggregate can be
described by a representative firm with constant-returns-to-scale production function
that benefits from technological progress resulting in an increasing division of labor:
Yt = ηtl
Y
t
1−α
(
Mφρ+ρ−1t
∫ Mt
0
Xt(m)
ρdm
)α
ρ
(3.1)
where Mt denotes the number of machines that have already been discovered, φ > 0
measures returns to specialization, and ρ > 0 determines the elasticity of substitution
between machine varieties 1/(1 − ρ).8 ηt denotes a RBC shock; its log follows an
AR(1)-process with autocorrelation AR1 whose innovation  is white noise,  ∼
i.i.d. N(0;Std. dev.2):
ln ηt+1 = AR1 · ln ηt + t+1 (3.2)
The representative firm chooses its labor lY and machine X(m) inputs in order to
maximize its profit
ΠYt = Yt −WtlYt −
∫ Mt
0
pt(m)Xt(m)dm (3.3)
subject to this production function while it takes the wage rate W and rental rates for
machines p(m) as given. The first-order conditions determine labor demand
Wt = (1− α)ηtlYt −α
(
Mφρ+ρ−1t
∫ Mt
0
Xt(m)
ρdm
)α
ρ
= (1− α)Yt
lYt
(3.4)
and demand for each machine variety i:
Xt(i) =
αηtlYt 1−α
(
Mφρ+ρ−1t
∫Mt
0
Xt(m)
ρdm
)α
ρ
−1
pt(i)

1
1−ρ
(3.5)
8Such a CES-aggregator has been proposed by Benassy (1998); Ethier (1982). For φ = 1/ρ− 1 the
well-known Dixit-Stiglitz-aggregator is nested.
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Machine production
Machines are protected by patents. Each producer of a machine variety has to buy the
corresponding patent first which grants him the exclusive right to produce machines
of this variety. Thus, the machine production sector operates under monopolistic
competition. The production technology for machines is linear and allows the producer
to transform physical capital – which he rents at the market price rK – into machines
at a 1:1 rate. Each machine producer i is assumed to set a price p(i) that maximizes
his static profit contribution
ΠXt (i) = (pt(i)− rKt )Xt(i) (3.6)
This price follows the standard monopoly pricing rule, i.e. is just a markup over
marginal costs
pt(i) =
1
ρ
· rKt (3.7)
which is the same for all machine producers.
R&D activities
There is a large number of identical innovators that can decide to hire scientists and
engineers sR, R&D supporting workers lR, and goods inputs Z in order to conduct
R&D activities. Research results in discoveries of new machine varieties D. They
are immediately patented and can be sold at the price V . The R&D sector can
be described by an representative innovator that conducts research according to the
following constant-returns-to-scale innovation possibilities frontier (IPF)
Dt = νt · sRt ωlRt ψZ1−ψ−ωt (3.8)
and takes the productivity of R&D effort νt as given. The parameters ω, ψ ∈ [0; 1]
control the wage shares of scientists and R&D supporting workers, respectively.
Note that allowing for three different input factors is a novelty. The proposed IPF,
which I call multi-input specification, is more general than the literature. While the
endogenous growth literature has focussed on single input specifications so far, the
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multi-input IPF nests both well-known special cases: the lab-equipment specification
for ω = ψ = 0 and the knowledge-driven specification for ψ = 1, ω = 0. Besides, the
literature usually considers only one type of labor which is split up between production
and R&D, whereas the present model distinguishes between two types: scientists &
engineers who can be employed only in the R&D sector and workers who can be
employed in both producing goods and supporting R&D. This distinction is motivated
by the objection that production workers may be a poor substitute for scientists and
engineers in undertaking research and vice versa.9 Rather, S&E labor is found to
be quite inelastic at business cycle frequencies (Goolsbee, 1998; Romer, 2001). For
this reason, I believe that separating scientists and engineers from R&D supporting
workers is essential when assessing the quantitative relevance of the opportunity costs
hypothesis.
The choice of a Cobb-Douglas functional form is motivated by NSF evidence (shown
in Figure 3.3) that the wage bill shares of both scientists & engineers and supporting
R&D personnel in industrial R&D funds remained quite stable during the postwar
period. Besides, Table 3.1 reveals that the cyclical properties of private R&D investment
by cost type are very similar.
Profits of the representative R&D firm are sales revenues net of R&D costs which
consist of the wage bill of scientists and engineers W SsR, the wage bill of supporting
R&D personnel WlR, and goods costs Z.
ΠRt = Vt ·Dt −
(
W St s
R
t +Wtl
R
t + Zt
)
(3.9)
Profit maximization implies the following optimal relative factor demand functions
lRt
Zt
=
ψ
1− ψ − ω
1
Wt
(3.10)
sRt
Zt
=
ω
1− ψ − ω
1
W St
(3.11)
which display substitution possibilities among R&D inputs. The third first-order
9Barlevy (2007) discusses this objection but sticks to the classical approach of the knowledge-driven
endogenous growth literature.
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condition determines the value of an innovation as
Vt =
1
1− ψ − ω ·
Zt
Dt
=
Et
Dt
(3.12)
implying the zero-profit condition that the value of discoveries V D is equal to R&D
costs:
Et ≡ W St sRt +WtlRt + Zt =
1
1− ψ − ωZt (3.13)
Last but not least, discoveries D accumulate according to the following law of
motion
Mt+1 = Mt +Dt (3.14)
The aggregate number of machines discovered M , in turn, determines the productivity
of R&D effort as follows
νt = ν¯ ·Mυt (3.15)
where υ ≤ 1 controls the knowledge spillover. Individual innovators, however, ignore
this standing-on-the-shoulders externality at the aggregate level.
Household sector
The household sector is modeled as a representative family that takes three decisions:
• a consumption-savings decision.
• a labor-leisure decision. The household elastically supplies two types of labor:
workers lH and scientists & engineers sH . While workers can be employed both
in producing goods and in supporting R&D, scientists & engineers are assumed
to be employable only in the R&D sector.
• a portfolio choice decision. The household may invest in two assets: physical
capital and R&D capital.
Lifetime utility is assumed to be separable between consumption and hours worked
with constant Frisch labor supply elasticities of 1/γ and 1/θ, respectively
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U = E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
logCt − (1− ς) · ζ l
H
t
1+γ
1 + γ
− ς · χs
H
t
1+θ
1 + θ
)]
(3.16)
where the parameters ζ and χ measure the disutility of working and ς denotes the
fraction of scientists and engineers in the representative family. When maximizing
lifetime utility, the household faces a sequential budget constraint
Ct + VtHt+1 +Kt+1 =
(
Vt + Π
X
t
)
Ht + (1 + r
K
t − δK)Kt +WtlHt +W St sHt (3.17)
where H denotes the holdings in machine producers equity at the beginning of each
period and K the beginning-of-period capital stock.
The first-order conditions give rise to the labor supply functions
lHt =
(
1
(1− ς) · ζ
Wt
Ct
) 1
γ
(3.18)
sHt =
(
1
ς · χ
W St
Ct
) 1
θ
(3.19)
the Euler equation
C−1t = βEt
[
C−1t+1(1 + r
K
t+1 − δK))
]
(3.20)
and an equality-of-expected-returns condition
Et
[
C−1t+1
(
1 + rKt+1 − δK −
Vt+1 + Π
X
t+1
Vt
)]
= 0 (3.21)
The corresponding transversality condition reads as
lim
t→∞
βt E0
[
C−1t
(
(1 + rKt − δK)Kt +
(
Vt + Π
X
t
)
Ht
)]
= 0 (3.22)
3.3.2 Characterization of equilibrium
The economy is defined by a vector of endowments < ς,K0,M0 > and a vector of
parameters < β, ζ, γ, χ, θ;α, ρ, φ, δK , ω, ψ, ν¯ >.
Definition 1. An equilibrium for this economy is an allocation such that
1. households choose {Ct, lHt , sHt , Ht+1, Kt+1}∞t=0 to maximize expected lifetime utility
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(i.e. satisfy (3.17) - (3.21)),
2. final good firms choose {lYt , {Xt(m)}m∈[0,Mt]}∞t=0 to maximize profits under perfect
competition (i.e. satisfy (3.4), (3.5)),
3. R&D firms choose {lRt , sRt , Zt}∞t=0 to maximize profits under perfect competition
(i.e. satisfy (3.10) - (3.12)),
4. all machine producers m ∈ [0,Mt] choose {pt(m), Xt(m)}∞t=0 to maximize the
discounted value of profits under monopolistic competition (i.e. satisfy (3.7)),
5. the time path of available machine varieties {Mt}∞t=1 is determined by free entry
(i.e. follows (3.14)),
6. and the evolution of prices {Wt,W St , rKt , pt, Vt}∞t=0 is consistent with market
clearing, i.e.
capital market
physical capital:
Kt =
∫ Mt
0
Xt(m)dm (3.23)
stocks of machine producers:
Ht = Mt (3.24)
labor market
workers:
lHt = l
Y
t + l
R
t (3.25)
scientists and engineers:
sHt = s
R
t (3.26)
goods market
Kt+1 = (1− δK)Kt + Yt − Ct − Zt (3.27)
The set of equilibrium conditions consists of 18 equations in 3 state variables
< Kt,Mt, ηt >, 12 endogenous variables < Yt, Ct, Zt, l
H
t , l
Y
t , l
R
t , s
H
t , s
R
t , Dt, Ht, Xt,Π
x
t >,
and 5 prices < Wt,W
S
t , r
K
t , pt, Vt >.
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First, it is shown that in equilibrium the economy operates under the familiar
Cobb-Douglas production technology. Second, both the physical and the R&D capital-
output ratio are computed. Finally, expressions for the allocation of workers between
final goods production and supporting R&D are derived.
Consider the machine production sector. Due to symmetry, all machine producers
charge the same price
pt =
rKt
ρ
(3.28)
and sell the same quantity of their variety
Xt =
(
ρα
rKt
ηtM
αφ−(1−α)
t
) 1
1−α
lYt =
ρα
rKt
Yt
Mt
(3.29)
Thus, under symmetry the market clearing condition for physical capital (3.23) becomes
Kt = MtXt which gives rise to a Cobb-Douglas final goods production function
Yt = ηt · AtlYt 1−αKαt (3.30)
where total factor productivity consists of a RBC shock η and an endogenous
productivity component A ≡Mαφ arising from an expansion in machine varieties.
Now, consider the capital-output ratios. Under symmetry the physical-capital-
output ratio can be written as (from (3.29)):
Kt
Yt
=
ρα
rKt
(3.31)
And the machine producer’s static profit contribution
ΠXt =
(
rKt
ρ
− rKt
)
Xt = α(1− ρ) Yt
Mt
(3.32)
determines the R&D-capital-output ratio as:
VtMt
Yt
= α(1− ρ) Vt
ΠXt
(3.33)
The intersectoral allocation of workers depends on the share of R&D investment in
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GDP
lRt
lYt
=
1
1− α
ψ
1− ω − ψ
Zt
Yt
=
ψ
1− α
Et
Yt
(3.34)
This follows immediately from intersectoral labor mobility and the competitive firm
behavior. The relationship implies that relatively more workers are allocated to support
R&D activities when the share of R&D investment in GDP is high. This link gives
birth to a channel allocating relatively more labor to the R&D sector which may
counteract the opportunity cost argument. Note that this channel goes back to the
multi-input specification of the R&D process, namely the fact that R&D input factors
are complementing each other.
3.3.3 Balanced Growth Path
In this section, the balanced growth path for a deterministic version of the above
economy will be characterized. To this purpose, restrictions on the BGP growth rate
are derived. Appendix 3.A.2 discusses how the great ratios depend on the BGP growth
rate and model parameters. In addition, analytical results for a few boundary cases are
provided.
The national accounting identity Y = C+ I+Z implies that output, consumption,
physical investment, and R&D investment grow at the same (gross) rate: gY = gC =
gI = gZ ≡ g. The final goods production function under symmetry implies gY = gαφM ·gαK
and the capital accumulation equation gK = gI . Therefore,
g = g
αφ
1−α
M ⇔ gM = g
1−α
αφ (3.35)
The innovation possibilities frontier (3.8) determines the growth rate of machines
varieties
gM = ν¯M
υ−1sR
ω
lR
ψ
Z1−ψ−ω (3.36)
which is constant if g1−υM = g
(1−ψ−ω)
Z . This restricts the knowledge spillover to be υ =
1− (1−ψ−ω) αφ
1−α .
10 Note that for sustaining productivity growth in the long-run the
10Growiec (2010) discusses the necessity of such a knife-edge condition for any model generating
exponential growth.
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economy must sustain the fraction of resources allocated to R&D; anything that raises
this fraction will increase the TFP growth rate on BGP. That is, the productivity-
growth function belongs to the class of second-generation fully endogenous models (Ha
and Howitt, 2007).
3.4 Quantitative Analysis
3.4.1 Solution Method
The purpose of solving the model is to determine whether, at the calibrated parameter
values, the model can deliver procyclical R&D activities and what role the specification
of the R&D process as well as endogenous labor supply play in accounting for these
patterns. Like for many DSGE models, it is not possible to solve the present model
analytically for an equilibrium. Actually, except for special cases (see Appendix 3.A.2)
one cannot even derive a closed-form solution of the stationary equilibrium for the
corresponding non-stochastic economy.
Therefore, the equations that define an equilibrium must be solved numerically.
To this end, a log-transformation of the set of stationary equilibriums conditions
reported in Appendix 3.A.1 is used. The solution describes the balanced growth
path of the corresponding deterministic model economy at the calibrated parameter
values. Transitional dynamics are computed by a first-order approximation around the
deterministic balanced growth path, applying code provided by Gomme and Klein
(2011).11 Then, the approximated laws of motion are exploited to simulate endogenous
variables. Finally, business cycle statistics are computed from the simulated time series
by a standard Monte Carlo method.
3.4.2 Calibration
The calibration exercise deals with assigning particular values to the 14 parameters
of the model. The model is calibrated to match key empirical evidence for the U.S.
economy during the period 1959-2007. Whenever possible, I rely on long-run growth
11The Gomme and Klein (2011) code provides numerical solutions for systems of second-order
expectational difference equations and, hence, can be applied to a variety of dynamic economic models.
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Table 3.2: Growth statistics for the U.S. and model economies
Data Model
growth statistic U.S. economy1 knowledge-driven multi-input
GDP growth rate 1.9 1.9T 1.9T
K/GDP 279.8 279.8T 279.8T
I/GDP 15.7 15.7T 15.7T
VM/GDP 10.3 132.3 329.2
E/GDP 2.3 7.9 2.3T
Y/GDP 98.9 92.1 98.9
portfolio VM/(K + VM) 3.5 32.1 54.1
total wage bill / GDP 64.0a 64.0T 64.0T
R&D wage bill share 46.1 100.0 46.1T
Ratio W S ∗ sR to W ∗ lR 151.2 – 151.2T
labor supply sH [FTE] 0.3 – 0.3T
labor supply lH [FTE] 42.8 43.2T 42.8T
lR 5.3 0.3
Π/V 9.1 3.6
gV -3.9 1.2
W S/W – 127.2
net return rK − δK 4.9 4.9
net markup 1/ρ− 1 50.0T 50.0T
in per cent.
1 R&DSA data, period 1959-2007.
a Source: Kydland and Prescott (1982)
T Calibration target.
facts. Otherwise, calibration is based on micro-evidence reported in the literature.
I regard the calibration presented here as a benchmark; an alternative one will be
discussed later on.
There are data on the economy’s wage bill Wl + W Ss, total employment l + s,
employment of scientists and engineers s, GDP , output Y , physical investment I,
R&D investment E by funder, capital stock K, R&D capital VM , and growth rate
g as well as wage payments to R&D supporting personnel WlR and scientists and
engineers W Ss.
I use these data to compute several growth statistics (Table 3.2, column 1), in
particular the great ratios, which serve as calibration targets. In other words, parameter
values are set such that the model economy matches features of actual U.S. data that
characterize economic growth in the long run. As a consequence, the model economies
will display these prescribed properties by construction (cf. Table 3.2, columns 2 and
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3).12 The following discusses for the multi-input model how these growth statistics
reported in Table 3.2 uniquely pin down its parameter values which are summarized
in Table 3.3.
RBC shock parameters. In the RBC literature, the shock process is well
characterized. However, RBC models are usually calibrated to quarterly data, while
I have to calibrate an annual model due to data availability. Therefore, I follow King
and Rebelo (1999, p. 952) to estimate the stochastic process of the RBC shock for
an exogenous growth model based on annual data. In particular, they assume an
AR(1) RBC shock process and estimate the persistence and standard deviation of
the innovation from the residuals of a regression of the log-Solow residual on a linear
trend. The results which are reported in Table 3.9 in the Appendix suggest to assign
an autocorrelation of 0.85 and a standard deviation of 1.5%.
R&D technology parameters. The IPF share parameters ψ, ω can be set directly
from NSF data on R&D costs by type (using (3.10) and (3.11) ):
ψ + ω =
WlR +W Ss
E
(3.37)
ω
ψ
=
W Ss
WlR
(3.38)
and R&D productivity is determined by the innovation possibilities frontier13
ν¯ =
g
1−α
αφ − 1
sω
(
lR
lH
lH
)ψ (
(1− ω − ψ) E
GDP
(
Y
GDP
)−1 Y
M
αφ
1−α
)1−ω−ψ (3.39)
with (using (3.10), (3.11), and (3.13) )
lR
lH
=
WlR
(Wl +W Ss)−W Ss =
ψ E
GDP
(Wl+WSs)
GDP
− ω E
GDP
(3.40)
12Hence, such an accordance does not test the theory. Rather, a test of the theory is whether these
parameter values give rise to business cycle properties of the model economy that are quantitatively
consistent with the observed behavior of the U.S. economy. Moreover, selected parameters should be
plausible in light of micro evidence.
13This requires a measure of detrended output y = Y
M
αφ
1−α
. In the numerical part, I will normalize
BGP output y∗ = 1. Note that this dependence of ν¯ is needed to kill the scale effect.
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Table 3.3: Multi-input model economy: calibrated parameter values (markup-
calibration)
Preferences Shock
β (1− ς)ζ γ ςχ θ AR(1) Std. dev.
0.972 4.21 1 0.0666 1 0.85 0.015
Technology
α ρ φ δK ω ψ ν¯
0.364 0.667 4.6 0.0372 0.277 0.183 1.05
Preference parameters. The disutility of work parameters ζ, χ are calibrated
according to the household’s intratemporal first-order conditions (3.18) and (3.19)
(1−ς)ζ = Wl
GDP
·
(
C
GDP
· lH1+γ
)−1
=
(
Wl +W Ss
GDP
− ω E
GDP
)
·
(
GDP − I − E
GDP
· lH1+γ
)−1
(3.41)
ςχ =
W Ss
GDP
·
(
C
GDP
· s1+θ
)−1
= ω
E
GDP
·
(
GDP − I − E
GDP
· s1+θ
)−1
(3.42)
for given Frisch labor supply elasticities which remain free parameters.14
Then I follow Comin and Gertler (2006); Nun˜o (2011); Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
who choose a Frisch elasticity of 1 which represents an intermediate value for the range
of estimates across micro and macro literature.15 Consequently, I set both labor supply
elasticities to 1.16
The discount factor is calibrated from the Euler equation to match the physical-
capital-output ratio.
β =
g
1 + ρα
(
K
GDP
)−1 Y
GDP
− δK
(3.43)
Production technology parameters. The capital share parameter α of the
production function is indirectly determined by the economy’s wage bill share via
14Note that ςχ ≡ χˆ and (1− ς)ζ ≡ ζˆ, respectively, are only jointly identified.
15Regarding the Frisch elasticity see survey on estimates by Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber
(2011) and discussion by R´ıos-Rull, Schorfheide, Fuentes-Albero, Kryshko, and Santaeula`lia-Llopis
(2012).
16The choice of the Frisch elasticity for scientists and engineers is based on ignorance. On the one
hand, Goolsbee (1998) argues that labor supply of scientists and engineers is quite inelastic in the
short run, estimating elasticities of supply between 0.1 and 0.2. On the other hand, the business cycle
statistics reported in Table 3.1 reveal that labor supply of scientists and engineers is about twice as
volatile as labor supply of workers. To match this business cycle fact the model, however, requires a
high Frisch elasticity.
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Table 3.4: Knowledge-driven model economy: calibrated parameter values (markup-
calibration)
Preferences Technology Shock
β (1− ς)ζ γ α ρ φ δK ν¯ AR(1) Std. dev.
0.972 4.49 1 0.391 0.667 0.5 0.0372 1.12 0.85 0.015
equation (3.4).
1− α = Wl
Y
Y
=
(
Wl +W Ss
GDP
− Wl
R +W Ss
E
· E
GDP
)
·
(
Y
GDP
)−1
(3.44)
where GDP = C + I + E = Y + WlR + W Ss. Depreciation of physical capital is
calibrated from the law of motion:
δK =
I
GDP
·
(
K
GDP
)−1
− (g − 1) (3.45)
Following the endogenous growth literature (e.g. Comin, 2004; Jones and Williams,
2000), the substitution parameter for machine varieties ρ is calibrated to match the
value of the gross markup
ρ =
1
markup
. (3.46)
Hence, I call this calibration variant the markup-calibration. According to Comin
(2004) the markups innovators can charge should be higher than typical estimates
for the average markup in the U.S. economy due to patent protection and up front
fixed costs. Therefore, I regard a markup of 50% – as proposed by Comin (2004) – to
be more appropriate for equipment investment goods.
Then, the gains-from-variety-expansion parameter φ is determined by
g
1−α
αφ = 1 +
E
Y
· g
1−α
αφ /β − 1
(1− ρ)α (3.47)
Knowledge-driven model. The knowledge-driven model is calibrated analo-
gously. However, since its R&D specification just employs workers while scientists and
engineers are not modeled, the model is calibrated to the U.S. economy’s total labor
supply of 43.2% (Table 3.2, column 2). Moreover, the classical knowledge-driven model
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Table 3.5: Business cycle statistics for the U.S. and model economies (markup-
calibration)
Data Model
US Economy Knowledge-driven Multi-input
rel. SD Corr. rel. SD Corr. rel. SD Corr.
GDP 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Consumption 0.87 0.93 0.44 0.92 0.47 0.94
Phys. investment 3.81 0.81 4.58 0.98 4.00 0.97
R&D investment 2.30 0.52 0.19 -0.16 1.44 0.93
Phys. capital 0.67 -0.13 0.43 0.56 0.37 0.59
R&D capital 1.10 -0.09 0.68 0.99 0.40 0.95
Labor 1.13 0.85 0.43 0.96 0.28 0.98
S&E labor 2.08 0.35 0.72 -0.99 0.50 0.89
R&D inv./GDP 1.97 0.09 1.05 -0.99 0.66 0.49
All variables are defined as logarithms of real per-capita measures. The business cycle component
is calculated as deviation from trend, using the HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 100.
According to these transformations, one can interpret the cyclical components as percentage
deviations from the trend.
Reported figures for the model economies are sample means of statistics computed for each of
67600 simulations, each of which was 49 periods long as is the U.S. time series.
assumes φ = 1
ρ
− 1. Hence, returns to specialization are implicitly pinned down by the
calibrated value of the markup.17 The resulting parameter values are reported in Table
3.4.
3.4.3 Findings: cyclical behavior of the model economies
This section quantitatively analyzes the cyclical properties of R&D activities in both
the knowledge-driven model economy and the multi-input economy. First, I show that
the knowledge-driven model fails to match the empirical cyclicality patterns of R&D
in the U.S. economy for plausibly calibrated parameters. Second, I demonstrate that
the multi-input specification of the R&D process improves in matching business cycle
moments of the U.S. economy and that in the calibrated model economy booms foster
TFP through the endogenous growth channel.
17For a critical discussion see Benassy (1998).
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Figure 3.4: Knowledge-driven model economy: Sensitivity w.r.t. labor supply elasticity
Figure 3.5: Knowledge-driven model economy: Sensitivity w.r.t. markup
Business cycle moments of the knowledge-driven model
While for the U.S. economy both R&D investment and R&D labor are procyclical, the
calibrated knowledge-driven model predicts countercyclical employment in the research
sector as well as weakly countercyclical R&D investment (Table 3.5). Figures 3.4 and
3.5 investigate how these cyclicality results depend on the calibrated parameter values
of the labor supply elasticity and the markup, respectively. The sensitivity analysis
reveals that the knowledge-driven model may generate procyclical R&D investment for
reasonable parameter values: labor supply needs to be a bit more elastic than in the
benchmark calibration or the markup a little lower.
In order to render R&D labor procyclical, however, either labor supply has to
be very elastic (with values of the Frisch elasticity 1/γ exceeding 3; see Figure 3.4) or
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Figure 3.6: Knowledge-driven model economy: growth effects
machine producers can earn only low margins of less than 10% (Figure 3.5). The reason
is that for high values of the labor supply elasticity procyclicality of total labor supply
dominates the opportunity cost effect which reallocates labor from R&D activities
to goods production during a boom. However, such calibrations are at odds with
the literature. Recently there has emerged a consensus that advocates an aggregate
Frisch elasticity of around 1 (cf. Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber, 2011; R´ıos-Rull,
Schorfheide, Fuentes-Albero, Kryshko, and Santaeula`lia-Llopis, 2012; Trabandt and
Uhlig, 2011, and the literature discussed therein). Moreover, the literature seems to
agree that a markup of 20% constitutes a lower bound for capital goods (Barlevy,
2007; Comin, 2004; Comin and Gertler, 2006).
Rather for a large range of standard parameterizations, the knowledge-driven
model results in countercyclical R&D labor which is counterfactual. Countercyclical
employment in the R&D sector, in turn, implies that R&D output is countercyclical,
too. Consequently, the model predicts booms to weaken TFP growth: A 1% positive
RBC shock entails a 0.079% lower TFP level after 10 years (Figure 3.6). Note that
these endogenous growth repercussions of RBC shocks are valid for a broad range of
plausible parameter values as figures 3.4 and 3.5 show.
In conclusion, the popular knowledge-driven specification of the R&D process has a
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Figure 3.7: Multi-input model economy: cyclicality of R&D activities
Notes: The experiment is conducted by varying the combined R&D labor share ω+ψ while holding
the ratio ω/ψ constant at the calibrated value.
hard time to generate procyclical R&D: while R&D investments – which are identical to
the wage bill of scientists and engineers under the knowledge-driven specification – may
plausibly be procyclical due to procyclical wage rates, the opportunity cost argument
constitutes a strong incentive for R&D labor and R&D output to be countercyclical.
This is clearly at odds with the empirical evidence. Moreover, the knowledge-driven
model tends to predict that R&D activities are less volatile than GDP whereas the
empirical measures are more than twice as volatile (Figures 3.4 and 3.5).
Business cycle moments of the multi-input model
In contrast to the knowledge-driven specification, the multi-input specification of
the R&D process is capable to generate procyclical R&D investment, procyclical
employment of scientists and engineers as well as procyclical employment of R&D
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supporting personnel. Therefore, it can replicate the data. Due to this procyclicality of
inputs, the endogenous growth mechanism gives rise to amplification of business cycle
shocks. In other words, booms promote productivity growth. In the following, I study
the calibrated model and show that this is indeed the case.
The calibrated multi-input model predicts that both employment of scientists and
engineers and R&D investment are procyclical (Table 3.5). This is true independently
of the parameter values for both Frisch elasticities and the markup as the sensitivity
analysis in Appendix 3.C.4 shows. Interestingly, even for low values of the labor
supply elasticity employment of R&D workers is not countercyclical (Figure 3.12 in the
Appendix). This suggests that intersectoral reallocation of labor is much less attractive
when the R&D process involves multiple inputs, a substantial share of them being
supplied procyclically, and substitution possibilities among inputs are not perfect.
Figure 3.7 sheds light on the role the innovation possibility frontier plays for the
cyclicality of R&D activities. The experiment underlying these graphs is to vary the
combined share of labor inputs in R&D ω + ψ, simulate the corresponding model
economy, and compute the cross-correlation of R&D activities with GDP. This exercise
is motivated by the finding of Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998) that the cyclical pattern of
R&D differs completely whether a lab-equipment or a knowledge-driven specification
of R&D – the boundary cases of the multi-input specification – is employed. In
contrast to Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998), I allow for endogenous labor supply and
consider different values of the Frisch elasticity because endogenous labor supply and
intersectoral reallocation of labor work in opposite directions. To this purpose, I pick
three values of the elasticity that cover the range of plausible parameter values.
Figure 3.7 reveals that for low R&D labor shares R&D activities are clearly
procyclical, independent of the labor supply elasticity. In this case goods – which are
supplied procyclically – are the main ingredient of R&D and impose their cyclical
pattern upon both labor inputs. Consequently, booms foster TFP growth which is in
line with Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998)’s finding for a lab-equipment model. However, if
labor were dominant in R&D activities (with the combined R&D labor share exceeding
50 per cent), R&D supporting personnel as well as S&E employment could become
countercyclical. Note that the turning point depends on the Frisch elasticity: the less
elastic labor supply is, the sooner the opportunity cost effect dominates and R&D
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Figure 3.8: Multi-input model economy: growth effects
labor becomes countercyclical. Finally, R&D output becomes countercyclical in this
case despite R&D investment remains procyclical. Again, this is in line with Aghion
and Saint-Paul (1998)’s finding that in a knowledge-driven economy recessions enhance
productivity.
To sum up, procyclical R&D inputs – as observed in U.S. data – imply that
endogenous TFP, i.e. R&D output, is procyclical, too. The sensitivity analysis shows
that this outcome is largely independent of parameter values for both Frisch elasticities
and the markup (Appendix 3.C.4), while large R&D labor shares may overturn this
finding. However, the latter does not seem to be the case for the U.S. economy as its
R&D labor share is moderate. Rather, the calibrated multi-input specification implies
that a 1% positive RBC shock raises endogenous TFP A by additional 0.257% within 10
years (Figure 3.8). That is, RBC shocks are amplified through the endogenous growth
mechanism. Hence, booms enhance economic growth.
3.4.4 Robustness: targeting R&D capital
This section considers an alternative calibration exercise and discusses the robustness
of previous findings. The R&D Satellite Accounts allow for another plausible way of
identifying model parameters: as these accounts provide data on R&D capital, the
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Table 3.6: Growth statistics for the U.S. and model economies (R&D-stock-calibration)
Data Model
growth statistic U.S. economy1 knowledge-driven multi-input
GDP growth rate 1.9 1.9T 1.9T
K/GDP 279.8 279.8T 279.8T
I/GDP 15.7 15.7T 15.7T
VM/GDP 10.3 10.3T 10.3T
E/GDP 2.3 3.1 2.3T
Y/GDP 98.9 96.9 98.9
portfolio VM/(K + VM) 3.5 3.5 3.5
total wage bill / GDP 64.0a 64.0T 64.0T
R&D wage bill share 46.1 100.0 46.1T
Ratio W S ∗ sR to W ∗ lR 151.2 – 151.2T
labor supply sH [FTE] 0.3 – 0.3T
labor supply lH [FTE] 42.8 43.2T 42.8T
lR 2.1 0.3
Π/V 37.6 30.2
gV -21.7 -17.0
W S/W – 127.2
net return rK − δK 7.8 8.0
net markup 1/ρ− 1 12.0 9.4
in per cent.
1 R&DSA data, period 1959-2007.
a Source: Kydland and Prescott (1982)
T Calibration target.
R&D-capital-output-ratio can be targeted instead of the markup. Hence, I call this
new identification scheme the R&D-stock-calibration.
The law of motion for machine varieties is used to calibrate the gains-from-variety-
expansion parameter φ in order to target the investment share and capital-output-ratio
for R&D capital:
g
1−α
αφ = 1 +
E
GDP
·
(
VM
GDP
)−1
(3.48)
Then, the substitution parameter ρ which determines the markup is pinned down by
1
ρ
= 1 +
VM
K
· g
1−α
αφ /β − 1
g/β − (1− δK) (3.49)
The calibrated parameter values are relegated to Appendix 3.C.5, Tables 3.10 and
3.11, respectively, while the underlying calibration targets and corresponding growth
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Table 3.7: Business cycle statistics for the U.S. and model economies (R&D-stock-
calibration)
Data Model
US Economy Knowledge-driven Multi-input
rel. SD Corr. rel. SD Corr. rel. SD Corr.
GDP 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Consumption 0.87 0.93 0.43 0.90 0.44 0.91
Phys. investment 3.81 0.81 4.42 0.97 4.34 0.97
R&D investment 2.30 0.52 0.64 0.99 0.75 0.99
Phys. capital 0.67 -0.13 0.40 0.58 0.40 0.59
R&D capital 1.10 -0.09 0.70 0.99 0.29 0.97
Labor 1.13 0.85 0.34 0.96 0.31 0.97
S&E labor 2.08 0.35 0.06 -0.89 0.18 0.99
R&D inv./GDP 1.97 0.09 0.37 -0.98 0.29 -0.88
All variables are defined as logarithms of real per-capita measures. The business cycle component
is calculated as deviation from trend, using the HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 100.
According to these transformations, one can interpret the cyclical components as percentage
deviations from the trend.
Reported figures for the model economies are sample means of statistics computed for each of
67600 simulations, each of which was 49 periods long as is the U.S. time series.
statistics are reported in Table 3.6. Two statistics are worth to mention: First, the loss
in value of patents implied by the multi-input model is 17%. Interestingly, this is close
to the range of 13% to 16% estimated by Bessen (2008). Second, implied markups of
9% and 12% are very low – probably too low to be plausible.
Under the current calibration, the knowledge-driven specification generates
procyclical R&D investment, while R&D labor remains countercyclical as already
predicted by the markup-calibration (Table 3.7, column 2). For the multi-input model
(Table 3.7, column 3) both calibrations yield, by and large, the same cross-correlations
of R&D inputs with GDP. However, the markup-calibration slightly outperforms the
R&D-stock-calibration with respect to volatilities.
In conclusion, the robustness analysis confirms that knowledge-driven models fail
to explain procyclical R&D labor while multi-input economies perform reasonably well
in quantitatively characterizing the cyclical properties of R&D activities.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
Employing a calibrated real business cycle model featuring R&D-based growth, I
quantitatively study the implications of business cycle shocks for productivity growth.
First, the essay may settle the discussion on the role of endogenous labor supply
for procyclical R&D activities in knowledge-driven model economies. I show that
for reasonable calibrations of the labor supply elasticity the opportunity cost effect
dominates and, hence, the knowledge-driven specification is not capable to generate
procyclical R&D labor as observed in the data. Second, I propose a multi-input
specification of the R&D process which is able to generate both procyclical R&D
investment and procyclical employment of scientists and engineers at the same time.
The main finding is that for a broad range of plausible parameter values booms promote
productivity growth. The reason is that business cycle shocks are amplified by the
endogenous growth mechanism. This result stands in contrast to the prediction of the
simple knowledge-driven model.
This highlights that the specification of the R&D process is crucial for the cyclical
properties of R&D activities. Therefore, normative statements derived from knowledge-
driven models should be treated with caution: for example, recessions may not be
ideal times to conduct R&D. Moreover, findings regarding optimal policies in classical
knowledge-driven or lab-equipment models might not be robust to a generalization of
the innovation possibility frontier. Rather, my findings call policy recommendations
on cyclical R&D subsidies or stabilization policies into question. Nonetheless, optimal
policies under a general R&D specification like the multi-input model should be studied
to settle this question.
Another promising avenue for future work would be a business cycle accounting
exercise a` la Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007). In particular, identifying a shock
process to the R&D productivity could help to increase the volatility of R&D activities
and, maybe, give rise to considerable propagation.
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3.A Model Appendix
3.A.1 The set of stationary equilibrium equations
Let bt ≡ Bt/M
αφ
1−α
t denote the detrended version of a variable Bt, B ∈
{Y,C, Z,K,X,W,W S} and piXt ≡ ΠXt /M
αφ
1−α−1
t , vt ≡ Vt/M
αφ
1−α−1
t , dt ≡ Dt/Mt. The
set of equilibrium conditions to a reduced form of the model in terms of stationary
variables is given by:
Households18
wt
ct
= (1− ς) · ζlHt γ (3.50)
for γ →∞: lHt = L¯ instead.
wSt
ct
= ς · χsHt θ (3.51)
for θ →∞: sHt = S¯ instead.
c−1t = βEt
[
g
− αφ
1−α
M,t+1c
−1
t+1(1 + r
K
t+1 − δK)
]
(3.52)
c−1t = βEt
[
g−1M,t+1c
−1
t+1
vt+1 + pi
X
t+1
vt
]
(3.53)
Production
yt = ηt · lYt 1−αkαt (3.54)
wt = (1− α) yt
lYt
(3.55)
rKt = ρ · α
yt
kt
(3.56)
18The household’s budget constraint which is redundant with the aggregate resource constraint
becomes: ct+vtgMht+1 +g
αφ
1−α
M kt+1 = (vt+pi
x
t )ht+ (1 + r
K
t − δK)kt+wtlHt +wSt sHt where h is defined
as ht = Ht/Mt.
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piXt = α(1− ρ)yt (3.57)
R&D sector
gM,t+1 − 1 = ν¯sRt ωlRt ψz1−ψ−ωt (3.58)
wt
vt
= ψ · gM,t+1 − 1
lRt
(3.59)
for ψ = 0: lRt = 0 instead.
wSt
vt
= ω · gM,t+1 − 1
sRt
(3.60)
for ω = 0: sRt = 0 instead.
1
vt
= (1− ψ − ω) · gM,t+1 − 1
zt
(3.61)
for 1− ψ − ω = 0: zt = 0 instead.
Market clearing
lHt = l
Y
t + l
R
t (3.62)
sHt = s
R
t (3.63)
yt = ct + zt + g
αφ
1−α
M,t+1 · kt+1 − (1− δK)kt (3.64)
TFP shock
ln ηt+1 = AR1 · ln ηt + t+1 (3.65)
3.A.2 BGP equilibrium and the great ratios
This section discusses how the great ratios depend on model parameters and the BGP
growth rate and compute the latter for a few special cases that constitute well-known
boundary cases of the R&D specification.
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On BGP, the Euler equation (3.20) becomes
gC = β(1 + r
K − δK) (3.66)
determining the real rate of return on physical capital as a function of the BGP growth
rate and model parameters.
In a deterministic environment, equation (3.21) becomes a no-arbitrage condition
1 + rK − δK = gV ·
(
1 +
ΠX
V
)
(3.67)
where the price-dividend ratio has to be constant on BGP, i.e. gV = gΠ = gY /gM =
g1−
1−α
αφ
On BGP, the free entry condition (3.12) becomes
V (gM − 1)M = 1
1− ψ − ωZ (3.68)
From the equilibrium laws of motion one gets equation (3.36) for the measure of
varieties and the following for capital:
gK = (1− δK) + Y
K
− C
K
− Z
K
(3.69)
The latter 5 equations determine the great ratios as a function of the BGP growth
rate and model parameters. As usual, the physical-capital-output ratio is governed by
the Euler equation via the real rate of return on physical capital
K
Y
=
ρα
g/β − (1− δK) (3.70)
and pins down the BGP capital intensity, defined as capital per efficiency unit of labor:
κ ≡ K/(M αφ1−α lY ), via the production function (3.30)
κ =
(
K
Y
)1−α
=
(
ρα
g/β − (1− δK)
)1−α
(3.71)
The no-arbitrage condition (3.67) implies that stocks of machine producers are
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priced according to
V =
ΠX
(1 + rK − δK)/gV − 1 (3.72)
Inserting the profit contribution (3.32) yields the R&D capital-output ratio on BGP
VM
Y
=
α(1− ρ)
gM/β − 1 (3.73)
Therefore, the BGP portfolio choice is characterized by
VM
K
=
1− ρ
ρ
g/β − (1− δK)
gM/β − 1 (3.74)
Moreover, the free-entry zero-profit condition pin downs the BGP value of the R&D
capital stock so that the share of final goods invested in R&D activities can be expressed
as:
Z
Y
= (1− ψ − ω)α(1− ρ) gM − 1
gM/β − 1 (3.75)
Finally, the capital accumulation equation determines the consumption share
C
Y
= 1− Z
Y
− [g − (1− δK)]K
Y
(3.76)
Given Z/Y and C/Y , the BGP values for equilibrium labor inputs are also known:
s =
(
ω
(1− ω − ψ)(ςχ)
Z
C
) 1
1+θ
(3.77)
l =
(
(1− α)Y + ψ
1−ω−ψZ
(1− ς)ζC
) 1
1+γ
(3.78)
Then, the innovation possibilities frontier together with the R&D productivity function
yields a nonlinear equation determining the BGP growth rate g. In the following I
consider three special cases which give rise to analytical solutions, well-known from
growth textbooks (e.g. Acemoglu, 2009; Arnold, 1997; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
93
Boundary case 1: lab-equipment model
Consider a special case of the model in which the only input into R&D activities is
final output Z, i.e. ψ = ω = 0, and the household is endowed only with workers’ labor,
i.e. ς = 0, which he supplies inelastically (γ → ∞) in quantity L¯. Moreover, φ = 1−α
α
and δK = 0.
In this case, the innovation possibilities frontier (3.36) is linear in R&D expenditures
Z so that the system can be solved analytically. The BGP growth rate of machine
varieties becomes
gM = β
(
1 + αρ ·
(
ν¯
1− ρ
ρ
· L¯
)1−α)
(3.79)
which is increasing in the labor endowment L¯, the productivity of R&D ν¯, the capital
share α, the discount factor β, and if 1/ρ−1 > α
1−α increasing in the markup 1/ρ−1.19
Boundary case 2: knowledge-driven model
Consider a special case of the model in which the only input into R&D activities are
workers lR, i.e. ψ = 1 and ω = 0. Moreover, assume that the household is endowed only
with workers’ labor, i.e. ς = 0, which he supplies inelastically (γ →∞) in quantity L¯.
In this case, the innovation possibilities frontier (3.36) is linear in the labor input lR so
that the system can be solved analytically. The BGP growth rate of machine varieties
becomes
gM = 1 +
α
1−α(1− ρ)
α
1−α(1− ρ) + 1 + 1−ββ
·
(
ν¯L¯− 1α
1−α(1− ρ)
· 1− β
β
)
(3.80)
which is increasing in the productivity of R&D ν¯ and the discount factor β. The BGP
labor input into R&D is20
lR =
1
ν¯
·
α
1−α(1− ρ)
α
1−α(1− ρ) + 1 + 1−ββ
·
(
ν¯L¯− 1α
1−α(1− ρ)
· 1− β
β
)
(3.81)
19R&D activities have to be sufficiently productive for the economy to grow, i.e. gM ≥ 1 ⇔ ν¯ >
ρ
1−ρ
(
1/β−1
αρ
) 1
1−α
L¯−1.
20Employment in the R&D sector lR is positive and, hence, the economy is growing iff ν¯ > 1α
1−α (1−ρ) ·
1−β
β L¯
−1, i.e. R&D activities are sufficiently productive.
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Boundary case 3: exogenous growth RBC model
Consider a special case of the model in which the only input into R&D activities is S&E
labor sR, i.e. ψ = 0 and ω = 1. Moreover, assume that the household supplies workers’
labor elastically while he supplies S&E labor inelastically (θ → ∞) in quantity S¯. In
this case, innovative activities are predetermined and the BGP growth rate of machine
varieties is exogenously given by
gM = 1 + ν¯S¯ (3.82)
Hence, the R&D sector is determined exogenously and the production sector is
equivalent to the classical RBC model.
3.B Data Appendix
3.B.1 Data Sources
Data on macroeconomic aggregates are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA), its NIPAs and its 2010 R&D Satellite Account (R&DSA). Data on the civilian
noninstitutional population aged 16 and older stem from the FRED database of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Besides, the National Science Foundation (NSF)
publishes various data on research and development activities.
Data on funds for industrial R&D are reported in Table 55 of the NSF report
”Research and Development in Industry: 2006-07”. Data on distribution of costs are
taken from NSF’s Industrial Research and Development Information System, Table H-
27 for 1962-1998, and from various issues of its ”Research and Development in Industry”
reports for later years. Data on full-time equivalent R&D scientists and engineers are
published in the NSF’s Industrial Research and Development Information System,
Tables B-25 (1957-1970) and H-19 (1971-1999), and for later years in various issues of
its ”Research and Development in Industry” reports.
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3.B.2 Adjustments to NIPA data to be in line with R&DSA
definitions
Currently, BEAs national economic accounts treat spending on R&D as expenses or
consumption rather than investment. The 2013 NIPA Comprehensive Revision will
capitalize R&D. By then, BEAs R&D Satellite Account provides data on U.S. R&D
activity and shows the impact of treating R&D spending as investment on GDP and
investment (Aizcorbe, Moylan, and Robbins, 2009; Mataloni and Moylan, 2007).
Mataloni and Moylan (2007) illustrate in detail how R&DSA R&D investment is
derived from NSF data on R&D21 and how the incorporation of R&D investment
into the NIPAs will affect the definition of core measures such as GDP, investment,
government consumption etc. Table A of Mataloni and Moylan (2007) provides a brief
overview of the revisions. Alas, BEA does not publish a R&DSA dataset comparable to
the NIPAs. However, the data published in Lee and Schmidt (2010), the current version
of the R&DSA, allows me to reconstruct R&DSA-conform aggregates as follows:
PCER&DSA = PCENIPA −RDINPI + CSRDNPI (3.83)
IR&DSA = INIPA − SDC (3.84)
GR&DSA = GNIPA −RDIGov + CSRDGov (3.85)
where
CSRDi = depreciationi + net returnsi
and PCE denotes personal consumption expenditures, G government consumption,
I physical investment, RDI R&D investment, SDC the R&D software double-count,
and CSRD Capital Services generated by R&D. Superscripts NPI and Gov indicate
non-profit institutions and the government, respectively. According to Mataloni and
Moylan (2007), the R&DSA removes double-counted R&D software development from
NIPA software investment and retains it in R&D investment. For the period 1978 -
2001, I back out SDC from Table 1.2 of Robbins and Moylan (2007); prior to 1978 no
21Most importantly, the R&DSA measure is extended to R&D in social sciences and the humanities.
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Figure 3.9: R&D investment/capital by source of funding
Notes: The shaded regions correspond to NBER-recessions.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, R&D Satellite Account
adjustment is made in the R&DSA; for recent years which have been revised in Lee
and Schmidt (2010) I calculate the residual SDC = GDPNIPA + total adjustments−
GDPR&DSA from Table C.
In principle, one would have to correct the NIPA software capital stock measures
for the double-count of R&D software development. However, BEA does not publish
corresponding corrections for the fixed asset account. Given a software-fraction of at
max 1.5% in private fixed assets, the R&D software double-count issue seems to be
negligible for the capital stock.
Figure 3.9 displays R&D investment and R&D capital from the R&DSA. The left
panel shows the share of R&D investment in GDP. The total R&D share displays
some medium-run fluctuations around its mean of 2.7%. These fluctuations stem from
the phased decline in federal government’s funding of extramural R&D combined
with subsequent rise in private R&D funding. Adding both time series up, yields a
stable share of 2.3% on average. The right panel shows illustrates that since the mid-
1960s R&D capital has amounted to a constant fraction of the physical capital stock,
namely 4.5% for total R&D capital and about 4% for private plus extramural R&D.
In the analysis of business cycle patterns I consider the sum of private and federal
government’s extramural R&D investment (capital) as the appropriate measure of R&D
investment (capital) as they reflect industrially performed R&D best.
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3.C Tables and Figures Appendix
3.C.1 More Empirical Evidence
Figure 3.10: per-capita R&D investment
Notes: The shaded regions correspond to NBER-recessions.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, R&D Satellite Account; National Science Foundation
Figure 3.11: Business cycle components of R&D
Notes: The business cycle component is calculated as deviation from trend, using the HP-filter with
λ = 100. The shaded regions correspond to NBER-recessions.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, R&D Satellite Account; National Science Foundation
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3.C.2 More Business Cycle Statistics
Table 3.8: Business Cycle Statistics of the U.S. Economy, 1959-2007
SDa AR(1) GDP−2 GDP−1 GDP GDP+1 GDP+2
TFP 1.41 0.56 -0.28 -0.01 0.61 0.64 0.34
GDP 1.99 0.58 0.06 0.58 1.00 0.58 0.06
Consumption 1.73 0.66 0.14 0.58 0.93 0.60 0.07
Investment 7.59 0.41 -0.36 0.25 0.81 0.49 0.10
R&D investment 4.57 0.75 0.26 0.53 0.52 0.26 0.06
Capital 1.34 0.54 0.44 0.26 -0.13 -0.27 -0.27
R&D capital 2.19 0.79 0.21 -0.04 -0.09 0.07 0.20
Wage bill 2.59 0.70 0.34 0.77 0.88 0.38 -0.10
Labor 2.24 0.60 0.20 0.74 0.85 0.28 -0.16
S&E labor 4.14 0.74 0.36 0.42 0.35 0.28 0.23
R&D wage costs1 4.37 0.53 0.16 0.37 0.43 0.25 0.09
R&D materials & supplies1 6.73 0.39 -0.11 0.26 0.43 0.18 0.03
R&D other1 6.60 0.53 0.44 0.56 0.45 0.14 -0.17
Cons/GDP 0.75 0.41 0.18 -0.21 -0.51 -0.17 -0.00
Inv/GDP 6.09 0.40 -0.47 0.12 0.69 0.42 0.11
R&D inv/GDP 3.93 0.70 0.28 0.32 0.09 0.01 0.04
Capital/GDP 2.54 0.51 0.19 -0.32 -0.85 -0.60 -0.18
R&D capital/GDP 3.09 0.62 0.11 -0.40 -0.71 -0.33 0.11
R&D inv./Inv 7.48 0.42 0.53 0.08 -0.51 -0.34 -0.06
S&E/Labor 4.14 0.64 0.25 0.01 -0.10 0.13 0.32
S&E/R&D inv. 3.35 0.40 0.07 -0.23 -0.26 -0.01 0.21
Labor/R&D inv. 3.76 0.74 -0.20 -0.21 -0.12 -0.15 -0.17
R&D wage cost share1 2.34 0.34 -0.26 -0.35 -0.22 0.05 0.27
wage cost ratio S to LR2 2.76 -0.01 0.69 0.14 -0.37 -0.15 -0.14
R&D materials share1 5.06 0.42 -0.40 -0.12 0.10 0.05 0.09
R&D other cost share1 4.03 0.40 0.41 0.32 0.14 -0.02 -0.22
avg. wage W 1.24 0.73 0.35 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.07
avg. wage for S&E W S2 2.48 0.12 -0.04 0.69 0.70 0.09 -0.43
All variables are defined as logarithms of real per-capita measures which are computed by normalizing with the price index for GDP and the civilian
noninstitutional population, aged 16 years and over. The business cycle component is calculated as deviation from trend, using the HP-filter with smoothing
parameter λ = 100. According to these transformations, one can interpret the cyclical components as percentage deviations from the trend.
a Standard deviations are reported in percentage terms.
1 Period 1962-2007; between 1977 and 1997 data were collected only at biannual frequency. HP-filtering is conducted with Schlicht (2008)’s MEND-code.
2 Period 1962-1975.
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3.C.3 Estimates of the RBC shock process
Table 3.9: RBC shock process, U.S. economy, 1959-2007
data source growth rate AR(1) coeff. std. dev. ()
Bureau of Labor Statistics 1.01 % 0.845 1.54 %
Fernald (2012) 0.97 % 0.832 1.52 %
Jorgenson and Landefeld (2006) 0.41 % 0.845 1.03 %
Kydland and Prescott (1991) 0.954 = 0.815 1.858 · 0.76% = 1.41%
Gomme and Rupert (2007)1 1.72 % 0.9644 = 0.864 1.896 · 0.82% = 1.55%
The data underlying the estimation are multifactor productivity for the private non-farm business sector
from Table 4 of the BLS’ historical multifactor productivity measures and Fernald (2012)’s business sector
TFP measure, both for the period 1959-2007, as well as the multifactor productivity measure of Jorgenson
and Landefeld (2006, Tab. 1.25) for 1959-2002.
1 Estimation period is 1954Q1 - 2000Q4. Results refer to the one-capital-stock specification reported in Table
2.
3.C.4 Sensitivity analysis for the multi-input model (markup-
calibration)
Figure 3.12: Multi-input model economy: sensitivity w.r.t. labor supply elasticity
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Figure 3.13: Multi-input model economy: sensitivity w.r.t. S&E labor supply elasticity
Figure 3.14: Multi-input model economy: sensitivity w.r.t. markup
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3.C.5 R&D-stock-calibration
Table 3.10: Knowledge-driven model economy: calibrated parameter values (R&D-
stock-calibration)
Preferences Technology Shock
β (1− ς)ζ γ α ρ φ δK ν¯ AR(1) Std. dev.
0.945 4.22 1 0.371 0.893 0.12 0.0372 14.4 0.85 0.015
Table 3.11: Multi-input model economy: calibrated parameter values (R&D-stock-
calibration)
Preferences Shock
β (1− ς)ζ γ ςχ θ AR(1) Std. dev.
0.943 4.21 1 0.0666 1 0.85 0.015
Technology
α ρ φ δK ω ψ ν¯
0.364 0.914 0.159 0.0372 0.277 0.183 33.7
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Chapter 4
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
and the U.S. Housing Boom1
4.1 Introduction
In the period from the mid 1990s until the beginning of the housing crisis, the U.S.
housing market experienced a number of remarkable developments. First, house prices
and mortgage volume increased strongly, but mortgage volume grew faster than house
prices so that the aggregate loan-to-value ratio increased. Specifically, between 1997
and 2007, real house prices went up by 55% percent (see Figure 4.1.A), the mortgage-
to-GDP ratio went up from 44% to 74% (see Figure 4.2.A), and the loan-to-value ratio
increased from 55% to 70% (see Figure 4.2.B). Second, in the same period delinquency
rates dropped significantly (see Figure 4.3). In this essay, we ask two questions. First,
did the U.S. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 contribute to these developments? Second,
to what extent could some of these developments have been dampened by a different
type of tax reform?
To address these questions, we develop a macro model with a housing sector and
conduct a quantitative analysis of the tax reform based on a calibrated version of
the model economy. In the model, households can buy consumption goods, save in a
risk-free asset, rent or invest in housing space, and invest in human capital. Housing
investment and human capital investment are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic
1This chapter is joint work with Tom Krebs and Mark L. J. Wright.
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Figure 4.1: House prices and rent-price ratio for the U.S.
Notes: Nominal values are deflated using the CPI for All Urban Consumers: All items less shelter.
The shaded regions correspond to NBER-recessions.
Source: FRED / FHFA; Davis, Lehnert, and Martin (2008), updated data:
http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/land-values/rent-price-ratio.asp
Figure 4.2: Home Mortgage Debt
Notes: The shaded regions correspond to NBER-recessions.
Source: FRED, Flow-of-Funds and NIPAs
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Figure 4.3: Mortgage Delinquencies
Notes: The shaded regions correspond to NBER-recessions.
Source: FRED
risk. Households can also borrow and default on their debt, in which case they lose
their housing investment and are excluded from borrowing for a number of periods
(mortgage default with foreclosure and limited access to mortgage markets in the
future). Household are ex-ante heterogeneous with respect to age (life-cycle) and their
preferences for housing. We close the model assuming a fixed supply of housing (land)
and an aggregate production function that displays constant returns to scale with
respect to physical capital and human capital. The second assumption implies that the
model generates endogenous growth.
The U.S. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 eliminated the capital gains tax on housing
sales for all households if the gains did not exceed $500,000 (for single households
$250,000). In contrast, before the tax reform in 1997 households could only avoid the
capital gains tax if they re-invested the gains in larger homes. In other words, before
the tax reform the capital gains tax had to be paid in all cases in which households do
not want to increase their housing investment, which are most likely cases of job loss,
divorce, or illness. Thus, the U.S. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 not only increased the
after-tax expected return to housing investment, but also reduced the risk associated
with housing investment. When we feed the tax changes associated with the U.S.
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Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 into the calibrated model economy, we find the following
results.
First, the model predictions are qualitatively in line with the main developments in
the U.S. housing market: house prices and mortgage volume rise, but mortgage volume
rises faster than house prices so that loan-to-value ratios (leverage) increase. Second,
the effects are quantitatively important, but the predicted changes are substantially
less than the changes observed in the period 1997-2007. Specifically, according to our
simulations the U.S. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 increased real house prices by 6.4
percent, increased the mortgage-to-GDP ratio from 44.0% to 49.0%, and increased the
loan-to-value ratio from 55.7% to 58.2%. Thus, our conclusion from this analysis is that
the U.S. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 can account for some part of the U.S. housing
boom, but the larger part, in particular the strong increase in house prices, has to be
explained by other factors (i.e. low interest rates and/or financial innovation).
We also find that the U.S. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 reduced mortgage default
rates. In our model economy, a reduction in the housing tax has two opposing effects on
equilibrium default rates. On the one hand, the tax reduction leads to higher housing
leverage and therefore higher mortgage default rates. On the other hand, the tax
reduction also makes mortgage default more costly since exclusion from mortgage
markets becomes more costly. In our calibrated model economy, the second effect
dominates and we therefore find that the U.S. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 decreased
mortgage default rates. The prediction of a simultaneous rise in loan-to-value ratios
and decline mortgage default rates distinguishes our work from previous macro work on
housing, which assumes that the only consequence of default is the loss of the housing
investment (foreclosure) and therefore necessarily predicts that leverage and default
rates are positively correlated.
We also consider the effect of a hypothetical tax reform that taxes capital gains
on housing sales at the same rate that all other capital gains are taxed without any
exemptions. We find that this tax reform would have reduced real house prices by 4.1
percent, the mortgage-to-GDP ratio from 44.0% to 41.5%, the loan-to-value ratio from
55.7% to 54.7%. Thus, if this tax reform had been implemented in 1997, instead of the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, our analysis suggests that real house prices would have
been 10.5 percent lower than their actual value. In other words, implementing a tax
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reform that treats capital gains of housing sales as ordinary capital gains as opposed
to the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 would have dampened the observed house price rise
during the U.S. housing boom by about 20 percent.
4.1.1 Related Literature
We build on the growing macro literature that uses calibrated model economies to
conduct a quantitative analysis of the housing sector. We make two contributions to
this literature. First, on the substantive side we contribute to the literature that studies
the positive (and normative) consequences of government housing policy. In this respect
our essay is closely related to the work of Gervais (2002), who studies the effects of
preferential tax treatment of housing, Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013), who evaluate
the effects of the government bailout guarantees for Government Sponsored Enterprises,
and Nakajima (2010), who studies the optimal income tax rate when residential capital
is treated preferentially in the tax code. Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2014)
analyze to what extent U.S. housing policy caused the postwar boom in homeownership.
We contribute to this literature by analyzing a major tax reform, namely the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, which has so far not been studied by the macro literature.
Our second contribution is to develop a model with mortgage debt and default
in which mortgage interest rates reflect equilibrium default probabilities and the
consequences of default are twofold: mortgage default leads to loss of housing
investment (foreclosure) and limited access to mortgage markets in the future. In
this regard, our work is a natural extension of the literature on uncollateralized debt
and equilibrium default (Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and R´ıos-Rull, 2007; Livshits,
MacGee, and Tertilt, 2010). In contrast, the existing housing literature has incorporated
equilibrium mortgage rates that fully reflect default probabilities (Chatterjee and
Eyigungor, 2011; Corbae and Quintin, 2013; Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman, 2013), but
has so far confined attention to the case in which mortgage default has no repercussions
on the ability of households to borrow in the future (however, see also Mitman (2012)
for a noteworthy exception). As we have argued above, this extension is important to
understand any historical episode in which leverage rises and default rates are either
constant or declining.
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Finally, our essay is related to empirical work evaluating the effects of the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997. Consistent with our results, this literature has found that during
the pre-reform period many homeowners were prevented from selling their homes due
to capital gains taxation, and that the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 has released these
lock-in effects (Biehl and Hoyt, 2014; Cunningham and Engelhardt, 2008; Heuson and
Painter, 2014; Shan, 2011). Indeed, we use the estimates of this literature to calibrate
our model economy along one important dimension. We complement this literature by
analyzing the effects on aggregate house prices, mortgage volume, and default rates in
an equilibrium model.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Economy
Household sector
The economy is populated by a unit mass of households. Households age stochastically
according to a Markov process with transition probability pi(j′|j). We consider three
age-groups j: young, middle-aged, and old. Old people stochastically die and are
immediately replaced by newborns. For each age group there are two subgroups with
low and high housing return, respectively. Households move from housing return state
L to H – i.e. become first-time buyers – with probability bj. In addition, we distinguish
middle-aged households with high human capital return (type m1) and middle-aged
with low human capital return (type m2). In sum, there are 2*4 types of households
denoted by {y,m1,m2, o}×{H,L}, with type transitions specified by transition matrix
ΠT (for details see Appendix 4.A.1). We assume that the demographic structure of the
population is stationary.
Households derive utility from consumption of two goods: a standard good and
housing services. We assume that households have identical time-separable preferences
which can be represented by the discount factor β and the following one-period utility
function
u(c1, c2) =
 ln c1 + ν ln c2 if no defaultln cd1 + ν ln cd2 − ud if in default (4.1)
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where c1 is consumption of the standard good, c2 is consumption of the housing service,
and ud is a utility cost of being in default. Households can invest in human capital h,
physical capital k, and housing x. We assume that households do not care whether they
live in a rented home or owner-occupied home. Besides, they can take out an one-period
mortgage m. Actually, they choose mortgages from a menu that states loan-to-value
ratios `′ = pmm
′
p˜xx′ and corresponding mortgage prices pm. The standard consumption
good can be transformed one-to-one into physical capital or human capital, whereas the
housing stock is in fixed supply. Thus, the sequential budget constraint for a household
who is not in default reads
c1 + p˜lc2 + k
′ + h′ + pmm′ + p˜xx′ = (1 + tr) ·
[(1 + r˜k − δk)k + (1 + r˜h(j)− δh + η(s))h+m+ [p˜l + (1 + (s))p˜x − τ(s)p˜x]x]
h′ ≥ 0 , k′ ≥ 0 , x′ ≥ 0 , m′ ≤ 0 (4.2)
where we used the following variable definition:
h, k, x: stock of human capital, physical capital, and housing owned by household
r˜h(j), r˜k: rental rate of human capital, physical capital
p˜x: aggregate price of housing
p˜l(j): price of housing services
(s): idiosyncratic shock to the price of housing
τ(s): capital gains tax on the sale of housing
m: mortgage (quantity)
pm: price of mortgage
η(s): idiosyncratic human capital shock
tr: transfer rate
s: exogenous state
We assume that the human capital shock η to is normally distributed with
zero mean. In the following, however, we consider a discrete-state approximation. In
contrast, the individual house price shock  is uniformly distributed on the support
[min; max].
In addition to the choice of (k′, h′,m′, x′, c1, c2) households also make a default
decision, which in general depends on the entire state (k, h,m, x, s). However, in our
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setting, the current default decision depends only on the current stock of housing x
and mortgage debt m as well as current shocks s. Thus, a default policy is a function
d = d(x,m, s, j) mapping current shocks into {0, 1} where 1 stands for default.
We model the consequences of default as follows. All debt is canceled and the
housing collateral is seized.2 However, there is no garnishment of wage income. Besides,
the household who defaults is excluded from the mortgage market in future. By this, we
mean the household can neither take on any debt nor buy a house. Nevertheless, he can
invest into physical and human capital. In sum, the budget constraint for households
in default is given by (4.2) with m = x = 0 and the restriction m′ = x′ = 0. We assume
that the period of exclusion ends stochastically with probability 1− p. As long as the
household is in default, he suffers a utility cost of ud.
Financial intermediaries
Financial intermediaries borrow at the risk-free rate rf = r˜k − δk and incur a real
resource cost of financial intermediation ∆ ≥ 0 per unit of the mortgage. We assume
that financial intermediaries can observe the loan-to-value ratio ` of the mortgages they
offer. However, they do not observe default policies and, hence, cannot condition the
mortgage price pm on it. Hence, a mortgage is represented by the pair (pm, `
′). In case of
default the mortgage claim m′ is written off and the housing collateral x′ is liquidated.
We assume that financial intermediaries possess a foreclosure technology according to
which they recover a fraction γ ≤ 1 of the current market value of the foreclosed home
(1 + ′)p′xx
′.3 Besides, we assume for simplicity that there are no capital gains taxes on
foreclosed homes.
Financial intermediaries offer various types of mortgages, i.e. combinations of loan-
to-value ratios and mortgage prices. We assume that financial intermediaries can fully
diversify idiosyncratic risk for each mortgage type (pm, `
′) and all mortgage markets are
perfectly competitive so that they earn zero profits on each mortgage type. Zero profit
per mortgage type requires that the intermediary exactly earns its costs of funding
2If the household decides to default, he loses, by assumption, all his housing assets in foreclosure,
even if he is not under water.
3If the net revenue from foreclosure exceeds the size of the mortgage m′, the bank is repaid and
the excess amount vanishes by assumption.
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1 + rf + ∆. Hence, the mortgage pricing schedule pm(`
′) is given by
1/pm = max
{
1 + rf + ∆− γ · p˜′xp˜x 1`′ (1 + E[′|dmax = 1])
1− E[dmax = 1] , 1 + rf + ∆
}
(4.3)
where E[dmax = 1] is the expected default rate for this mortgage contract.
Production and Housing Supply
We assume that the non-housing good is produced under the production function
Y = AKαH1−α, where K is the aggregate stock of physical capital, H the aggregate
stock of human capital, and A a productivity parameter. Markets for physical and
human capital are perfectly competitive so that the rental rates satisfy
r˜k = αAK˜
α−1 (4.4)
r˜h = (1− α)AK˜α
where K˜ = K/H denotes the capital-to-labor ratio. While the non-housing
consumption good can be transformed one-to-one into physical capital or human
capital, the housing stock is in fixed supply, normalized to one. We assume that one unit
of the housing stock generates one unit of housing consumption services. We further
assume that mortgages are financed through savings from abroad. Thus, we have three
market clearing conditions that read:
K˜ =
∑
iE[k
i|j = i]pi(i)∑
iE[h
i|j = i]pi(i)
1 =
∑
i
E[xi|j = i]pi(i) (4.5)
1 =
∑
i
E[ci2|j = i]pi(i)
where pi(i) is the population share of household type i. Note that the first market
clearing condition in (4.5) follows from combining the market clearing conditions for
physical capital and human capital. The second condition is market clearing for the
housing stock and the third is for housing services. Finally, goods market clearing is
implied by Walras’ law and the aggregate stock of mortgage debt amounts to M =
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∑
iE[m
i|j = i]pi(i).
Government
The government collects income taxes. The U.S. law of taxation distinguishes ordinary
income, which includes wage income, from long-term capital gains. However, in the
U.S. there have been several tax breaks for owner-occupied housing.4
This essay focuses on special provisions for the recognition of capital gains from
the sale of a primary residence and studies the changes that were implemented by the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97). Consequently, we model the taxation of capital
gains from the sale of housing in detail and abstract from ordinary income taxes and
standard capital gains taxes.5 Before the TRA97, the recognition of capital gains from
the sale of a primary residence could be deferred in case the taxpayer bought a new
residence of at least equal value. In this case, the capital gain would have been rolled-
over into the new home. Otherwise, the gain was subject to capital gains taxation. The
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 replaced this roll-over rule by an exemption of $500’000
per married couple. As a consequence, since 1997 capital gains on housing have been
de facto tax-exempt for the vast majority of U.S. households.6
We model the pre-TRA97 tax law as follows: first, we assume that a household sells
his home with exogenous probability Prob(χ = 1) = ς. Second, capital gains from the
sale of housing are taxed only if the house is downsized. In our model, this corresponds
to a negative realization of the labor shock η. The following tax function which specifies
the tax liability per unit of housing in case of a sale captures this interpretation of roll-
over:
τ(s) =
 τ¯ ·max
{
(1+)p˜x
p˜x0
− 1 ; 0
}
if χ = 1 and η < 0
0 otherwise
(4.6)
4For a brief history of the U.S. law of taxation focussing on owner-occupied housing see Appendix
4.B.
5However, in the quantitative analysis we calibrate the model to after-tax returns.
6According to the Office of Management and Budget (1997, p. 46) ”the proposal would exempt
over 99 percent of home sales from the capital gains tax and would dramatically simplify taxes and
record keeping for over 60 million homeowners.” Evidence by Shan (2011) supports this claim: using
transaction data for the Boston metropolitan area, Shan (2011) imputes accumulated housing capital
gains and finds that prior to the TRA97 only 1% of transactions have imputed capital gains over
$500’000.
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where (1 + )p˜x is the individual sales price and p˜x0 denotes the purchase price of the
home. For simplicity, we assume that the house-buying took place 1/ς periods ago so
that the the individual purchase price was p˜x0 = p˜x/(1 + g)
1/ς . For future reference,
denote the threshold level of the house price shock that implies zero capital gains on
housing by ¯, i.e. (1 + ¯)p˜x/p˜x0 − 1 = 0.
In equilibrium housing tax revenues amount to
Tax = ς ·
∑
i
E[τ(s) · p˜xxi|j = i]pi(i) (4.7)
= ςτ¯ · Prob(η < 0) ·
(∫ max
¯
(1 + )p˜x
p˜x0
dpi()− 1
)
· p˜x
where the last line uses the market clearing condition for the housing stock (4.5) and the
tax function (4.6). The government rebates its tax revenues as transfers to households in
order to run a balanced budget. Suppose these transfers are proportional to household
wealth after all assets have paid off (1 + r˜k − δk)k + (1 + r˜h − δh + η(s))h + m +
[p˜l + (1 + (s))p˜x − τ(s)p˜x]x and denote the transfer rate by tr. Then the government’s
budget constraint reads
Tax = tr · [(1 + r˜k − δk) ·K + (1 + r˜h − δh) ·H +M + (p˜l + p˜x) · 1− Tax](4.8)
where we again use the market clearing conditions (4.5). Hence, the balanced budget
policy determines the equilibrium transfer rate.
4.2.2 Theoretical Results
In this section, we derive the main theoretical results. Proposition 1 characterizes
the optimal decision rules of the household. Proposition 2 decribes the stationary
competitive equilibrium of the model economy.
Characterization of Household Problem
First, note that optimality requires that consumption expenditures on goods and
housing services are proportional so that the demand for housing consumption is
c2 =
ν
p˜l
c1. This implies that total consumption expenditures are c = c1+p˜lc2 = (1+ν)c1.
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Second, due to homothetic preferences and a linear-homogenous budget, the
consumption-saving decision will be independent from the portfolio choice problem
which makes the model highly tractable. In the following, we will derive this separation
property. To this end, it is convenient to express the household’s decision problem as
a portfolio choice problem. Thereto, define the following variables:
w = h+ k + pm,−1m+ p˜x,−1x
θk =
k
w
, θh =
h
w
, θm =
pm,−1m
w
, θx =
p˜x,−1x
w
θ = (θk, θh, θx, θm)
rk = r˜k − δk
rh(s, j) = r˜h(j)− δh + η(s)
rm(θ, s, j) =
 1pm,−1(θ) − 1 if d(x,m, s, j) = 0−1 if d(x,m, s, j) = 1
rx(s, j) =

(1+(s))p˜x+p˜l(j)
p˜x,−1
− 1− τ(s) if d(x,m, s, j) = 0
−1 if d(x,m, s, j) = 1
r(θ, s, j) = θkrk + θhrh(s, j) + θmrm(θ, s, j) + θxrx(s, j)
px =
p˜x
W
pl =
p˜l
W
where p−1 is the price one period before the current period and W = E[w] is aggregate
total wealth. Let the law of motion for aggregate wealth be
W ′ = (1 + g)W (4.9)
where the growth rate g has to be determined later on. Using this notation, the budget
constraints become
w′ = (1 + r(θ, s, j, d))(1 + tr)w − (1 + ν)c1
1 = θ′k + θ
′
h + θ
′
m + θ
′
x (4.10)
θ′h ≥ 0 , θ′k ≥ 0 , θ′x ≥ 0 , θ′m ≤ 0
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and, for households in default,
w′d = (1 + rd(θ, s, j))(1 + tr)wd − (1 + ν)cd1
1 = θ′k + θ
′
h (4.11)
θ′h ≥ 0 , θ′k ≥ 0
where the portfolio return for households in default is rd(θ, s, j) = r(θk, θh, 0, 0, s, j).
The recursive formulations of the household maximization problems read:
V (w, θ, s, j,W ) = max
 maxw′,θ′,c1
ν ln (ν/p˜l) + (1 + ν) ln c1 + β∑
j′
∑
s′
V (w′, θ′, s′, j′,W ′)pi(s′)pi(j′|j)
 ;
max
w′,θ′d,c1
ν ln (ν/p˜l) + (1 + ν) ln c1 + β∑
j′
∑
s′
Vd(w
′, θ′d, s
′, j′,W ′)pi(s′)pi(j′|j)

(4.12)
subject to the budget constraint (4.10), the mortgage pricing schedule (4.3),7 and the
aggregate law of motion (4.9);
Vd(wd, θd, s, j,W ) = max
w′,θ′d,cd1
ν ln (ν/p˜l) + (1 + ν) ln c1 − ud + βp∑
j′
∑
s′
Vd(w
′
d, θ
′
d, s
′,W ′)pi(s′)pi(j′|j)
+β(1− p)
∑
j′
∑
s′
V (w′d, θ
′
d, s
′,W ′)pi(s′)pi(j′|j)
 (4.13)
subject to the constraints (4.11) and (4.9) where θd = (θk, θh, 0, 0) and there is no
disutility ud in the period of default.
Appendix 4.A.2 derives the solution to these Bellman equations. The value functions
are logarithmic and separable:
V (w, θ, s, j,W ) = V˜0(j) +
1 + ν
1− β [ln (1 + r(θ, s, j, d)) + lnw] +
ν
1− β lnW(4.14)
Vd(wd, θd, s, j,W ) = V˜0d(j) +
1 + ν
1− β [ln (1 + rd(θd, s, j)) + lnwd] +
ν
1− β lnW
where V˜0(j), V˜0d(j) are type-specific constants (see Appendix 4.A.2). Consumption
7While households take the pricing function (4.3) into account, they ignore the effect of their
individual default policy on the mortgage price pm(`). That is, they take the default probability
E[dmax = 1] and the expected house price shock under default E[
′|dmax = 1] as given.
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policies are linear in wealth:
c1 =
1− β
1 + ν(1− β) (1 + r(θ, s, j, d)) (1 + tr) · w (4.15)
cd1 =
1− β
1 + ν(1− β) (1 + rd(θd, s, j)) (1 + tr) · wd
c2 =
ν(1− β)
p˜l · (1 + ν(1− β)) (1 + r(θ, s, j, d)) (1 + tr) · w (4.16)
cd2 =
ν(1− β)
p˜l · (1 + ν(1− β)) (1 + rd(θd, s, j)) (1 + tr) · wd
The laws of motion for wealth are linear, too:
w′ =
β
1 + ν(1− β) · (1 + tr) · (1 + r(θ, s, j, d)) · w (4.17)
w′d =
β
1 + ν(1− β) · (1 + tr) · (1 + rd(θd, s, j)) · wd
The optimal portfolio choices, θ′max, θ
′
d,max, are independent of wealth. For given default
policy d′, the portfolio choices are the solution to
θ′max(j) = arg max
θ′
∑
j′
∑
s′
ln (1 + r(θ′(j), s′, j′, d′))pi(s′)pi(j′|j) (4.18)
subject to (4.3)
θ′d,max(j) = arg max
θ′d
∑
j′
∑
s′
ln (1 + rd(θ
′
d(j), s
′, j′))pi(s′)pi(j′|j)
Recall that, being excluded from mortgage markets, households in default have less
investment opportunities than households not in default. Hence, their portfolio return
will be lower: rd(θd,max(j), s, j) ≤ r(θmax(j), s, j, d). And the optimal default policy
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dmax(θx, θm, s, j) is described by the following inequality
β
1− β
1 + ν
∑
j′
[V˜0(j
′)− V˜0d(j′)]pi(j′|j)
+ β
∑
j′
∑
s′
ln(1 + r(θmax(j), s
′, j′, dmax(θ′x, θ
′
m, s
′, j′)))pi(s′)pi(j′|j)
− β
∑
j′
∑
s′
ln(1 + rd(θd,max(j), s
′, j′))pi(s′)pi(j′|j)]
≥ ln(1 + r(θ, s, j, 1))− ln(1 + r(θ, s, j, 0)) (4.19)
which has to hold for all states (θx, θm, s, j) with no default, d(θx, θm, s, j) = 0,
given the current portfolio state θ and next-period optimal portfolio choice θ′max. And
for all states (θx, θm, s, j) with default, d(θx, θm, s, j) = 1, the reversed inequality is
satisfied. The condition (4.19) states that the household chooses to repay his debt
whenever the expected discounted utility loss in the future, which arises due to exclusion
form mortgage markets ensuing default, outweighs the current utility gain due to the
forgiveness of mortgage debt when defaulting. If the opposite is true, the household
decides to default.
The following proposition summarizes our findings about optimal household
decisions:
Proposition 1. Consumption expenditures on the standard good and housing services
are proportional to each other, linear in current wealth, and increase in the individual
portfolio return. Next-period wealth is linear in current wealth and increases in the
individual portfolio return. Portfolio choices are independent of current portfolios and
current wealth, but depend on next period’s default decision rule. Default decisions are
independent of wealth, but depend on portfolios.
The proposition highlights the tractability of the model. Due to the separation of
the consumption-savings decision from the portfolio choice and default decision, we just
need to solve the latter problem numerically. In a nutshell, for given current portfolio
θ and given mortgage price schedule (4.3), next period’s optimal portfolio choice, θ′max,
and optimal default policy, dmax, are the solution to (4.18) and (4.19). Furthermore,
the optimal portfolio choice of households in default θ′d,max is independent of θ and pm.
For the consumption-savings problem, however, we use the analytical solution, that is,
118
consumption policies (4.15) and (4.16) as well as savings policy (4.17).
Equilibrium
From now on, we focus on balanced growth path equilibria of the model economy. On a
balanced growth path (BGP) all variables grow at constant rates. Suppose the economy
grows at rate g which is endogenously determined in our model. Since the aggregate
stock of housing is in fixed supply, on BGP the housing price p˜x grows at the growth
rate of the economy.
To solve the model for a BGP equilibrium, it is useful to express the market clearing
condition (4.5) in terms of stationary variables. For convenience, define w˜ = (1 + tr) ·
(1 + r(θ, d)) · w as cash at hand, that is, wealth after all assets have paid off and after
transfer payments. Let W˜ = E[w˜] =
∑
iE[w˜|j = i]pi(i) denote total cash at hand,8
then the share of cash at hand owned by type z is
Ωz =
E[w˜|j = z]pi(z)
W˜
=
E[w˜|j = z]pi(z)∑
iE[w˜|j = i]pi(i)
(4.20)
where E[w˜|j = z] is the average cash-at-hand level of type z. For later reference, let
Ω = {Ωi}i denote the wealth distribution of households and note that Ω is a finite-
dimensional object. The market clearing condition (4.5) can be written as
K˜ =
∑
i θ
i
k · Ωi∑
i θ
i
h · Ωi
px = (1 + g) ·
∑
i
θix · Ωi (4.21)
pl = ν
1− β
β
· (1 + g)
where the last line uses the consumption policy for housing services (4.16). Now, define
a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium in the usual manner:
Stationary recursive competitive equilibrium. For given government policy τ¯ ,
a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a vector of prices (px, pl, pm(`), r˜k, r˜h),
household value functions V, Vd, household policy functions c1, c2, w
′, θ, d, cd1, cd2, w′d, θd,
8Note that total cash at hand W˜ and aggregate wealth W are related by W ′ = β1+ν(1−β) · W˜ .
Hence, on BGP total cash at hand and aggregate wealth grow at the same rate, g.
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and a stationary distribution of households Ω, such that
1. Utility maximization: the policy functions satisfy the household’s problem (4.12)
and (4.13), respectively;
2. Profit maximization: the aggregate capital-to-labor ratio K˜ satisfies the necessary
and sufficient conditions for profit maximization (4.4);
3. Financial Intermediation: mortgage contracts are priced according to (4.3)
4. Market-clearing: condition (4.21) holds;
5. Policy: the government budget constraint (4.8) holds;
6. Consistency: the law of motion for aggregate wealth and the wealth distribution
of households Ω are consistent with individual decisions.
The stationary equilibrium is characterized in Appendix 4.A.3 where the stationary
wealth distribution Ω and the equilibrium growth rate are derived. It turns out that
the growth rate is proportional to a weighted average of individual portfolio returns
1 + g =
β(1 + tr)
1 + ν(1− β)
∑
i
E[1 + r(θi, s, j)] · Ωi (4.22)
Last but not least, for calibration purposes it is useful to compute the equilibrium
rent-price ratio
pl
px
= ν
1− β
β
1∑
i θ
i
x · Ωi
(4.23)
which only depends on the housing portfolio shares θx, the wealth distribution, and
model parameters.
Finding a stationary equilibrium means finding the three numbers K˜, px and g
solving (4.22) and (4.21), where the corresponding portfolio choice θ is the solution to
the household decision problem and mortgage rates are determined by the zero profit
condition for the banking sector.
Default policy. In stationary equilibrium, the optimal default policy can be
characterized in more detail. Recall that the current default decision d(θx, θm, s, j) has
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to satisfy condition (4.19) for given next-period optimal portfolio choice θ′max as well as
next-period optimal default policy d′max. In a stationary equilibrium, both the portfolio
choice and the default decision are time invariant, or θ′max = θmax and d
′
max = dmax. In
other words, we are looking for a fix point of condition (4.19).
Suppose now that house price shocks  have continuous support on [min, max], but
human capital shocks η are discrete. Then, the optimal default policy dmax is a cut-off
rule. For every given portfolio state θ and human capital shock ηk with k = 1, ..., K,
there exists a cut-off value c for the house price shock such that if the realization of
the shock is c the household is indifferent between defaulting and repaying his debt.
For better realizations of the house price shock, the household decides to repay; for
worse, he defaults. Since the optimal portfolio choices depend only on the household
type j, there are K default cut-off values for every type. In sum, the optimal default
policy dmax is given by
d(, ηk, j) =
 0 if  ≥ ckj1 otherwise (4.24)
where the cut-off values ckj are determined by the requirement that condition (4.19)
has to hold with equality. That is, continuous house price shocks yield the following
indifference condition
β
1− β
1 + ν
∑
j′
[V˜0(j
′)− V˜0d(j′)]pi(j′|j)
+ β
∑
j′
∑
k′
∫ max
ckj
ln(1 + r(θ′max(j), 
′, η′k, j
′, 0)) dpi()pikpi(j′|j)
+ β
∑
j′
∑
k′
∫ ckj
min
ln(1 + r(θ′max(j), 
′, η′k, j
′, 1)) dpi()pikpi(j′|j)
− β
∑
j′
∑
k′
ln(1 + rd(θ
′
d,max(j), η
′
k, j
′))pikpi(j′|j)]
= ln(1 + r(θ, ckj, ηk, j, 1))− ln(1 + r(θ, ckj, ηk, j, 0)) (4.25)
≈ r(θ, ckj, ηk, j, 1)− r(θ, ckj, ηk, j, 0)
= −[θm 1
pm,−1
+ θx
(1 + cj)px + pl
px,−1
]
= −[m+ ((1 + cj)p˜x + p˜l)x]/w
where the last three lines follow from a first-order Taylor approximation. Applying a
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first-order Taylor approximation, the gain from default is exactly the change in the
portfolio return due to defaulting which is independent of the human capital shock η.
Hence, the optimal default policy cj does no longer depend on the labor shock.
For comparison, it is convenient to call the future utility loss due to exclusion – i.e.
the left hand side of the indifference condition – Υ(θj, cj) and rearrange terms
cj =
−m
p˜xx
−
(
1 +
p˜l
p˜x
)
− w
p˜xx
·Υ(θj, cj) (4.26)
The first term of the default cut-off is the amount of forgiven mortgage debt per dollar
of the housing asset. The second term represents the loss of the house and its rent due
to foreclosure. The third term captures the future utility loss due to default: As default
triggers exclusion from mortgage markets for some time, the defaulter’s portfolio choice
is restricted to human and physical capital. Hence, the defaulter’s portfolio will earn
a lower return which decreases his future consumption. While Υ(θj, cj) is the future
utility loss per unit of wealth, the third term in cj is the future utility loss per dollar of
the housing asset. Note that our default policy nests the cut-off rule of Jeske, Krueger,
and Mitman (2013) if p = 0. That is, if there is no exclusion from mortgage markets,
households will walk away from their mortgage debt as soon as the house is under
water. However, if default is punished by an exclusion from mortgage markets in the
future, the cut-off level will be lower. This means that households are willing to suffer
some losses today in order to maintain the opportunity to borrow in the future.
The following proposition characterizes the stationary recursive competitive
equilibrium of the model economy:
Proposition 2. The value functions (4.14), consumption policies (4.15) and (4.16),
savings policy (4.17), portfolio choices (4.18), default policy (4.24) with default cut-off
values ckj determined by indifference condition (4.25) for θ
′
max = θmax and d
′
max =
dmax, an aggregate growth rate (4.22), a stationary wealth distribution Ω determined
as fix point of (4.47), as well as prices given by (4.3), (4.4), and (4.21) comprise the
stationary recursive competitive equilibrium of the model economy.
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4.3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we study the quantitative effects of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 on
the U.S. economy. In addition, we consider a hypothetical tax reform that repeals the
preferential tax treatment of housing capital gains. To this end, we solve the model
economy numerically for a partial equilibrium in the housing market and simulate these
two reforms. First, we lay out our calibration strategy. Then, we describe the tax reform
experiments in more detail and discuss our findings.
4.3.1 Calibration
The model economy’s balanced growth path is calibrated to match various stylized facts
of the U.S. economy before the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 came into effect, that is,
the pre-TRA97 period. In the following, we lay out our calibration strategy. We begin
with parameters that are directly related to our targets and can be set immediately.
Then, the remaining parameters are calibrated jointly by matching a set of targets. All
parameters are listed in Table 4.1.
Demographics. Let’s begin with the demographic structure of the model
population. We calibrate the ageing process to the following age groups: young (18-40
years), middle-aged (40-60 years), and old (60-85 years). Besides, the share of middle-
aged households with high human capital return (type m1) pi(m1|m) is set to match
an average loan-to-value ratio of 50% for the middle-aged group, as in U.S. data.9
Next, the probabilities of being a first-time buyer by, bm are set to match the home-
ownership rates of young (37.9% for households younger than age 35) and middle-aged
households (75.4% for age 45-54) in the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (Kennickell,
Starr-McCluer, and Sunden, 1997). Finally, the probability of leaving default 1 − p is
calibrated to match an average duration of exclusion from mortgage markets of 10
years. This completes the calibration of exogenous type transition probabilities.
Taxation. Next, consider the tax system. The tax rate on capital gains from the
sale of a home τ¯ is set to 25%. This matches the average marginal capital gains tax
9The 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Sunden, 1997) reports
median values of asset holdings for families by age of head. We compute a loan-to-value ratios based
on residential property of 50% for age groups both 45-54 and 55-64.
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before TRA97 (Barro and Redlick, 2011). Furthermore, the probability of home sale ς is
calibrated to match an mobility rate of 5%, as reported in the literature (Cunningham
and Engelhardt, 2008; Shan, 2011). This implies an holding period of 20 years. Given
that a capital gain from housing is only taxable if the house is downsized, the probability
of a taxable home sale is 2.5% under this calibration.
Banks. Now we turn to the banking sector. There are two banking parameters to be
calibrated: the cost of financial intermediation and the recovery rate at foreclosure. We
follow Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013) to calibrate the recovery rate at foreclosure
γ to match an average loss in foreclosure 1−γ of 22%. Estimates for the cost of financial
intermediation ∆ vary considerably, ranging from 0.11% to 2.18% (Mehra, Piguillem,
and Prescott, 2011; Mitman, 2012; Philippon, 2012). We choose an intermediate value
of 1%.
Risk. Finally, the labor shock and the house price shock are to be calibrated. We
choose the labor shock η to be normally distributed with zero mean and a standard
deviation of 15% (see Krebs, 2003, and references therein). In our quantitative
analysis, however, we consider a four-state approximation of the labor shock that is
based on Gauss-Hermite quadrature. The individual house price shock  is uniformly
distributed with zero mean and a standard deviation of 20%.10
Having selected the parameters that are directly related to our targets, we now turn
to the parameters which are calibrated jointly by solving the model and matching a
set of model statistics with their data equivalents.
Preferences. First, consider the preference parameters. As usual, we calibrate the
discount factor β to match the growth rate of the U.S. economy which is about 2% p.a.
(Krebs, 2003). Next, we choose the utility weight of housing services consumption ν so
that the model generates a rent-to-price ratio of 4.9% as calculated by Davis, Lehnert,
and Martin (2008) for the aggregate stock of U.S. owner-occupied housing in 1997.
Finally, the disutility of being in default ud can be used to calibrate the equilibrium
foreclosure rate pid as the indifference condition determining the default cutoff-level
10There are several estimates of the cross-sectional house price volatility in the literature (e.g.
Campbell and Cocco, 2014; Corbae and Quintin, 2013; Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz, 2008; Zhou and
Haurin, 2010), ranging from 15% to 22%.
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(4.25) suggests.11 We follow Corbae and Quintin (2013) and target an aggregate annual
foreclosure rate of 0.72%, computed as the population-weighted average of the default
rates of all types holding mortgages. Our calibration implies a default rate of 1.75%
for young households which is close to the U.S. foreclosure rate on subprime residential
mortgages reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (2011) for 1998.
Investment returns. Now, we turn to the calibration of the rental rates on
physical and human capital. We aim at matching the portfolio choices by age-group, in
particular the implied loan-to-value ratios. Our calibration strategy is as follows: first,
consider households with high housing return, i.e. potential home-owners. For young
households we target a loan-to-value ratio of 80% as computed from the 1995 Survey
of Consumer Finances (Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Sunden, 1997) for households
younger than age 35. In addition, we target a housing portfolio share of 22.5% which
implies housing wealth of $450’000 given total wealth of $2’000’000. In sum, the
portfolio target for young households is θy = (θyh, θ
y
m, θ
y
x, θ
y
k) = (0.955,−0.18, 0.225, 0).
To this end, we select the rental rates of human capital for young ryh and physical
capital rk which determines the mortgage rate appropriately.
The rental rate of human capital for middle-aged households with high human
capital return rm1h is assumed to be the same as for young agents, while the
corresponding rental rate for middle-aged with low human capital return rm2h is set
to match a human capital portfolio share of 75% (θm2h = 0.75).
As we interpret old households as retired, their rental rate of human capital is set
such that they do not invest in human capital, and, hence do not earn wage income.
Besides, we assume old households are renters rather than home-owners. Consequently,
they invest only in physical capital.12
Technology. Finally, we calibrate the depreciation rates as follows: we assume that
the depreciation rates on physical and human capital are equal δk = δh = δ. Then, we
set δ such that the model economy matches the aggregate mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio
11In the quantitative analysis, we assume that the household suffers also in the period he actually
defaults and, hence, enjoys just a fraction of the current utility gain due to default. We capture this
idea by introducing the factor Γ to the right hand side of (4.25). We set Γ = 0.25.
12This assumption is necessary to get a plausible physical-capital-to-GDP ratio. Otherwise there
would not be enough physical capital in the economy. The reason is that in our calibrated model
economy home-owners do not hold physical capital and renters mainly invest into human capital.
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of 44% in 1997.13
4.3.2 Findings
The main quantitative experiment is to study the consequences of Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997 for the U.S. housing market. In addition, we simulate the effects of an
hypothetical reform that would repeal the tax-breaks for owner-occupied housing and
treat all capital gains in the same way.
The U.S. Tax Reform of 1997
In this section, we analyze the reform of housing-capital-gains taxation issued by the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Before the 1997 reform capital gains from the sale of a
primary residence were taxed as long as the taxpayer did not replace his residence by
a more expensive one, rolling the capital gain over. Given a 20-years holding period of
the home, the average taxable gain under our calibration amounts to ca. 50% which
is taxed at the average marginal tax rate on capital gains of 25%. This implies an
expected annual tax payment of 0.3% of individual housing wealth. Nowadays, capital
gains from the sale of owner-occupied housing are de facto tax-exempt due to the
TRA97.
The experiment. We mimic this reform by setting the tax rate for capital gains
from housing τ¯ to zero. According to our calibration, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
means, on average, a tax relief of 0.3% of individual housing wealth per year. We
simulate this reform by computing the balanced growth path equilibrium of the post-
reform model economy (τ¯ = 0). This way, the computational experiment allows us to
isolate the effects of the TRA97 from other factors that simultaneously impacted the
U.S. economy during the post-TRA97 period. Comparing this simulated post-reform
economy to the actual performance of the U.S. economy sheds light on the role the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 has played for the recent housing boom. In particular, this
comparison allows us to quantify the fraction of the observed increase in U.S. house
prices that can – according to the model – be attributed to the TRA97.
13We compute the aggregate mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio from NIPA and FOF data by dividing
home mortgage debt of the household sector by GDP.
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Table 4.2: TRA97 reform: portfolios by household type
pre-TRA97 post-TRA97, endo. default
young middle1 middle2 old young middle1 middle2 old
Human Capital 95.5 92.4 75.0 0.0 95.2 92.3 75.5 0.0
Mortgage -18.0 -21.4 -5.4 0.0 -20.3 22.7 -6.6 0.0
Housing 22.5 29.0 30.4 0.0 25.1 30.4 31.1 0.0
Phys. Capital 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
LTV Ratio 80.0 73.9 17.9 0.0 81.0 74.7 21.1 0.0
Default Rate 1.75 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.41 0.13 0.00 0.00
in per cent.
This table reports the portfolios of high-housing-return types, not in default. The corresponding
portfolios for households in default consist of 100% human capital.
Effects on household behavior. Before discussing aggregate effects of the
Taxpayer Relief Act, we inspect how individual households react to the tax-cut. We
focus on household portfolios and their default decisions. Table 4.2 displays the results.
As already mentioned, the TRA97 tax-cut implies an increase in the after-tax housing
return by 31 basis points, holding all else equal. Consequently, investors adjust their
portfolios. They take on additional mortgage debt in order to increase their housing
portfolio share. Besides, young and middle-aged households with high human capital
return (type m1) slightly shift resources from human capital into housing. As a result,
their loan-to-value ratio increases. Middle-aged investors with low human capital return
(type m2), in contrast, increase both their housing and their human capital share.
This suggests that the TRA97 reform has two counteracting effects: firstly, by
increasing the after-tax return the tax-cut leads to a portfolio shift towards housing.
Secondly, by abolishing the dependency of the housing tax on the human capital state
the TRA97 reform induces more risk-taking. The reason is that before 1997 the roll-
over rule implied that capital gains from housing were only taxed when the house
was downsized. Downsizing, in turn, happens when negative human capital shocks
hit the household. In this view, the pre-reform tax code had the opposite effects of
an insurance. When abolishing this tax schedule, the middle-aged investor of type 2
reduces, consequently, his position in risk-free assets by increasing mortgage debt and
shifts funds into human capital and housing which are risky. Young and middle-aged
investors of type 1, however, do not have the opportunity to sell risk-free assets as
neither they hold physical capital nor mortgage debt is save for them, given their
positive default rate.
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Table 4.3: TRA97 reform: key statistics for the U.S. and model economies
U.S. Economy Model: TRA97 reform
exo. default endo. default
Statistic 1997 ∆20071997 pre post ∆ post ∆
Housing Tax Rate 25.0%a -100% 25.0%T 0.0% -100.0% 0.0% -100.0%
House Price 100 +55% 0.1052 0.1113 +5.8% 0.1119 +6.4%
Rent-to-Price Ratio 4.9%b -27% 4.9%T 4.63% -5.5% 4.60% -6.1%
Mortgage Debt/GDP 44.0% +67% 44.0%T 49.4% +12.3% -49.0% +11.3%
Housing Wealth/GDP 78.8% +32% 79.1% 83.5% +5.6% 84.1% +6.3%
Loan-to-Value Ratio 55.8% +26% 55.7% 59.2% +6.4% 58.2% +4.6%
Physical Capital/GDP 2.12 2.11 -0.3% 2.11 -0.3%
Growth Rate 2.00%T 1.98% -1.0% 1.98% -1.1%
Default Rate 0.72%c 0.72%T 0.72% 0.0% 0.55% -23.8%
a Barro and Redlick (2011)
b Davis, Lehnert, and Martin (2008)
c Corbae and Quintin (2013)
T Target
In fact, young and middle-aged investors of type 1 would have adjusted their
portfolio in the same direction, if default rates had remained unchanged. However,
default rates decreased by 34 and 15 basis points for young and middle-aged investors
of type 1, respectively. Lower default rates, in turn, reduce the risk premium competitive
banks charge to cover their losses in foreclosure and, hence, mortgage rates. This means
that households are willing to accept higher losses on their houses for a reduction in
their mortgage rate. In contrast, if default rates had remained unchanged, mortgage
rates would have increased due to the collateral channel. That is, higher loan-to-value
ratios imply less collateral per unit of mortgage and, hence, higher losses in foreclosure.
A decline in default rates, however, reduces mortgage rates and makes leverage less
desirable. This way, endogenous mortgage default dampens the effects of the TRA97
reform on individual portfolios. Besides, for higher levered portfolios, the exclusion
from mortgage markets ensuing default is more costly.
Aggregate effects. Now we turn to our evaluation of Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.
We analyze the effects of the tax reform on the U.S. macroeconomy and, in particular,
the U.S. housing market. Table 4.3 reports the main results: we find that house prices
increase by 6.4% due the TRA97 in our model, while the rent-to-price ratio declines
by 30 basis points, or 6.1%. As a consequence, in equilibrium the expected after-tax
housing return hardly changes. Furthermore, the mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio increases
by 11.3% and the aggregate loan-to-value ratio by 4.6%. Compared to the actual U.S.
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data for the period 1997 to 2007, our computational experiment accounts for more
than one ninth of the observed increase in U.S. house prices of 55%. At the same time,
almost a quarter of the observed decline in the aggregate rent-to-price ratio as well
as a bit more than one sixth of the rise in both the aggregate loan-to-value ratio and
mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio can be attributed to the TRA97 reform. In a nutshell, our
quantitative analysis suggests that Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 made some important
contributions to developments in the U.S. housing market during subsequent decade
that culminated in a boom-bust-cycle.
Discussion. Microeconometric evaluations of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 find
that residential mobility rates increased by 19% to 31% among affected homeowners
(Cunningham and Engelhardt, 2008; Shan, 2011). They argue that homeowners who
wanted to buy a less expensive house felt ”locked-in” before 1997 and the TRA97
enabled them to sell their homes without paying capital-gains taxes. Biehl and Hoyt
(2014) provide evidence supporting this view: after 1997, home sellers were 6.6% less
likely to move for a larger home and 6.2% more likely to move for a house that is cheaper
to maintain. Finally, a recent study by Heuson and Painter (2014) does not only confirm
the previous findings for affected homeowners. Rather, they find that housing turnover
increased for all age groups and independently of whether homeowners traded up or
down. Their time-series of aggregate housing turnover shows an increasing trend since
the passage of the TRA97. By 2005, the peak, the turnover rate increased by almost
two thirds, compared to 1997.
Clearly, our stylized way of modeling home sales abstracts from such considerations.
Rather, by calibrating the sales probability to pre-TRA97 residential mobility rates we
neglect locked-in households. Therefore, the current experiment may understate the
share of households benefitting from the Taxpayer Relief Act.
Repeal of Housing Tax-breaks
In addition to the TRA97 reform, we study the effects of an hypothetical reform that
would repeal the tax-breaks for capital gains from owner-occupied housing. Rather,
these capital gains would be treated in exactly the same way as other capital gains.
This counterfactual experiment serves as a natural benchmark case.
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Table 4.4: Repeal of housing tax-breaks: key statistics for the U.S. and model
economies
U.S. Economy Model: repeal of housing tax-breaks
exo. default endo. default
Statistic 1997 ∆20071997 pre post ∆ post ∆
Housing Tax Rate 25.0%a -100% 25.0%T 25.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0%
House Price 100 +55% 0.1052 0.1006 -4.3% 0.1008 -4.1%
Rent-to-Price Ratio 4.9%b -27% 4.9%T 5.12% +4.5% 5.11% 4.3%
Mortgage Debt/GDP 44.0% +67% 44.0%T 41.7% -5.1% -41.5% -5.8%
Housing Wealth/GDP 78.8% +32% 79.1% 75.6% -4.4% 75.8% -4.1%
Loan-to-Value Ratio 55.8% +26% 55.7% 55.2% -0.8% 54.7% -1.7%
Physical Capital/GDP 2.12 2.12 0.0% 2.12 0.0%
Growth Rate 2.00%T 1.99% -0.7% 1.99% -0.7%
Default Rate 0.72%c 0.72%T 0.72% 0.0% 0.66% -8.9%
a Barro and Redlick (2011)
b Davis, Lehnert, and Martin (2008)
c Corbae and Quintin (2013)
T Target
We implement this hypothetical reform by assuming that the tax function (4.6) is
applied independently of the human capital shock, i.e. for every realization of η. While
the tax rate τ¯ remains at 25% as in the pre-TRA97 economy, now every home sale
would be taxable, even when the home is replaced by a more expensive one. Hence, the
probability of a taxable home sale is now 5%, compared to 2.5% during the pre-reform
period. This implies that the expected annual tax payment doubles to approximately
0.6% of individual housing wealth. Nevertheless, this hypothetical reform abolishes the
anti-insurance character of the pre-1997 tax code, as the TRA97 did. However, by
increasing the capital gains tax on housing, this reform would not nourish a housing
boom. Rather, it could have mitigated the recent developments in the housing market.
Aggregate effects. On the aggregate level, such a repeal of the housing tax-
breaks makes housing investments less attractive. Indeed, the proposed reform would
reduce the expected after-tax return on housing by approximately 30 basis points,
all else equal. As a result households reduce their housing portfolio shares, pay back
some mortgage debt, and de-lever. Since housing demand goes down, the equilibrium
house price falls by 4.1% so that the rent-to-price ratio increases by 21 basis points.
Hence, in equilibrium the expected after-tax housing return declines by only ca.
0.1%. Furthermore, aggregate housing wealth, relative to GDP, declines by 4.1%. The
mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio shrinks even stronger – to be precise: by 5.8% – so that
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the aggregate loan-to-value ratio declines by 1.7%. Default rates decline, too.
In sum, the computational experiment shows that a repeal of the housing tax-breaks
has stabilizing effects on the economy by bringing down mortgage debt and leverage.
In particular, the repeal of tax-breaks would have counteracted the house price boom
during the 2000s. Altogether, implementing instead of the TRA97 a tax reform that
treats capital gains on home sales as ordinary capital gains would have dampened the
observed rise in house prices by about 20 percent.
4.A Model Appendix
4.A.1 Demographic Structure
The population consists of three age groups {y,m, o} and two housing-return groups
{L,H}. Furthermore, for middle-aged households there are two human-capital-return
groups {1, 2}. Combining the these groups with the solvency state, i.e. in default (d) /
not in default (n), gives 12 types:14
• young, not in default, high housing return: ynH
• young, in default, high housing return: ydH
• young, not in default low housing return: ynL
• middle-aged 1, not in default, high housing return: m1dH
• middle-aged 1, in default, high housing return: m1dH
• middle-aged 1, not in default low housing return: m1nL
• middle-aged 2, not in default, high housing return: m2nH
• middle-aged 2, in default, high housing return: m2dH
• middle-aged 2, not in default low housing return: m2nL
• old, not in default, high housing return: onH
• old, in default, high housing return: odH
• old, not in default, low housing return: onL
Let ΠJ denote the age transition matrix with typical transition probability pia,b = pi(j
′ =
b|j = a), a, b ∈ {y,m1,m2, o}. Note that the transition from old to young is understood
14Note that according to this type classification the groups ynH and m1nH consist of both agents
that decide to pay off their mortgage debt and those that decide to default.
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as death of old agents and birth of young agents. Given these age transitions, the
exogenous probability of being a first-time home buyer bj, the endogenous default
probabilities pidj , and the exogenous probability of re-entering mortgage markets after
default (1 − p), type transitions are determined. The resulting type transition matrix
is
ΠT =

ΠTyy Π
T
m1y Π
T
m2y 0
0 ΠTm1m1 0 Π
T
om1
0 0 ΠTm2m2 Π
T
om2
ΠTnb 0 0 Π
T
oo
 (4.27)
with
ΠTyy =

(1− pidy)pi(y|y) pidypi(y|y) 0
(1− p)pi(y|y) ppi(y|y) 0
bypi(y|y) 0 (1− by)pi(y|y)
 (4.28)
ΠTm1y =

(1− pidy)pi(m1|y) pidypi(m1|y) 0
(1− p)pi(m1|y) ppi(m1|y) 0
bypi(m1|y) 0 (1− by)pi(m1|y)
 (4.29)
ΠTm2y =

(1− pidy)pi(m2|y) pidypi(m2|y) 0
(1− p)pi(m2|y) ppi(m2|y) 0
bypi(m2|y) 0 (1− by)pi(m2|y)
 (4.30)
ΠTm1m1 =

(1− pidm1)pi(m1|m1) pidm1pi(m1|m1) 0
(1− p)pi(m1|m1) ppi(m1|m1) 0
bmpi(m1|m1) 0 (1− bm)pi(m1|m1)
 (4.31)
ΠTom1 =

(1− pidm1)pi(o|m1) pidm1pi(m1|m1) 0
(1− p)pi(o|m1) ppi(o|m1) 0
bmpi(o|m1) 0 (1− bm)pi(o|m1)
 (4.32)
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ΠTm2m2 =

pi(m2|m2) 0 0
(1− p)pi(m2|m2) ppi(m2|m2) 0
bmpi(m2|m2) 0 (1− bm)pi(m2|m2)
 (4.33)
ΠTom2 =

pi(o|m2) 0 0
(1− p)pi(o|m2) ppi(o|m2) 0
bmpi(o|m2) 0 (1− bm)pi(o|m2)
 (4.34)
ΠToo =

pi(o|o) 0 0
(1− p)pi(o|o) ppi(o|o) 0
bopi(o|o) 0 (1− bo)pi(o|o)
 (4.35)
ΠTnb =

bnbpi(y|o) 0 (1− bnb)pi(y|o)
bnbpi(y|o) 0 (1− bnb)pi(y|o)
bnbpi(y|o) 0 (1− bnb)pi(y|o)
 (4.36)
where bnb is the probability that a newborn is of the high-housing-return type.
However, in the following we assume that newborns do not inherit houses, i.e. bnb = 0.
In addition, old agents cannot be first-time buyers, i.e. bo = 0.
Obviously, the demographic structure of the population evolves according to the
law of motion
piTt+1 = Π
T · piTt (4.37)
where piT denotes the vector of population shares pi(j). The stationary type distribution
is the fix point to this law of motion (4.37).
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4.A.2 Solution to the Bellman equation
We solve the Bellman equations of the households decision problem (4.12) by the guess-
and-verify method. Our guess is
V (w, θ, s, j,W ) = V˜0(j) + V˜1 ln (1 + r(θ, s, j, d(s, j))) + V˜2 lnw + V˜3 lnW
Vd(w, θd, s, j,W ) = V˜0d(j) + V˜1d ln (1 + rd(θd, s, j)) + V˜2d lnw + V˜3d lnW
c1 = c˜ (1 + r(θ, s, j, d(s, j))) (1 + tr)w
cd1 = c˜d (1 + rd(θd, s, j)) (1 + tr)w (4.38)
Substituting this guess into the Bellman equation yields
V˜0(j) + V˜1 ln (1 + r(θ, s, j, d(s, j))) + V˜2 lnw + V˜3 lnW =
max
{
ν ln (ν/pl) + ν lnW + max
c˜
[
(1 + ν) ln c˜+ βV˜2 ln(1− (1 + ν)c˜)
]
+β
∑
j′
V˜0(j
′)pi(j′|j) + βV˜1 max
θ′
∑
j′
∑
s′
ln (1 + r(θ′, s′, j′, d(s′, j′)))pi(s′)pi(j′|j)
+ (1 + ν + βV˜2) ln (1 + r(θ, s, j, 0)) + (1 + ν + βV˜2) lnw + (1 + ν + βV˜2) ln(1 + tr)
+βV˜3 ln ((1 + g)W )
}
;{
ν ln (ν/pl) + ν lnW + max
c˜
[
(1 + ν) ln c˜+ βV˜2d ln(1− (1 + ν)c˜)
]
+β
∑
j′
V˜0d(j
′)pi(j′|j) + βV˜1d max
θ′d
∑
j′
∑
s′
ln (1 + rd(θ
′
d, s
′, j′))pi(s′)pi(j′|j)
+(1 + ν + βV˜2d) ln (1 + r(θ, s, j, 1)) + (1 + ν + βV˜2d) lnw + (1 + ν + βV˜2d) ln(1 + tr)
+V˜3d ln ((1 + g)W )
}}
and
V˜0d(j) + V˜1d ln (1 + rd(θ, s, j)) + V˜2d lnw + V˜3d lnW =
ν ln (ν/pl) + ν lnW − ud + max
c˜d
[
(1 + ν) ln c˜d + β
(
pV˜2d + (1− p)V˜2
)
ln(1− (1 + ν)c˜d)
]
+ βp
∑
j′
V˜0d(j
′)pi(j′|j) + β(1− p)
∑
j′
V˜0(j
′)pi(j′|j)
+ β
(
pV˜1d + (1− p)V˜1
)
max
θ′d
∑
j′
∑
s′
ln (1 + rd(θ
′
d, s
′, j′))pi(s′)pi(j′|j)
+
[
1 + ν + β
(
pV˜2d + (1− p)V˜2
)]
ln (1 + rd(θ, s, j))
+
[
1 + ν + β
(
pV˜2d + (1− p)V˜2
)]
lnw +
[
1 + ν + β
(
pV˜2d + (1− p)V˜2
)]
ln(1 + tr)
+ β
(
pV˜3d + (1− p)V˜3
)
ln ((1 + g)W )
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The guess works for
V˜1 = V˜2 = V˜1d = V˜2d =
1 + ν
1− β
V˜3 = V˜3d =
ν
1− β
c˜ = c˜d =
1− β
1 + ν(1− β)
and V˜0d and V˜0 given by
V˜0(j) = A+ β ·max
∑
j′
V˜0(j
′)pi(j′|j) +B(j) ;
∑
j′
V˜0d(j
′)pi(j′|j) +Bd(j)
 (4.39)
V˜0d(j) = A− ud + β
p∑
j′
V˜0d(j
′)pi(j′|j) + (1− p)
∑
j′
V˜0(j
′)pi(j′|j) + Bd(j)
(1− βp)
 (4.40)
where
A = ν ln (ν/pl) + β ln(1 + g) + (1 + ν) ln(1− β)
+
1 + ν
1− β [β lnβ − ln(1 + ν(1− β)) + ln(1 + tr)]
B(j) =
1 + ν
1− β
∑
j′
∑
s′
ln (1 + r(θ′max(j), s
′, j′, d(s′, j′)))pi(s′)pi(j′|j) (4.41)
Bd(j) =
1 + ν
1− β
∑
j′
∑
s′
ln
(
1 + rd(θ
′
max,d(j), s
′, j′)
)
pi(s′)pi(j′|j)
and θ′max and θ
′
d,max denote the optimal portfolio choices for next period and d the
optimal default decision rule.
Note that B(j) ≥ Bd(j) as r(θ′max(j), s′, j′, d(s′, j′) ≥ rd(θ′max,d(j), s′, j′) and
suppose V˜0(j) ≥ V˜0d(j) for all j. Then V˜0(j) = A + β · B(j). Denote V˜0 =
[V˜0(y) V˜0(m) V˜0(o)]
′, V˜0d = [V˜0d(y) V˜0d(m) V˜0d(o)]′, B = [B(y) B(m) B(o)]′, Bd =
[Bd(y) Bd(m) Bd(o)]
′, and Π the age-type transition matrix. Then equations (4.39)
and (4.40) can be written in matrix notation as:
V˜0 = (I − βΠ)−1[A+ B] (4.42)
V˜0d = (I − βpΠ)−1[A− ud + Bd + β(1− p)V˜0] (4.43)
In other words, one has to solve a linear equation system to compute the constant
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terms of the value function V˜0(j), V˜0d(j).
Default decision. Having substituted our solutions for the value function and the
policy function into the Bellman equation that describes the decision problem of a
household that is not in default (4.12), we can now solve the maximum operator for
the default decision. Recall that the default policy function d = d(θx, θm, s, j) maps the
current state into a default decision {0, 1} where 1 denotes default. Simplifying terms
we get
1 + ν
1− β ln(1 + r(θ, s, j, 0)) + β
∑
j′
V˜0(j
′)pi(j′|j)
+
β(1 + ν)
1− β
∑
j′
∑
s′
ln(1 + r(θmax(j), s
′, j′, dmax(s′, j′)))pi(s′)pi(j′|j)
≥ 1 + ν
1− β ln(1 + r(θ, s, j, 1)) + β
∑
j′
V˜0d(j
′)pi(j′|j) (4.44)
+
β(1 + ν)
1− β
∑
j′
∑
s′
ln(1 + rd(θd,max(j), s
′, j′))pi(s′)pi(j′|j)
which has to hold for all states (θx, θm, s, j) with d(θx, θm, s, j) = 0. And the reverse is
true for all states (θx, θm, s, j) with d(θx, θm, s, j) = 1. Rearranging terms, we get an
easy-to-interpret condition that is stated in the main text, equation (4.19).
4.A.3 Characterization of the Stationary Equilibrium
The growth rate of the economy is determined as a weighted average of individual
portfolio returns by the aggregation of individual wealth. First, recall that on BGP
aggregate cash at hand W˜ and aggregate wealth W grow at the same rate g because
of W ′ = β
1+ν(1−β) · W˜ . Next, note that the law of motion for individual wealth (4.17),
expressed in terms of cash at hand, reads as
w˜′ =
β
1 + ν(1− β) · (1 + tr
′) · (1 + r(θ′, d′)) · w˜ (4.45)
Finally, aggregation yields the growth rate
1 + g =
β(1 + tr)
1 + ν(1− β)
∑
i
E[1 + r(θi, s, j)] · Ωi (4.46)
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Next, turn to the law of motion for the wealth distribution. The individual wealth
share of type z, Ωz, evolves according to
Ωz ′ =
E[w˜′|j′ = z]pi(z)∑
iE[w˜
′|j′ = i]pi(i)
=
∑
iE[(1 + tr
′) · (1 + r(θi′, d′)) · w˜|j = i] · pi(z|i) · pi(i)∑
m
∑
iE[(1 + tr
′) · (1 + r(θi′, d′)) · w˜|j = i] · pi(m|i) · pi(i) (4.47)
=
∑
iE[1 + r(θ
i′, d′)|j′ = z] · E[w˜|j = i] · pi(z|i) · pi(i)∑
m
∑
iE[1 + r(θ
i′, d′)|j′ = m] · E[w˜|j = i] · pi(m|i) · pi(i)
=
∑
iE[1 + r(θ
i′, d′)|j′ = z] · Ωi · pi(z|i)∑
m
∑
iE[1 + r(θ
i′, d′)|j′ = m] · Ωi · pi(m|i)·
where the second line applies the equilibrium law of motion for individual cash at hand
and the law of iterated expectations, the third line follows from the fact that portfolio
choices are independent of wealth, and the last one simply uses the definition of Ωz.
The stationary wealth distribution Ω is determined as fix point of the law of motion
(4.47).
4.B A brief History of the U.S. Law of Taxation
4.B.1 Personal Income Taxation
The U.S. federal government introduced personal income taxation in 1913. At that
time the basic structure of the current federal income tax system was developed.
Firstly, taxable income – the tax base – is defined, and secondly tax liabilities are
computed by applying a tax schedule to taxable income (Slemrod and Bakija, 1999).
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, for example, defines taxable income as “all income
from whatever source derived” minus allowable deductions minus personal exemptions
and imposes a progressive tax schedule consisting of 24 brackets (for details see Sunley
and Stotsky, 2005). In the following the major reforms since the 1970s are sketched:
• the Revenue Act of 1978 was a first step to simplify the income tax system: It
reduced the number of tax brackets from 26 to 16, thereby lowering personal
income taxes, and increased both the personal exemption and the standard
deduction.
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• the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 gradually cut ordinary tax rates over 3
years and introduced inflation indexation of tax brackets in 1984.
• the Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed federal income taxation substantially: it
broadened the tax base by cutting back preferences and exemptions, reduced the
number of brackets to 5, and lowered ordinary tax rates.
• During the 1990s top marginal personal income tax rates were increased several
times. However, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 reduced capital gains tax rates
and introduced a more favorable exemption for capital gains on home sales (see
below).
• the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 created a new
bottom rate of 10% and phased-in a lowering of the whole income tax schedule.
Figure 4.4 shows the development of the income tax burden, as measured by the source-
of-income weighted average marginal tax rate (see Barro and Redlick, 2011), over time.
The federal income tax time series reflects the Reagan tax cuts, the subsequent increase
under Bush senior and Clinton, as well as Bush junior’s tax relief. Detailed changes in
the U.S. federal ordinary income tax schedule, in particular tax brackets and marginal
rates, can be studied from Center for Federal Tax Policy (2011).
4.B.2 Capital Gains Taxation
U.S. federal income tax code distinguishes two types of realized capital gains depending
on the holding period of the corresponding capital asset: short-term capital gains and
long-term capital gains. While the former are subject to ordinary income taxation,
long-term capital gains have generally been taxed at lower rates during the post-war
period (Break, 1999).15 The holding period required to classify as long-term was 6
month before 1977 and has been increased to 1 year for most of the following years.16
According to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, only 50% of long-term capital
gains where recognized for computing adjusted gross income (Esenwein, 2006; Office of
15The only exception in the post-war period were the years 1987 to 1990 (Break, 1999).
16Esenwein (2006) reports a time-series with holdings period for long-term capital gains treatment.
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Figure 4.4: Average Marginal Income Tax Rate
Source: Barro and Redlick (2011), updated data:
http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/marginal-tax-rates/index.html
the Secretary of the Treasury and Office of Tax Analysis, 1985). Hence, because of this
exclusion, the effective tax rates applied to long-term capital gains were 50% of the
ordinary rates. The 1978 Revenue Act lowered the capital gains tax by increasing the
exclusion rate to 60%. However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the exclusion
of long-term capital gains and thereby increased capital gains rates (Auten, 2005;
Esenwein, 2006). Till 1990 long-term capital gains were treated like ordinary income.
Then the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 established a maximum tax rate on long-
term capital gains of 28% which was reduced to 20% by the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997. Further reductions in the tax schedule were implemented by the Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 lowering the top marginal rate to 15%. Recent
changes in the capital gains tax schedule are reported in Center for Federal Tax Policy
(2010).
Figure 4.5 shows the statutory top marginal capital gains tax together with two
series of weighted average marginal capital gains tax rates. Evidently, the link between
statutory top marginal tax rates and average marginal taxes changed due to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986: while during the 1970s statutory top rates were considerable
higher than the marginal rate of an average taxpayer, the Reagan reforms led to a
140
Long-Term Capital Gains Tax Rates, US 1970-2011   
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
i n
 
p e
r  
c e
n
t
Weighted Average Marginal Tax Rate / Eichner Sinai
Weighted Average Marginal Tax Rate / NBER-Taxsim
Maximum statutory tax rate on long-term capital gains income
Figure 4.5: Federal Capital Gains Tax Rate
Source: NBER Taxsim; Eichner and Sinai (2000); Esenwein (2006)
stronger comovement of top and average marginal rates. In particular, by reducing
the number of tax brackets, the 1986 tax increase significantly affected the average
taxpayer: the weighted average marginal capital gains tax was hiked up by almost 10
percentage points. However, recent tax reliefs more than reversed this hike by cutting
top marginal rates.
4.B.3 Home Mortgage Interest Deduction
U.S. federal income tax has allowed for interest deductions since its creation. While in
the beginning all interest paid within a year were deduced from income, the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 limited interest deductions to “qualified residence interest” (Ventry, 2010).
Interest qualifies for deduction if the corresponding loan is collateralized by a principal
or secondary residence and used to buy, construct, or improve the residence (acquisition
indebtedness). However, the total amount of deducible residence interest is limited to
interests on the first $1 million (married filing) of acquisition indebtedness. In addition,
regardless of the purpose of the mortgage, interests on home equity debt qualify for
deduction as long as home equity indebtedness does not exceed the market value of
the residence minus acquisition indebtedness or $100’000 (married filing).
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4.B.4 Capital Gains on Principal Residences
Under U.S. income tax code there is a special treatment of capital gains on the sale
of a taxpayer’s principal residence. The following special regulations deal with non-
recognition of capital gains and tax exclusions. Capital gains on principal residences
beyond these exclusions are subject to capital gain taxes.
Tax-free rollover of gains on home sales. Section 1034 of the Internal Revenue
Code allowed taxpayers to defer recognition of a gain if the principal residence was
replaced by another one of at least equal value. In this case capital gains were rolled
over into the purchased residence. For eligibility, the replacement residence had to
be bought and occupied within a year after the sale. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975
prolonged the replacement period to 18 month, and the Economic Recovery Act of 1981
increased the period to 2 years. This provision was valid from 1951 to 1997. (Office of
the Secretary of the Treasury and Office of Tax Analysis, 1985; Ventry, 2010)
One-time exclusion of gains from home sales for elderly taxpayers. The
Revenue Act of 1964 introduced a one-time exclusion of capital gains on the sale of
principal residences up to $20’000. Taxpayers over the age of 65 were eligible for this
exclusion if they had owned the house for at least 8 years and had lived in the house
for at least 5 years before the sale. In 1976, the ceiling on the exclusion was increased
to $35’000. The Revenue Act of 1978 shortened the occupation period to 3 out of the
last 5 years. Besides, it reduced the age limit to 55 years and raised the exclusion to
$100’000 (married filing). Finally, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 increased
this allowance to $125’000 (married filing) (Auten, 2005; Newman and Reschovsky,
1987; Office of the Secretary of the Treasury and Office of Tax Analysis, 1985).
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 replaced both
the tax-free rollover and the one-time exclusion by a new exclusion of up to $500’000
(married filing) which can be claimed once every two years. Taxpayers qualify for this
exclusion if they have owned and lived in the residence during 2 of the last 5 years
prior to the sale. This exclusion of gain from sale of principal residence is codified in
Section 121 of the Internal Revenue Code. (Auten, 2005; Office of the Secretary of the
Treasury and Office of Tax Analysis, 1985; Ventry, 2010).
Figure 4.6 displays these exclusions of capital gains together with two time-series of
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Figure 4.6: Exclusion of Capital Gains on the Sale of Principal Residences
Notes: The shaded regions correspond to NBER-recessions.
house prices. As the sales price of a house constitutes an upper bound of the realized
capital gain, we can infer from Figure 4.6 that these gains on the sale of a primary
residence are effectively tax-free for the vast majority of households.17
4.C Mortgage default
A mortgage is considered to be in default when the borrower does not make his
payments on the mortgage. Typically, mortgage documents define that default occurs
if more than 30 days after the due date pass by. Then the lender is allowed to initiate
foreclosure, i.e. the legal process by which the mortgage holder forces a sale of the
property used as collateral. Usually banks begin the foreclosure procedure within the
next two or three months. Moreover, they will also notify a credit agency of the
mortgage default (Elias, 2011; Garriga and Schlagenhauf, 2009; Li and White, 2009).
17Data from FRED, for example, indicate that only 4 to 12 per cent of new houses sold in the U.S.
in the years 2002 to 2012 were sold at prices exceeding $500’000. Shan (2011, p. 187) mentions that
“about 5% of homeowners in the 2007 SCF have more than $500 K housing capital gains. Among
them, the median homeowner also faces a tax liability of around $30,000.”
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4.C.1 Foreclosure
State legislations vary with respect to the details determining foreclosure. By and large,
there are two types of procedures: judicial foreclosures and non-judicial foreclosures. In
case of judicial foreclosure, the whole process is supervised by a court and the lender
has to obtain a court order before auctioning the property. Non-judicial foreclosures or
foreclosures by power of sale, in contrast, do not require judicial supervision. Instead
mortgage lenders proceed according to the specifics set out by state law. In both cases,
the mortgage holder will eventually obtain a legal title to the property and sell it.
However, there is a substantial variation in the duration of the foreclosure procedure
across states (Elias, 2011; Li and White, 2009).
The sales price after expenses is used to repay the mortgage debt. Often the revenues
are insufficient to repay the mortgage completely. Whether the borrower still owes the
difference between the principal and the sales revenue depends again on state law.18 In
some states the mortgage is non-recourse debt which means that the lender cannot sue
the borrower to cover the losses evoked by foreclosure. Hence, the borrowers other assets
are protected. In most states, however, mortgages are recourse debt so that the lender
may obtain a deficiency judgment which obligates the borrower to repay the difference
from his other assets.19 In most judicial foreclosure states a deficiency judgment can
be part of the foreclosure lawsuit while a few judicial foreclosure and all non-judicial
foreclosure states require a separate lawsuit. In the latter states lenders have to incur
substantially higher costs in pursuing a deficiency and, hence, won’t often do so (Elias,
2011; Garriga and Schlagenhauf, 2009; Ghent and Kudlyak, 2011; Mitman, 2012).
If mortgage debt is (legally or de facto) non-recourse, borrowers have an incentive
to default strategically. Strategic default means the borrower can afford to service his
debt but decides to default because the home has turned into a lousy investment with
its current value falling below the mortgage debt. In this case the limitation of liability
to the collateral allows the borrower to walk away from his mortgage debt by sacrificing
his home while keeping his other assets (Elias, 2011; Lerner, 2010).
18Many states limit deficiency to the difference between loan amount and fair market value.
19According to the classification of Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) in 41 U.S. states mortgages are
recourse and in 11 states non-recourse debt.
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4.C.2 Future credit standing
Being a predictor of future credit risk, arrears and foreclosures have a negative impact
on the borrower’s credit score. According to the American Bankers Association the
FICO score deteriorates by 100 to 400 points due to a foreclosure. Foreclosures remain
on a credit report for at least seven years. However, scores typically recover after a
couple of years given the borrower fulfills all his payment obligations (Lerner, 2010).
The following rule of thumb characterizes lending customs before the recent crisis (Elias,
2011): it takes about two years after bankruptcy to rebuild credit scores in order to be
able to buy a car and four to five for a house. Similarly, Lerner (2010) reports that it
takes three to seven years to qualify for a new mortgage. Strategic defaulters, however,
are nowadays penalized more severely: FannieMae and FreddieMac will effectively deny
them a new mortgage for at least seven years after foreclosure due to new regulations
they face (Elias, 2011; Lerner, 2010).
4.C.3 Tax issues
A short sale or foreclosure may incur capital gains tax liability. If the sales price is
higher than the adjusted tax basis of the house, this difference qualifies as a capital
gain which is taxed at the capital gains tax rate (Elias, 2011). For capital gains on
principal residences the usual tax-breaks are available (see Appendix 4.B.4 ).
At the same time an income tax liability may arise. Suppose the house is sold
for less than the actual debt and the borrower’s remaining debt is forgiven. Then,
this deficiency is, in general, subject to income taxation. Since from the tax system’s
perspective the borrower receives a gift from the lender which amounts to the difference
between principal and sales revenue. Hence, this amount counts as taxable income.
However, since 2007 there is an exception to this rule: deficiencies on loans secured by
and used to buy or improve the borrower’s principal residence are exempt form income
taxation. As a response to the current crisis, this Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief
Act was intended to be a temporary exception but has been prolonged twice till end
of 2013 (Elias, 2011; Garriga and Schlagenhauf, 2009).
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4.D Data Sources
4.D.1 Federal Reserve Economic Data
The following time-series stem from the Federal Reserve Economic Data by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
• Inflation rate: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items
• Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All items less shelter
(CUUR0000SA0L2): U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
• Gross Domestic Product: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis
• Home Mortgages (HMLBSHNO): Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Z.1 Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States. Home mortgage debt
is debt on owner-occupied homes, including home equity loans.
• Real estate of Households (incl. mobile homes and farm houses) at market value
(REABSHNO): Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Z.1 Flow of
Funds Accounts of the United States
• Residential Structures of Households at Replacement-Cost Value (RCVSHNWB-
SHNO): Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Z.1 Flow of Funds
Accounts of the United States
• Delinquencies On Single-Family Residential Mortgages (DRSFRMACBN): Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Charge-Off and Delinquency Rates
on Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks
• Delinquency Rate On Loans Secured By Real Estate (DRSREACBN): Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Charge-Off and Delinquency Rates on
Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks
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4.D.2 House Price Indices
• All-Transactions House Price Index for the United States (USSTHPI): Federal
Housing Finance Agency, House Price Index (taken from FRED)
The Federal Housing Finance Agency estimates a quarterly house price indexes
for single-family detached properties using data on conventional conforming
mortgage transactions obtained from Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Based on
sales prices and appraisal data, the index measures average price changes in
repeat sales or refinancings on the same properties.
• Average Sales Price of Houses Sold for the United States (ASPUS): U.S.
Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, Quarterly New One-Family Home
Sales by Price and Financing (taken from FRED)
• Median Sales Price of Houses Sold for the United States (MSPUS): U.S.
Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, Quarterly New One-Family Home
Sales by Price and Financing (taken from FRED)
• S&P Case-Shiller 20-City Home Price Index (SPCS20RSA): Standard and Poor’s
(taken from FRED)
The S&P Case-Shiller 20-City Home Price Index tracks Single-Family housing in
on 20 metro areas. Data are collected on transactions of all residential properties
during the months in question. The composite index is a weighted average of the
different regional indices which calculated as a three-month moving average from
the collected data.
4.D.3 Rent-Price Ratio
Davis, Lehnert, and Martin (2008) compute a quarterly time-series of the ratio of
imputed annual rents of homeowners to the value of owner-occupied housing in the
U.S. To estimate the rent-price ratio, they use micro data from the Decennial Census
of Housing surveys. In between these decennial surveys they interpolate rents and
house prices employing the BLS’s index for the rent of primary residence and Freddie
Mac’s repeat-sales house price index (CMHPI). These quarterly rent-price ratio data
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are regularly updated by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and published at http://
www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/land-values/rent-price-ratio.asp. For the
period starting in 2000, the Lincoln Institute computes an alternative series of the
rent-price ratio when house prices are based on the Case-Shiller-Weiss index.
4.D.4 Taxation
Ordinary income taxation
Barro and Redlick (2011) compile an annual time-series of average marginal income
tax rates (AMTR) in the U.S. Their AMTR measure comprises of federal individual
income taxes, state income taxes as well as the social security payroll tax. Recent data
is mainly derived from the NBER TAXSIM program which depicts the U.S. federal and
state income systems (for details see Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). The AMTR measure
is intended to capture a concept of income that is close to labor income. Hence, Barro
and Redlick (2011) calculate marginal tax rates for wages and related forms of income.
Then, they compute the AMTR as the weighted mean of these marginal rates where
the weight is the amount of income of various types reported on the filing. Daniel
Feenberg of the NBER publishes updated AMTR data at http://users.nber.org/
~taxsim/barro-redlick/
Long-term capital gains taxation
• Maximum statutory marginal tax rates for the U.S. are compiled in Esenwein
(2006). The maximum statutory marginal capital gains tax rate is the marginal
tax rate on the highest income bracket.
• Eichner and Sinai (2000) construct a time-series of the weighted average marginal
capital gains tax rate for the period 1954 to 1997 following the methodology of
the U.S. Congressional Budget Office.
• Average marginal long-term capital gains tax rates are taken from NBER’s
Average Marginal U.S. Income Tax Rates by Income Type table. They are dollar
weighted average marginal tax rates derived from the NBER TAXSIM model (see
http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/marginal-tax-rates/index.html).
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